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Abstract 
The emergence of free and open source software (FOSS) has posed many challenges to the 
mainstream proprietary software production model. This dissertation endeavours to address 
these challenges through tackling the following legal problem: how does FOSS licensing 
articulate a legal language of software freedom in support of large-scale collaboration among 
FOSS programmers who have to face a rather hostile legal environment underlined by a 
dominant ideology of possessive individualism? I approach this problem from three aspects. 
The first aspect examines the unique historical context from which FOSS licensing has 
emerged. It focuses on the most prominent “copyleft” licence—GNU General Public 
Licence—which has been shaped by the tension between the MIT-style hacker custom and 
intellectual property law since the 1980s. The second aspect tackles the legal mechanism of 
FOSS licences, which seems not dissimilar from other non-negotiated standard-form 
contracts. My analysis shows that FOSS licences do not fit well with the neoclassical 
contract model that has dominated software licensing jurisprudence so far. I therefore call for 
replacing the neoclassical approach with Ian Macneil’s Relational Contract Theory, which 
has remained conspicuously absent in the software licensing literature. The third aspect 
explores FOSS programmers’ authorship as manifested in FOSS licensing. It argues that the 
success of a FOSS project does not merely depend on the virtuosity of individual 
programmers in isolation. More importantly, a core team of lead programmers’ efforts are 
essential to channel individual authors’ virtuosity into a coherent work of collective 
authorship, which can deserve credit for the project as a whole. The study of these three 
aspects together aims to create a synergy to show that it is possible to graft a few 
collaborative elements onto the existing legal system—underpinned by a neoliberal ideology 
assuming that human beings are selfish utility-maximising agents—through carefully crafted 
licensing schemes. 
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Chapter 1   Overview: Problematising FOSS Licensing 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The emergence of free and open source software (FOSS) development as a method 
for producing highly robust information products, such as the Linux operating 
system or the Apache web server, has challenged many conventional ideas that 
underpin the business model of proprietary software.1 What is truly remarkable about 
these FOSS projects is their ability to attract a wide-range of voluntary contributors 
across the globe, whose contributions are produced largely without immediate 
monetary incentives.2 Benkler calls this phenomenon networked “peer production”, 
where innovation is decentralised to its maximum and creative individuals follow 
neither price signals under the market mechanism nor managerial commands within a 
hierarchical corporate structure.3 In fact, the “peer production” model goes beyond 
FOSS and it has already inspired many non-programming creative activities to be 
conducted on the mass collaborative level in a similar way.4  
Most significantly, each FOSS project can be seen as generating a software commons, 
in which source code is freely accessed, used, modified and redistributed under 
                                                 
1
 Eric Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, 2000, Version 3.0 at 
<http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/> (hereafter Cathedral) 
2
 For a survey of the motivational forces behind FOSS contribution, see Karim R. Lakhani and Robert 
G. Wolf, “Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding Motivation and Effort in Free/Open 
Source Software Projects”, in Perspective on Free and Open Source Software, eds. by Feller, 
Fitzgerald, Hissam & Lakhani (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005) 
3
 Benkler finds that the production model of FOSS operate largely outside the firm-based or market-
based structure: “Free software projects do not rely either on markets or on managerial hierarchies to 
organize production. Programmers do not generally participate in a project because someone who is 
their boss instructed them, though some do. They do not generally participate in a project because 
someone offers them a price, though some participants do focus on long-term appropriation through 
money-oriented activities, like consulting or service contracts. But the critical mass of participation in 
projects cannot be explained by the direct presence of a command, a price, or even a future monetary 
return particularly in the all-important microlevel decisions regarding selection of projects to which 
participants contribute.” See Yochai Benkler, “Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and ‘The Nature of the 
Firm’” (2002) 112, (3) Yale Law Journal 369, at 372-3 
4
 Wikipedia is a glaring example here. Richard Stallman sees Wikipedia as a natural extension of 
FOSS collaboration into the area of encyclopaedias. See Stallman, “The Free Universal Encyclopedia 
and Learning Resource” at <http://www.gnu.org/encyclopedia/free-encyclopedia.html>; see also Don 
Tapscott, and Anthony D. Williams, Wikinomics (London: Portfolio, 2006); Charles Leadbeater, We-
Think (London: Profile Books, 2008) 
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certain rules specified in a corresponding FOSS licence5. It is important to note that a 
FOSS licence does not make programmers entirely abandon their intellectual 
property rights altogether into the public domain, but it carefully retains some private 
ownership rights for the purpose of preserving and nurturing the software commons.6  
1.1.1 Two Conflicting Traditions: Where Do FOSS Licences Come From? 
One of the most interesting but also puzzling issues that concern this dissertation is a 
paradox as manifested in the software commons created by collaborative FOSS 
projects. There seem to be two conflicting notions that are welded together in these 
commons-oriented regimes: 1) programmers’ “stewardship” responsibility to share 
software with the public, and to develop it collaboratively and 2) their individual 
“private property” rights in the software code that is produced. These two notions 
stem respectively from the two almost diametrically opposed traditions of producing 
and circulating software. In this dissertation, I call the first one the “stewardship” 
tradition, where software is widely shared in the community7, and the second one the 
“private property” tradition, where exclusive property rights in software are held by 
its authors. The two traditions have different pedigrees. The first tradition of software 
stewardship is derived from the computer hacker culture originated in the 1950s and 
1960s in some leading US computer research labs such as the MIT Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) Lab, while the second tradition is institutionalised in intellectual 
property law (especially copyright) that started to cover software as a subject matter 
in the early 1980s.8 
                                                 
5
 A FOSS licence is sometimes seen as the constitution of the corresponding software-sharing 
community. Weber comments that FOSS licences can be read as the statement giving “constitutional 
message” to a community and it should reassure that all programmers “will be treated fairly if they 
join the community.” Steven Weber, The Success of Open Source (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni. 
Press, 2004) Success, p.179 (Hereafter Success)  
6
 FOSS projects are not embodiment of anarchy, but there is organisation and governance. It is argued 
that stewardship is an important mode of governing the software commons enabled by FOSS licences. 
See Chris DiBona, Danese Cooper, and Mark Stone, “Introduction”, in Open Sources 2.0,edited by 
Chris DiBona, Danese Cooper, and Mark Stone (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly, 2006) p. xxxvii 
7
 A few leading FOSS programmers calls for adopting the term “stewardship”, which is believed to be 
a more accurate term in describing FOSS practice in managing software commons. See, for example, 
Chris DiBona, Danese Cooper, and Mark Stone, “Introduction” to Open Sources 2.0,edited by Chris 
DiBona, Danese Cooper, and Mark Stone (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly, 2006) p. xxxvii 
8
 The US Congress amended their 1976 Copyright Act in 1980 and put “software” under the 
protection the same way that “literary works” are protected. The similar thing happened in the UK in 
the early 1980s as well.  
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The hacker’s stewardship tradition follows the so-called “Hacker Ethic”, which was 
first documented in the form of six tenets by Steven Levy in his famous book—
Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution—published in 1984.9 From the 1950s 
to the early 1970s, software was shared among computer hackers and it was 
impossible for anyone to claim exclusive ownership rights in software because 
copyright was not established enough to include software as a subject matter. This 
Hacker Ethic is important because it is said to have a lasting impact on the “shared 
identity and belief system” of today’s FOSS programmers.10 It has also seeded an 
important norm of collaboration for any sustainable FOSS project, where software 
code should be shared as widely as possible and there should be no barrier to 
artificially block the flow of information11. 
However, in the late 1970s, this hackers’ stewardship tradition of information sharing 
began to be eroded by the rise of proprietary software. There were two developments 
that contributed to this erosion. First, software came under trade secrecy protection. 
Many hackers were required to sign non-disclosure agreements when they were lured 
away to write code for proprietary software companies. Secondly, legislation was 
changed to make copyright subsist in software. In 1980, the US Congress extended 
its copyright law to explicitly cover software programs12. Copyright later became a 
main mode of IP that grants programmers’ exclusive ownership in software.13 
The FOSS licences came into existence exactly during this historical context where 
the old Hacker Ethic came into intense conflict with the new trend of owning 
proprietary rights in software. In response to the ascendancy of proprietary software, 
some hackers began to experiment with the idea of crafting copyright licences to 
specify the programmers’ stewardship responsibility of software sharing. The most 
prominent example is the GNU General Public License (GPL), which was designed 
                                                 
9
 Hereafter Levy, Hackers (London: Penguin Books, 1984,1994) 
10
 Steven Weber, Success, supra note 5, p.144  
11
 For example, the second tenet of the Levy’s ethic says that “all information should be free”, which 
later becomes an important, though not entirely uncontroversial, norm in the internet age. 
12
 17 U.S.C. s.101 
13
 Specifically, the US Copyright Act gives copyright owners including software programmers the 
“exclusive right” to do certain activities, and it would be illegal for non-owners to do these activities 
without permission.17 USC s. 106; However, it should not be forgotten that the copyright owners’ 
“exclusive right” have two exceptions in software: First, in order to run the software program, it 
should be allowed to copied to hard disk and computer’s memory; second, users are allowed to make 
back-up copies. 17 U.S.C. s.117 
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and has been perfected by an ex-MIT hacker Richard Stallman since the 1980s.14 The 
GPL is the first and most widely adopted licence among FOSS developers. It 
contains an innovative feature known as a “copyleft” clause that enjoins the 
downstream developers to share their modifications and improvements of the GPL 
covered code.15 Copyleft is especially useful for those community-based projects 
such as the Linux kernel to grow and expand outside the market mechanism and the 
hierarchical corporate structure. It is interesting to note that copyleft licences, 
including the GPL, do not dispense with copyright. The paradox is that their 
imposition of the “share-alike” responsibility in copyleft is dependent upon the broad 
property rights granted by the copyright regime in the first place. In order to make 
sense of this paradox, it should be borne in mind that the GPL (and other FOSS 
licences) is an attempt to reconcile two antagonistic traditions battling to gain 
influence over the way that software is produced and distributed. In other words, 
copyleft is the computer hackers’ legal experiment to graft the old hacker culture 
onto the IP law system through the device of FOSS licensing. Given the hugely 
complex and paradoxical nature of the subject, I need to further narrow the 
dissertation down to three more specific aspects of FOSS licensing and its role in 
FOSS collaboration in the following sub-section. 
1.1.2 Three Aspects of FOSS Licensing: Framing the Questions 
The main thrust of this dissertation is to study collaborative relations through the lens 
of FOSS licensing, which is shaped by the tension between the tradition of 
stewardship and that of private ownership. With this tension firmly in the 
background, I frame the research questions under three interrelated aspects of FOSS 
licensing: 
 Historical Aspect    The first aspect tackles the question as to the origin the 
FOSS stewardship tradition and how it has managed to coordinate large-scale 
                                                 
14
 Stallman wrote the very first copyleft licence known as the Emacs General Public Licence (EGPL) 
in 1985. It was a licence specifically designed for the Emacs programming editor. It was been 
amended a couple times before it finally was turned into the generic GPL 1.0 in 1989. The 1985 
EGPL licence was the solo work of Stallman intended to retain the Emacs culture of software sharing, 
which nonetheless became increasingly vulnerable facing the rise of proprietary software. I will give a 
more detailed account of the birth of copyleft in Chapter 2. 
15
 s. 2(b) GPL v2.0; s. 5(c) GPL v.3.0 
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collaboration among programmers. I will show the historical context where 
computer hackers’ collaborative ethos was first gestated and later concretised 
into software stewardship responsibility as detailed by FOSS licences. I define 
“stewardship” as FOSS programmers’ responsibility to preserve and protect the 
commons where software is freely accessible, modifiable and redistributable. I 
further narrow down stewardship responsibility in this dissertation to the 
software developers’ specific duty to share software pursuant to 1) the Hacker 
Ethic (documented by Steven Levy in 1984) 2) Free Software Definition (by 
Stallman) and 3) Open Source Definition (by Raymond and Perens). I will show, 
through the lens of FOSS licensing, why the “commons” held in stewardship is 
critical to the success of any large-scale “peer produced” collaborative software 
project.  
 Legal Aspect (Intellectual Property and Contract)   The second aspect 
explores the jurisprudence of FOSS licensing schemes which covers both 
(intellectual) property and contract laws. It tries to tackle the question as to how 
FOSS licensing has attempted to graft FOSS stewardship responsibility (to secure 
software freedom) onto the IP system. I find that the existing doctrinal rules from 
IP and contract laws, which assume that economically minded individuals 
compete against each other in zero-sum games, do not satisfactorily explain the 
highly collaborative relation that FOSS licences intend to support. Instead, I will 
employ Ian Macneil’s Relational Contract Theory (RCT)16 to shed some new 
light on the issue. I argue that licences used by any successful FOSS projects are 
actually a kind of relational contract involving a high degree of cooperation over 
a long period of time, rather than a series of one-shot discrete transactions. 
 Authorial Aspect    The third aspect asks: who are the “authors” of FOSS? 
How is programmers’ authorship manifested in FOSS licences? What motivates 
authors to contribute to software commons in a seemingly altruistic manner? I 
will show that the highly collaborative nature of FOSS authorship hardly 
conforms to the Romantic vision of the authors as solitary individual geniuses 
that are assumed by the orthodox IP legal institution. The practice of FOSS 
licensing reflects FOSS programmers’ desire to be credited as authors of their 
                                                 
16
 I.R. Macneil, The New Social Contract—An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980) 
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contributions. Most importantly, FOSS authors are not just individual creators of 
code in isolation. When individually created contributions are pieced together 
into a whole, the coordinating efforts behind the project would give birth to a 
collective authorship that can be held responsible and deserve credit for the 
production of the FOSS project as a whole. This collective authorship is closely 
related to the lead programmers’ stewardship responsibility to forge collaboration 
among individual programmers driven by a multiplicity of motivational forces. It 
is exactly this alignment of authorship with stewardship that has fundamentally 
challenged the author-ownership model that dominates the conventional IP 
jurisprudence. 
The study of these three aspects together will create a synergy to show that FOSS 
programmers’ struggle to rebuild some elements of a collaborative ethos that 
originated from the old hacker ethic but has been eclipsed by the rise of intellectual 
property (especially copyright) regulation of software innovation.  This struggle runs 
against a dominant neo-liberal understanding of modern property and contract 
institutions as mainly furthering the economic interests of atomised individuals in 
isolation. It results in programmers’ minimum stewardship responsibility being 
verbalised into FOSS licensing terms, which becomes the legal infrastructure that 
large-scale collaboration can rely upon. Although the role of FOSS licensing in 
facilitating collaboration is important, my thesis by no means intends to exaggerate 
this role. FOSS licensing alone does not make collaboration happen, but it must be 
combined with other non-legal decisions made by programmers’ one integrated 
project in a radically decentralised environment17. I will start by clarifying a few 
basic key concepts that will help to understand FOSS programmers’ licensing 
schemes in relation to their collaborative efforts.  
1.2 Key Concepts in FOSS Licensing 
This section is written to clarify a few of the most basic concepts that are of great 
importance to this dissertation. I will divide them into four groups, each of which 
deals with two closely related concepts in pair. I will give each concept a concise 
                                                 
17
 One of these non-legal factors is the technical decision made by lead programmers to create a 
modular architecture, where software can be modified by many collaborating programmers. See 
Section 1.3.1 of this chapter for more detail. 
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definition and then explain briefly their importance in the context of FOSS licensing. 
I believe these explanations will facilitate the understanding of the subject when the 
dissertation progresses into a more detailed and technical discussion.  
1.2.1 Source Code and FOSS 
Source code is the technical term used to describe the human-readable code that is 
written by programmers. Not unlike other human language, source code is written in 
the alphanumeric form, which can be understood or possibly altered by other 
programmers. Source code needs to be turned into machine-readable object code 
through a complier program before it can be run by a computer. This process is 
known as “compilation”.18 
The significance of source code is threefold. First, because source code can be 
written and read by human beings, it is not drastically dissimilar from literary text. 
For this reason, most countries make software eligible for copyright protection under 
the category of literary work by analogy19. Second, software can be easily modified 
through changing the source code and thus opens up the possibility for other 
programmers to make adaptations to their own needs or improve the software 
collaboratively. Thirdly, because the source code can be read by human beings, it 
makes software not only a technological artifact but also a communicative process. 
That’s why software can also be seen as a kind of “discourse”. 20 This 
“communicative” or “discursive” feature has a broader social consequence. It leads 
the anthropologist Christopher Kelty to believe that FOSS is a kind of public sphere 
where FOSS programmers argue not only “about” technology but also “through” 
technology (as if the source code is their human language).21 So by hiding the source 
code, software will be effectively deprived of its communicative potential, which 
goes against the original design of this technology.  
                                                 
18
 David Bainbridge, Legal Protection of Computer Software (Heywards Heath, West Sussex: Tottel 
Publishing, 2008, 5th Ed.) p.57 
19
 For example, s.3(1), UK CDPA 1988 
20
 Fitzgerald points out that software is kind of discourse due to its communicative nature: “Software 
in the information society is discourse. It is not simply a literary text (a copyright law categorisation) 
it is fundamental to communicative architecture.” Brian Fitzgerald, “Software as Discourse? The 
Challenge for Information Law” (2000) 22 (2) E.I.P.R. 47 
21
 Kelty, Two Bits—The Cultural Significance of Free Software, (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2008), p.29 (Hereafter Two Bits) 
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FOSS can be defined as the kind of software whose source code is publicly available 
with no restriction on modification and redistribution of it. In contrast, proprietary 
“closed-source” software developers release software only with non-human readable 
object code without disclosing the corresponding source code. Stallman points out:  
Source code is useful (at least potentially) to every user of a program. But most 
users are not allowed to have copies of the source code. Usually the source code 
for a proprietary program is kept secret by the owner, lest anybody else learn 
something from it. Users receive only the files of incomprehensible numbers 
that the computer will execute. This means that only the program’s owner can 
change the program.22 
It is important to know that disclosure of the source code by itself is not enough to 
qualify software as FOSS. We must look at the definitions of “free software” and 
“open source” for more detailed guide in the following sub-section. 
1.2.2 “Free Software” and “Open Source” 
Free software is more than just publicly disclosed source code. The Free Software 
Foundation (founded by Richard Stallman) publishes The Free Software Definition 
(FSD), defining free software as the type of software that gives its users four kinds 
of freedom: 
 The freedom to run the program, for any purpose (freedom 0). 
 The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to your needs 
(freedom 1). Access to the source code is a precondition for this. 
 The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor (freedom 2). 
 The freedom to improve the program, and release your improvements to the 
public, so that the whole community benefits (freedom 3). Access to the 
source code is a precondition for this.23 
                                                 
22
 Richard Stallman, “Why Software Should Be Free”, 1991, at 
<http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/shouldbefree.html> 
23
 Richard Stallman, “The Free Software Definition” at <http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-
sw.html> 
 18
Along the same line, Open Source Initiative (co-founded by Eric Raymond and 
Bruce Perens) publishes the Open Source Definition (OSD) including a long and 
detailed list comprising ten criteria. Perens distils the ten criteria into the three 
principles. It defines open source software as giving software users three kinds of 
rights: 
 The right to make copies of the program, and distribute those copies.  
 The right to have access to the software’s source code, a necessary 
preliminary before you can change it 
 The right to make improvements to the program. 
Except that the wording is slightly different, the FSD and the OSD means almost the 
same thing in terms of the duty that programmers should bear: FOSS programmers 
should give users the “freedoms” (as in the FSD) or the “rights” (as in the OSD) to 
access, copy, modify and redistribute the software. Based on this reason, some 
scholars think that there is no pronounced difference between “free software” and 
“open source” because both labels describe the same type of technological artifact or 
the same type of programming practice.24  
Unfortunately, this view is not held by the people who have respectively authored the 
FSD and the OSD. There has been a long-standing schism between the two camps. 
Stallman on the side of the FSD, believes that free software campaigners and open 
source advocates hold different visions about the future of non-proprietary software. 
According to him, free software is a “social movement” to enlarge users’ software 
freedom, while open source is merely a software “development methodology” that 
claims itself to be superior to proprietary software.25 Raymond, from the camp of 
“open source”, distances himself from Stallman’s deep scepticism about 
commercialisation of non-proprietary software. He criticises free software movement 
for being “very zealous and very anticommercial”.26 For Raymond and his followers, 
“open source” should break into the mainstream software market and its success 
                                                 
24
 For example, Kelty is the champion of this view. See Kelty, Two Bits, p.100 
25
 Stallman, “Why Open Source Misses the Point of Free Software” at 
<http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/open-source-misses-the-point.html> 
26
 Raymond, Section 2 “The Varieties of Hacker Ideology” in Homesteading the Noosphere, 2002, at 
<http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/homesteading/homesteading/> 
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depends upon the pragmatic approach rather than the closed ideology of “software 
freedom”.27 
1.2.3 FOSS Stewardship and the Hacker Ethic 
FOSS stewardship means programmers’ duty or responsibility to preserve and 
protect the commons where software is freely accessible, modifiable and 
redistributable. FOSS stewardship must be pursuant to the software developers’ duty 
listed in Free Software Definition and/or the Open Source Definition. 
The Hacker Ethic is historically the main source of FOSS stewardship duty to share 
software, and it later evolves into the FSD and the OSD. It first developed in the 
computer hacker community such as the MIT AI Lab since the 1950s and the 1960s. 
It originally means the hackers’ duty to share any information concerning computer 
technology and this happens in an era when IP law had not yet been used to cover 
software. In the beginning, the Hacker Ethic was largely a body of unwritten rules, 
and it was “an ethic seldom codified, but embodied instead in the behaviour of 
hackers themselves.”28 In 1984, Steven Levy, in his highly regarded pioneering study 
of the hacker culture, identifies six widely recognised tenets of the Hacker Ethic. The 
first three tenets are the most relevant to the software stewardship obligation in this 
dissertation: 
 Tenet 1: Access to computers—and anything which might teach you 
something about the way the world works—should be unlimited and 
total. Always yield to the Hands-on Imperative! 
 Tenet 2: All information should be free. 
 Tenet 3: Mistrust Authority—Promote Decentralisation. 
                                                 
27
 My position on this issue is that there is both consensus and division between the two camps and it 
would be wrong to see only one side of the story. The consensus and the division happen on two 
different levels. First, on the technical level, the two camps agree on the technical definition of non-
proprietary software (in the FSD and OSD) and there is a consensus that software developers should 
have the same set of stewardship obligations to share software as listed in both the FSD and the OSD. 
Secondly, on the ideological level, free software campaigners and open source advocates disagree on 
the ideology behind their respective causes. Stallman’s “free software” is a belief in the intrinsic value 
of “freedom” as the ultimate driving force of the movement. Raymond’s “open source” does not wish 
to engage with the philosophical discourse of “freedom”, but it adopts a more pragmatic market-
friendly approach. For more detail about difference between the two camps in a historical context, see 
Section 2.4, Chapter 2 of this dissertation for more detail. 
28
 Levy, Hackers, p.7 
 20
The first two tenets calling for “unlimited and total” access to computers (Tenet 1) 
and “all information should be free” (Tenet 2) lays the ethical foundation for the FSD 
and the OSD, while Tenet 3 of “Mistrust Authority—Promote Decentralisation” 
anticipates the decentralised “peer production” model that marks the success of 
FOSS projects. Furthermore, there is also a difference between Levy’s ethic and the 
later FSD and OSD. The unlimited and total access to “computers” in the first tenet 
of the Hacker Ethic covers both hardware and software in its early days, whilst the 
FSD and the OSD is focused only on software, because the latter is intended to be the 
guideline for writing software licences.  
Alternatively, the definition of the Hacker Ethic can also be found in the definitive 
The New Hacker's Dictionary (also known the “Jargon File” edited by Raymond). 
The dictionary defines the Hacker Ethic as the “belief that information-sharing is a 
powerful positive good, and that it is an ethical duty of hackers to share their 
expertise by writing open-source code and facilitating access to information and to 
computing resources wherever possible.”29  (added emphasis) This is a good and 
succinct definition that encapsulated the core meaning of FOSS programmers’ 
stewardship duty which is adopted by this dissertation.  
The old Hacker Ethic was later challenged and eroded by the rise of proprietary 
software in the late 1970s, but it was never fully defeated. A more recent study 
shows that the Hacker Ethic after the 1980s and until the beginning of the twenty-
first century is still alive and well amongst FOSS programmers,30  thanks to the 
advent of FOSS licences in the mid-1980s. These licences are written in the form of 
intellectual property licences to guard programmers’ core stewardship responsibility 
of software sharing against encroachment of proprietary software. This leads me to 
explain exactly what the FOSS licences are. 
                                                 
29
 According to the Jargon File, the Hacker Ethic has also a second meaning: “The belief that system-
cracking for fun and exploration is ethically OK as long as the cracker commits no theft, vandalism, or 
breach of confidentiality.” This is not the ethic that is dealt with in this dissertation. “The Hacker 
Ethic” in Jargon File, compiled by Raymond, at <http://www.catb.org/jargon/html/H/hacker-
ethic.html> 
30
 Himanen’ study demonstrates the robustness of the Hacker Ethic in the information society. See 
Pekka Himanen, The Hacker Ethic and the Spirit of the Information Age, (NY: Random House, 2001) 
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1.2.4 FOSS Licence and “Copyleft” 
A FOSS licence is defined as an “intellectual property” licence that gives software 
users the rights to access, copy, modify and redistribute the source code.31  The 
clauses in a FOSS licence should not impose any restriction that contradicts FOSS 
stewardship responsibility as detailed in the FSD and the OSD32. There are two types 
of FOSS licences. One is called copyleft licences and the other is known as 
permissive (non-copyleft) licence.  
Copyleft Licences 
A copyleft licence contains an anti-privatisation clause that enjoins downstream 
developer-users to share their publicly released modifications or improvements of the 
original software. In other words, any derivative works based on the original 
copylefted code, when publicly distributed, must be released under the same copyleft 
licence. In the mid-1980s Richard Stallman designed the first copyleft licence for his 
GNU Emacs programming editor. Later he turned this Emacs-specific licence into a 
generic template licence—GNU General Public License (GPL)—that can be used by 
any software.33 The GPL is not only important to Stallman’s own GNU software 
project, but it is also crucial to the success of many other FOSS projects. The most 
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 It is important to be aware that the umbrella term “intellectual property” (IP) normally comprises at 
least three main sub-areas: copyright, patent and trademark. Stallman points out that three sub-areas of 
are rather different and the term should be avoided whenever possible: “Copyright law was designed 
to promote authorship and art, and covers the details of expression of a work. Patent law was intended 
to promote the publication of useful ideas, at the price of giving the one who publishes an idea a 
temporary monopoly over it—a price that may be worth paying in some fields and not in others. 
Trademark law, by contrast, was not intended to promote any particular way of acting, but simply to 
enable buyers to know what they are buying. Legislators under the influence of the term “intellectual 
property”, however, have turned it into a scheme that provides incentives for advertising. ” Stallman, 
“Did You Say ‘Intellectual Property’? It’s a Seductive Mirage” at 
<http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/not-ipr.html> 
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 Larry Rosen distinguishes open source licences from proprietary licences against the criteria as to 
whether “software freedom” is protected or not. His definition is also helpful to illustrate the nature of 
a FOSS licence: 
 “An open source license is the way a copyright and patent owner grants permission to others to 
use his intellectual property in such a way that software freedom is protected.”  
 “A proprietary licence is the way a copyright and patent owner grants permission to others to use 
his intellectual property in a restricted way, through secrecy or other limitations, so that software 
freedom is not protected.”  
Lawrence Rosen, Open Source Licensing—Software Freedom and Intellectual Property Law (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall PTR, 2005) p. 52 
33
 For the historical context in which the GPL came out of the GNU Emacs dispute from 1983 to 
1985, see Chapter 2 of this thesis and also Kelty, Chapter 6 “Writing Copyright Licences”, Two Bits, 
pp.179-209 
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successful one of them is no doubt the Linux kernel program that has been licensed 
under the GPL since its inception. 
It is important to note that copyleft does not straightforwardly reverse or oppose 
copyright, but its legal mechanism relies on copyright. The preamble of the current 
version of the GPL (version 3.0) makes it clear that software developers use the GPL 
to protect users’ rights with two steps: “(1) assert copyright on the software, and (2) 
offer [users] this License giving [users] legal permission to copy, distribute and/or 
modify it.” 34  So copyright provides the basic legal framework for the software 
developers to enable software freedom in the first place. What is really innovative 
and central to copyleft is its “share-alike” clause, which is sometimes also known as 
the “viral” clause.35  Section 5(c) of the GPL requires that the “modified source 
version” based upon the original GPL covered code must be licensed under the same 
GPL when publicly released:  
You must license the entire work, as a whole, under this [GNU General Public] 
License to anyone who comes into possession of a copy. […] This License 
gives no permission to license the work in any other way, but it does not 
invalidate such permission if you have separately received it.36 (added emphasis) 
Under this clause, if a follow-up programmer makes some changes to a piece of GPL 
covered code, then the modified source version as a whole (i.e. the “entire work” as 
in the clause), when publicly re-distributed, must be released under the same GPL. 
Copyleft is essentially an anti-privatisation device meticulously designed to prevent 
software programmers from hiding modifications of the GPLed code. It reconfigures 
the central function of copyright—which intends to give copyright owners exclusive 
control over their work—into an anti-exclusionary institution, where everything must 
be shared. In this way, GPLed software is made into an evolving object more than a 
static non-modifiable end-product and it is said to give its users an unbroken chain of 
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 Preamble, GNU GPL 3.0 
35
 Andres Guadamuz, “Viral contracts or unenforceable documents? Contractual Validity of Copyleft 
Licenses", (2004) 26 (8) European Intellectual Property Review 331-339. 
36
 Historically, the previous version of the GPL (v2.0) has been critical in the success of projects like 
the Linux project. Since the GPL v2.0 continues to be used until today, it is worth quoting its copyleft 
clause as well. Section 2(b) of the GPL v2.0 says: “You must cause any work that you distribute or 
publish, that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof, to be 
licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this License.” 
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software freedom.37 It is worth noting that the whole GPL licence is a much longer 
and more complicated document than this anti-privatisation copyleft clause. I will go 
back to discuss the GPL and its relation with intellectual property law in more detail 
in Chapter 3. 
Permissive Licences (BSD-style Licences) 
Not all FOSS licences are copylefted. There are non-copyleft licences as well. They 
are known as the “permissive licences”, which are sometimes also called BSD-style 
licences or “academic licence”38 in the literature. Because permissive licences do not 
have copyleft’s anti-privatisation clause that forces the downstream developers to 
contribute modifications back to the community, it is more “permissive” than the 
GPL in this sense. Historically, permissive licences are associated with software 
distribution by academic institutions such as the University of California, Berkeley. 
For example, UC Berkeley publishes its own permissive licence called BSD 
(Berkeley Software Distribution) License, which is also widely adopted in the FOSS 
world. The BSD License is occasionally called “copycenter”, which indicates that it 
sits somewhere between copyright and copyleft.39 
Apart from the requirement of retaining the original copyright notice40, the BSD 
licence allows the downstream users to do almost whatever they want in 
redistributing the source and object code. This means that in future distributions, the 
BSD licensed software is not obliged to be re-licensed under the same BSD licence. 
So it is possible for the original BSD licensed software to be released under other 
licences including proprietary licences. The direct upshot is that the initially freely 
available source code has the possibility to be privatised in future distributions. A 
notable example is Mac OS—Apple’s operating system—which contains a 
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 Free Software Foundation, “Rationale Document”, at <http://gplv3.fsf.org/rationale> 
38
 Rosen, supra note 31, pp.73-74 
39
 Eric Raymond et. al., “Copycenter”, The Jargon File at 
<http://catb.org/~esr/jargon/html/C/copycenter.html>; Kirk McKusick, a computer scientist and a 
major contributor to the BSD system writes: “[…] Berkeley had what we called "copycenter," which 
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<http://www.bsdnewsletter.com/bsd/license.html> 
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 The BSD licence requires that redistribution of the source code and binary code “must retain the 
above copyright notice”. See “BSD License Template” at <http://www.opensource.org/licenses/bsd-
license.php> 
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significant amount of FreeBSD code originally released under the BSD License. 
Apple modifies FreeBSD’s code and then turns the modified version into proprietary 
software. Apple is allowed to do so because the BSD License, unlike the GPL, does 
not require downstream developers to disclose the source code of their modified 
versions.  
1.3 Stewarding FOSS Projects: What Licences Can and Cannot Do 
To steward a FOSS project is more than just to choose and use a plausible licensing 
scheme.41 A licence does not exist for its own sake, but its importance is realised 
through its being the legal expression of programmers’ real collaborative experience 
that actually builds the FOSS project. In this dissertation, I argue that there are at 
least two elements that make a FOSS project sustainable for a lasting period of time: 
i) programmers’ collaboration to integrate peer-produced contributions into a single 
coherent artefact and ii) a corresponding FOSS licence that is employed to facilitate 
this collaboration. The combination of the two elements makes the licence not 
merely a paper or electronic document on its own, but this licence is underpinned by 
a kind of “relational contract” with real lived collaborative experience among FOSS 
programmers. In particular, I will show that Ian Macneil’s Relational Contact Theory 
(RCT) is helpful in analysing the FOSS projects’ ability to engage long-term 
collaborative relations, which are sharply distinguished from the discrete commodity 
transaction model as assumed by proprietary software licensing practice. I will now 
explain the two elements.  
1.3.1 Collaboration in FOSS Projects 
The norm to “collaborate radically”, according to Larry Sanger, is “one of the great 
innovations of the open source software movement.”42 Here collaboration happens in 
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 Tim O’Reilly, a prominent pro-FOSS entrepreneur, observes: “But open source is more than just a 
matter of licenses. Some of the most significant advances in computing, advances that are 
significantly shaping our economy and our future, are the product of a little-understood ‘hacker 
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“Lessons from Open-Source Software Development”, (1999) 42 (4) Communications of the ACM 33 
at 34 
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 Sanger (the ex-chief architect of Wikipedia) means “radical collaboration” by the norm that 
“anyone can edit any part of anyone else’s work”. Radical collaboration is crucial to the success of 
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a radically decentralised environment and it is deeply rooted in the FOSS 
programmers’ stewardship tradition where computers hackers address and solve 
almost all their technical problems collaboratively through information sharing since 
the 1950s and the 1960s.43 Many later long-lasting FOSS projects owe exactly their 
success to this tradition of radical collaboration inherited from the older hacker 
community.  
Radical collaboration may appear to be self-organised or spontaneous cooperative 
behaviour among FOSS contributors, but in fact it is coordinated by a small team of 
lead developers to make it happen.44 In this light, I offer a refined definition of 
“radical collaboration” as identified by Sanger. I argue that “collaboration” in any 
successful FOSS project has two defining aspects: it is not only 1) radically 
decentralised but also 2) coordinated among a large number of contributors. First, 
what makes FOSS collaboration stand out is its radically decentralised structure 
capable of harnessing knowledge, intelligence and skills from potentially everyone 
with a minimum level of programming literacy connected by the internet. This 
radical openness allows individual innovators to delve into the tasks that truly pique 
their interest. It restores software programming activities as intellectual endeavours 
that are worth pursuing for their own sake.45 Programmers satisfy their own curiosity 
in the process of exploring and solving technical problems instead of just following 
managerial commands in a firm, or monetary incentives on the market.46 In short, a 
peer-production environment allows individuals to have a large degree of autonomy 
to follow their own intellectual pursuits under its radically decentralised and 
                                                                                                                                          
Wikipedia, because it was “made possible for work to move forward on all fronts at the same time, to 
avoid the big bottleneck that is the individual authors, and to burnish articles on popular topics to a 
fine luster.” Larry Sanger, “The Early History of Nupedia and Wikipedia: A Memoir”, in Open 
Sources 2.0,edited by Chris DiBona, Danese Cooper, and Mark Stone (Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly, 
2006) p.322 
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 See Section 2.2 of Chapter 2. See especially, Tenet 3 (“Mistrust Authority and Promote 
Decentralisation” of the Hacker Ethic documented by Levy.  
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 Although the vast number of non-core “peripheral” contributors’ behaviours are rather more like 
self-organised spontaneous cooperation, these behaviours should not prevent us from seeing core 
developers’ efforts to organise and coordinate collaboration among all contributors. For a detailed 
analysis of the “myth” of “self-organisation” in FOSS, see Weber, Success, supra note 5, pp.131-132; 
see also Marrella, Fabrizio & Yoo, Christopher S. “Is Open Source Software the New Lex 
Mercatoria? ( 2007) 47 (4) Virginia Journal of International Law 
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 See Richard Sennett, The Craftsman (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2008) p.9, 
pp.24-25 
46
 Raymond’s famous aphorism that “every good work of software starts by scratching a developer’s 
personal itch” captures this situation. Raymond, Cathedral, supra note 1 
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curiosity-driven structure.47 Furthermore, it is also worth noting that collaboration is 
not unique to FOSS, and many corporate proprietary software projects also require 
some degree of collaboration. However, corporate collaboration happens on a much 
smaller scale and it is by no means radically decentralised, because innovation tends 
to be strictly restricted among the employed programmers and non-programming 
administrative staff within the compound of a particular company.48 
The second aspect of FOSS collaboration addresses an important weakness of radical 
decentralisation. No matter how innovative each individual programmer is, peer-
produced contributions by themselves do not automatically integrate into one big 
piece of coherently functional software. The radical scale of decentralisation only 
adds tremendous difficulty to the task of integrating a heterogeneous amount of 
contributions into a whole. According to Surowicki, in a highly decentralised system, 
innovation becomes inevitably fragmentary and unsystematic because “there’s no 
guarantee that valuable information which is uncovered in one part of the 
[decentralised] system will find its way through the rest of the system” and 
[s]ometimes valuable information never gets disseminated, making it less useful than 
it otherwise would be.”49 
In order to compensate for this weakness of radical decentralisation, it is 
tremendously important for leaders of FOSS projects to coordinate many and varied 
peer-produced innovations. Or in Surowicki’s words, decentralised creations must be 
“aggregated” into a coherently functional whole. He is aware that “[a]ggregation—
which could be seen as a curious form of centralization—is therefore paradoxically 
important to the success of decentralization.”50  In fact, the more decentralised a 
system is, the more efforts are needed to aggregate peer-produced contributions 
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together. Leaders of a FOSS project need to decide on (or sometimes speculate about) 
the level of decentralisation that they are willing and capable to cope with. In order 
to make a project both peer-productive and manageably aggregateable, a delicate 
balance must be drawn between decentralisation and aggregation. However, there is 
no fast and fixed rule about how this balance between the two should be kept. 
Situations vary from project to project. In order to find out how to make this balance, 
Raymond’s essay The Cathedral and the Bazaar seems to give a clue to start with. 
Though an unflinching champion of decentralisation, Raymond recognises the 
importance of a “strong, attractive basic design” that is necessary to make a project 
aggreateable into one. This design is based on the two general pre-conditions that are 
needed for a decentralised Bazaar-style project to take off: “Your program doesn’t 
have to work particularly well. It can be crude, buggy, incomplete, and poorly 
documented. What it must not fail to do is (a) run, and (b) convince potential co-
developers that it can be evolved into something really neat in the foreseeable 
time.”51 In other words, a small group of core lead developers must go beyond the 
level of scratching their own programming itch, but they must also work hard to 
convince potential co-developers that their efforts are highly likely to be successfully 
aggregated “into something really neat in the foreseeable time.” With these two pre-
conditions in mind, I now need to delve a little deeper into the “strong, attractive 
basic design” mentioned by Raymond above, because it is crucial to the success of 
any collaborative FOSS project. 
Designing a Collaborative Project 
Not every kind of creative task is conducive to collaboration, let alone radically 
decentralised collaboration.52 A task that is radically collaborateable must have a 
modular architecture, which means it is capable of being divided into a lot of smaller 
improvable units and later pieced together into one coherent project. There are two 
parameters that matter here. One is the “modularity” and the other “granularity” of 
the task. Modularity concerns the extent to which a task “can be broken down into 
smaller components, or modules, that can be independently produced before they are 
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 Raymond, Cathedral, supra note 1 
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 For example, many traditional non-software creations, such as writing a novel or a academic paper, 
are done by a solo author or a very small number of collaborators, because these creative tasks are 
hard to be broken down into improvable fine-grained modules. 
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assembled into a whole,” while “granularity” concerns “the size of the modules, in 
terms of the time and effort that an individual must invest in producing them.”53 
Benkler observes that any “successful large-scale peer-production project must 
therefore have a predominate portion of its modules be relatively fine-grained.”54 
The fine-grained modularity that is conducive to peer-production collaboration is 
also often known as the “extensibility” of software among programmers.55  
Software projects are not by nature “extensible” with the right level of fine 
granularity, but they are designed to be so.56 There are two types of design decision 
that leaders of FOSS projects have to make: one is the modular “architectural design” 
in software engineering terms and the other is the “legal design” for FOSS 
collaboration through FOSS licensing. The second type is exactly the main focus of 
this dissertation. 
First, the architectural design concerns the software engineering problem of how to 
make a project “extensible” or modular at a manageable level. The GNU Emacs 
programming editor led by Stallman is a good example here. Stallman designs Emacs 
to be “extensible” in the sense that everyone can easily “go beyond simple 
customization and create entirely new commands” and these newly created 
commands “are simply programs written in the Lisp language, which are run by 
Emacs’s own Lisp interpreter.”57 The Linux kernel project is another example of 
designed extensibility. Linus Torvalds, as the leader of the project, “followed good 
design principles, which allowed [Linux] to be extended in ways that he didn’t 
envision when he started work on the kernel.”58 The modular architecture allows 
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Linux to be broken down into many “subsystems”.59 All subsystems are stewarded 
by lead developers known as “maintainers” who have the responsibility to select, test 
and assemble contributions (known as “patches) into a planned release. (A report 
published by the Linux Foundation in 2009 revealed that Linus Torvalds ranked 
number 9 among all subsystem maintainers in terms of his work of reviewing peer-
produced code into the kernel.60) Submitted patches must be reviewed and approved 
by the subsystem maintainers before they can be integrated into the Linux kernel. 
This means patches that fail to meet the expected standard may well be filtered out 
by the maintainers. Normally, maintainers need to give good reasons why some 
patches cannot be integrated into the project. The rejected programmers should be 
given the opportunity to appeal the decisions made against them. The rejection of 
patches would understandably cause much tension between the subsystem 
maintainers and the rejected programmers. So it is necessary to have “laws” and 
“courts” to efficiently solve disputes just like what is needed in the off-line real 
world.61 In the worst-case scenario, rejected programmers may “fork” or break away 
from the main project by starting up a new project in competition with the original 
one. In summary, the modular architecture in Linux does not just aggregate whatever 
contribution that is peer-produced, but it picks and chooses the most suitable ones 
that can be integrated into a coherent whole. 
The second type of design decision that lead developers have to make for their 
collaborative project is a legal one: how to design a legal structure that makes a 
project “legally” extensible? The exiting copyright regime seems to be rather 
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unfriendly to, if not militate emphatically against, collaboration on a radical level. 
Copyright permits authors to exclusively copy, modify and distribute the original 
software, and these permissions do not automatically extend to non-copyright holders. 
In an extensible FOSS project, a large number of participants are expected to 
frequently modify each other’s works, and it is a hugely cumbersome job for each 
participant to clear the right each time a contribution is made however small it is. 
Even if people do tirelessly give some kind of permission when releasing their 
contributions, it is not guaranteed that all contributed modules are legally compatible 
with each other. For example, participant A allows his module X to be freely 
modifiable but not redistributable. Participant B allows his module Y to be both 
modifiable and re-distributable but at the same time he requires attribution to him in 
each of the downstream redistribution. So are X and Y legally compatible modules 
even though they can be technically welded into one piece of software? There is an 
even trickier situation: what if A or B changes his mind and decides to pull his 
contribution out of the project? Will he be allowed to go back on his commitment? 
Short of a formal and written agreement, these issues may well bog down the 
development of a collaborative project. 
In order to avoid the above problems, standard form FOSS licences are designed to 
give some level of legal certainty. These licences are attempts to configure a legal 
structure (based on copyright law) to standardise the legal commitments of individual 
collaborators. They are designed to clear the legal hurdle for radical collaboration in 
FOSS projects. As has been shown in Section 1.2, a lead developer or a team of core 
developers need to choose between two types of licensing schemes, which are 
effectively two major legal designs for a given project: the copyleft design and the 
permissive BSD-style design. Copyleft is designed to make all downstream 
developers share their publicly released improvements of the original software in 
collaborative projects. It is an approach that suits well the community-based projects 
consisting mainly of voluntary contributors (such as GNU software and Linux 
projects), as it provides a guarantee that no contribution will be made proprietary in 
future distributions. In contrast, the permissive licensing design does not provide an 
anti-privatisation guarantee. Developers who choose this legal design are normally 
backed by well-funded established institutions including universities and software 
companies. Especially for those corporations writing software for consumer products 
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(e.g. operating systems for smartphones 62 ), they nowadays tend to license their 
products under a permissive licensing scheme. Their targeted users are normally non-
sophisticated end-users who do not read or write code and they are not expected to 
make modification of the software. The non-copyleft design imposes virtually no 
restriction on redistribution of the software63, which may help the software to spread 
quickly far and wide. For example, Google’s release of the “Chrome” web browser 
in 2008 is a case in point. Chrome was licensed under the BSD License64 clearly in 
an attempt to compete against the market incumbents like Microsoft’s Internet 
Explorer and Mozilla’s Firefox. This move is based on the speculation that the non-
copyleft design can help Google’s new software to break into the market rapidly and 
establish a big user-base in a relatively short space of time. 
It is not difficult to see that between the two legal designs, copyleft dovetails better 
with the volunteer-driven peer-production model, while the permissive non-copyleft 
design nowadays tends to be adopted by for-profit corporations with a clear aim to 
expand their market. Both designs need a great deal of coordination in order to 
channel collaborative efforts into certain useful and coherent products. Coordination 
under copyleft tends to be led by volunteer developers who are rightly the members 
from the “peers”. In contrast, the non-copyleft design relies less on peer-produced 
contributions, and its coordination may well be led by corporations that are keen to 
break their products into the market. This dissertation focuses itself mainly on the 
legal mechanism of the copyleft design (especially the GPL) for peer-produced 
FOSS projects, but the corporate strategic use of the non-copyleft scheme to build up 
a user base should not go unnoticed. 
1.3.2 The Role of FOSS Licensing 
A FOSS licence plays an important role in facilitating collaboration under the 
modular architecture of a corresponding project. It makes sure that peer produced 
contributions are legally compatible with each other and they can be safely pieced 
together into one integrated artifact. In other words, a FOSS licence is designed with 
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an attempt to give some degree of legal certainty to collaboration in a FOSS project. 
When a collaborative project grows in size, the importance of a licence will 
accordingly increase, because the licence stabilises the programmers’ expectation by 
spelling out what responsibility they should bear and what benefit they may also gain 
from the project. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that a licence by itself does not 
kick-start or constitute any collaborative relation. A licensing scheme is only the 
legal expression supporting the collaborative efforts that have already been going on 
or are expected to take place among all contributors.65  The purpose of a FOSS 
licence is to verbalise and standardise the minimum legal commitments of a large 
number of existing and potential contributors. The expected legal commitments are 
rightly embodied in the form of FOSS stewardship responsibility pursuant to the Free 
Software Definition or Open Source Definition. 
“Death of Assent” after the ProCD ruling 
Almost all FOSS licences are non-negotiated standard form licences. They are 
mostly either in the form of clickwrap or browsewrap. The former requires users to 
manifest their assent by clicking button “Yes, I Agree” and the latter is just a 
webpage displaying the licensing terms and conditions. In terms of users’ 
manifestation of assents, there seems to be no pronounced difference between FOSS 
and proprietary software that also uses mass-market off-the-shelf licensing schemes. 
In both cases, their respective standard form licensing schemes suffer from a similar 
problem, which is the lack of adequate assents from users.66 In 1996, the US Seventh 
Circuit ruled that a shrink-wrap licence (as the precursor of clickwrap and 
browsewrap) was contractually enforceable in ProCD v. Zeidenberg67, which then 
caused much heated debate.68 This ruling signals what Lemley calls “death of assent” 
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in the digital environment where online standard form licensing becomes so 
ubiquitous:  
Assent by both parties to the terms of a contract has long been the fundamental 
principle animating contract law. Indeed, it is the concept of assent that gives 
contracts legitimacy and distinguishes them from private legislation. But in 
today’s electronic environment, the requirement of assent has withered away to 
the point where a majority of courts now reject any requirement that a party take 
any action at all demonstrating agreement to or even awareness of terms in 
order to be bound by those terms.69 
No doubt the death of assent in standard form poses a great challenge to the consent-
driven classical contract law that enforces bilateral bargained exchanges. Neither is it 
good news to software users who are likely to be on the receiving end of this 
challenge. If assents cease to be the reason to legitimate non-negotiated obligations 
against licensees, then is there a new ground for enforcing these standard form FOSS 
licences? If there is one, what is it? The current dominant but not uncontroversial 
theory is based on a neoclassical economic justification that is articulated by the 
ProCD court. It goes that if a standard form licence makes an information product 
available to consumers at the lowest possible economic cost, then it should be 
justified and enforced.70 However, the situation in a FOSS project is a bit more 
complicated than just a matter of maximising the economic utility for FOSS users but 
there is also considerable non-economically measurable social benefit that should not 
be ignored in a collaborative FOSS project. In Chapter 4, I will show that 
justifications other than material wealth maximisation (such as “software freedom” 
for its own sake) should also be considered in examining FOSS licensing terms in 
more detail. 
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Collaboration and Relational Contract  
In order to tackle the conundrum arising from the death of assent, I propose to 
examine FOSS licensing with an alternative approach—Relational Contract Theory 
(RCT)—which has remained conspicuously absent in the literature of FOSS 
licensing. RCT is a reaction to the classical view of contract as “abstract statements 
of the total obligation” leading to one-shot discrete transactions where the “parties 
may not have dealt before, and there is no assurance that they will deal again”71. In 
contrast, a relational contract is underpinned by pre-existing and ongoing relations 
where parties agree “to cooperate to achieve mutually desired goals.”72 My basic 
point here is that licences for collaborative FOSS projects cannot be discrete 
transactional contracts, but they need to be relational contracts that are supported by 
the pre-existing or ongoing collaborative relations experienced among participating 
contributors. 
There are two important reasons why FOSS licensing should be closely scrutinised 
under RCT. 73  First, RCT posits that human beings have “dual motives” when 
engaged in a contractual exchange: they do not merely 1) seek to maximise their 
individual utility but 2) they also want to build “social solidarity” with other 
members of the society. In a relational contract, the second motive for social 
solidarity is especially important, because it reins in the otherwise unbridled first 
motive for utility maximisation. 74  Note that the first motive for utility is not 
eliminated altogether but it is only restricted by the second motive for solidarity. The 
double motives were well present in the collaborative ethos since the early computer 
hacker community. On the one hand, hackers enhanced their utility when each of 
them could have total and unlimited access to the continuous improvements of the 
software by other fellow-hackers. On the other hand, hackers bonded with each other 
through the practice of software sharing, which enhanced the solidarity within the 
community. However, the advent of proprietary software started a new trend where 
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the second motive for solidarity was gradually being swallowed into the first motive 
for utility. Proprietary software developers do not intend to establish collaborative 
relations with outsiders, but they are only interested in maximising their utility 
through selling as many as possible closed-source software products as if they were 
discrete commodities. Friends become strangers after a commodity transaction is 
consummated. Stallman observes that many programmers feel disheartened when 
their programming activities are reduced to a single motive for making money, while 
the motive for solidarity (or “friendship among programmers” in Stallman’s 
language) is jettisoned. In The GNU Manifesto, Stallman briefly analyses the 
consequence of loss of solidarity after the operating system software is close-sourced 
and commercialised: 
Many programmers are unhappy about the commercialization of [operating] 
system software. It may enable them to make more money, but it requires them 
to feel in conflict with other programmers in general rather than feel as 
comrades. The fundamental act of friendship among programmers is the sharing 
of programs; marketing arrangements now typically used essentially forbid 
programmers to treat others as friends.75 
The introduction of FOSS licensing is exactly an attempt to restore the balance 
between the dual motives for enhancing both utility and solidity, which is lost in 
commercial proprietary software. In this sense, FOSS licensing schemes are also an 
effort to rebuild the relational contract among programmers under the software 
stewardship tradition. Furthermore, I need to caution my readers that the dual 
motives in a relational contract are not necessarily mutually exclusive. I do not wish, 
by quoting the above paragraph from Stallman, to give a misimpression: one has to 
sacrifice one motive for the other. In fact, the two motives in FOSS collaboration are 
often closely connected and mutually reinforcing. For example, the reputational 
gains play a hugely important role in incentivising production of FOSS in a 
collaborative manner. Satisfaction from one’s enhanced reputation as a kind of non-
monetary reward is an interesting and somewhat ambivalent motive. On the one hand, 
the reputation of one’s virtuosity in programming and generosity in sharing 
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contributions results from the recognition from other community members, and it is 
essentially a product of enhanced solidarity. On the other hand, this good reputation 
may also increase one’s material utility in the real world. For example, it is likely to 
increase a programmer’s employability to get a permanent salaried job.76  In this 
sense, the reputational reward for writing FOSS is the site where the boundary 
between the two motives is blurred in a relational contract. 
The second reason for RCT’s relevance to FOSS licensing lies in its position on the 
role of consent (or assent) in contractual exchange. In a classical contract, obligation 
is presumed to arise in a single moment where there is a meeting of the minds 
between parties. Macneil finds this consent-centred view is not helpful in leading to a 
more realistic understanding of contractual exchanges: “The dominant role of 
consent in the jurisprudence of classical contract law has put intellectual barriers in 
the way of communicating a broader analysis of the subject that appears in that 
jurisprudence.”77 In contrast, RCT has a more nuanced position on this issue. A 
relational contract is less driven by explicit consents (or assents to standard form 
licence in particular), but obligation may also come out of parties’ experience from 
the pre-existing and ongoing relations.78 So in a FOSS project, the pre-existing and 
ongoing collaborative relations become highly important in the sense that they will 
alleviate the burden on discrete explicit consents as the sole device to effectuate the 
obligations in a corresponding licence. In other words, it should not be ignored that 
relations can also give rise to obligations when explicit consents are weak or non-
existent in standard form licences. 
It is also important to be aware that assents in FOSS licensing are not irreversibly 
“dead” but they are just being relationalised. (Gudel similarly observes that there is 
no “decline of assent,” but there is only “a decline of assent discretely understood” in 
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a more general context.79) At its worst, consents, as Macneil claims, still function as 
“a vital triggering mechanism” in contractual exchanges.80 As there are a growing 
number of FOSS projects that are nowadays targeted at non-programming end-users 
rather than sophisticated co-developers, manifested assents through clickwrap 
licences do not become entirely unnecessary. Because these end-users do not directly 
participate in the collaborative relation of co-developing a certain FOSS product, 
they should be given a good chance to know what kind of licensing scheme they will 
enter into and there is no harm in doing so. 
Collaboration and Intellectual Property 
The relational contract perspective offers important insights into the role of 
collaborative relations in FOSS licensing. However, FOSS collaborative relations do 
not merely come out of the pristine software stewardship tradition originated from 
the hacker custom, but they have also been deeply affected (both positively and 
negatively) by the institution of intellectual property in software since the 1980s. 
(Recall that FOSS licensing is a compromise between these two conflicting traditions 
of stewardship and private property.) Barnett argues that “property” is also “a highly 
relational concept that performs its own vital social functions”81, but Macneil’s RCT 
has never adequately developed a line of theoretical inquiry into the role of 
“property” in relational contract: 
I maintain that although [Macneil’s] observation [“standing behind all relational 
exchange or contracts is a socially-enforced system of property socially-
enforced system of property”] is largely true, somewhat surprisingly [property] 
is never properly integrated into Macneil's social analysis. Consequently his 
social theory of contract is virtually, if not entirely, uninfluenced by any 
comparable social theory of property. Related to this is the near complete 
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absence in his theory of background rights that can be used to evaluate 
normatively the legal rights actually recognized by a legal system.82 
Contractual exchanges are not made in vacuum, but they are profoundly shaped by 
“background rights” as delineated by “property”, which is allegedly neglected by 
Macneil. In other words, property precedes and continues through contractual 
exchanges. Even if these contractual relations come to an end, the property relation 
will keep living on. Benkler’s definition of “property” serves as a good example of 
the relational aspect of “property” that provides the background rules for defining 
relations between property owners and the non-owning public:  
Property is a cluster of background rules that determine what resources each of 
us has when we come into relations with others, and, no less important ‘having’ 
or ‘lack’ a resource entails in our relations with these others. These rules 
impose constraints on who can do what in the domain of actions that require 
access to resources that are the subject of property law.83 (added emphasis)  
Note that property posits an asymmetrical relation between owners and the non-
owning public in Benkler’s definition. The asymmetry is due to the exclusive rights 
given to property owners, who are then entitled to exercise unilateral power over 
non-owners in terms of utilising the owned resources. Benkler makes it clear that 
property rules “are aimed to crystallize asymmetries of power over resources, which 
then form the basis for exchanges.”84 (added emphasis) 
Compared with the asymmetrical “property” relation, “commons” is intended to be a 
symmetrical arrangement. The symmetry in the relation under a commons has 
twofold meanings. First, all participating members have equal non-exclusive rights to 
the resources within a particular commons. Secondly, all participants have the same 
obligations to other members of the commons. The purpose of FOSS licensing is 
exactly to re-configure the asymmetries posited by intellectual property with an 
attempt to create a symmetrical relation among all members of software commons. In 
this software commons, all software developers have the same set of rights (or 
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software freedoms) to access, use, modify and redistribute software. At the same 
time, all of them are bound by the same set of duties, i.e. the stewardship 
responsibility, to refrain from exercising some of their exclusive rights given by 
intellectual property. In a nutshell, FOSS licensing is based upon the institution of 
“property”, but it reconfigures the asymmetric property relation into a symmetrical 
one under a software commons where property owners and the non-owning public 
share the same set of rights and duties.  
The radically decentralised collaboration of any FOSS project is impossible without 
the symmetrical relation under a software commons, where everyone can legally 
make and share improvements of the original software. This symmetrical 
arrangement under software commons has two perceived advantages. On the one 
hand, individual programmers enhance their utility by being able to use a rapidly 
improved software program. On the other hand, they also enhance the solidarity with 
other members of the commons through sharing contributions to a FOSS project. 
These two advantages are not readily available from the asymmetrical relation within 
a proprietary software project. 
Finally, it is worth knowing that total and despotic ownership does not actually exist 
in software copyright. Copyright does make some effort to keep a level of symmetry 
between software authors and their users. There are numerous occasions where 
software can be utilised without the copyright holders’ permission.85 It is a balance 
that is needed to rein in the unilateral power that may be exercised by copyright 
holders to unfairly restrict non-owning public’s rights. For example, under the UK 
copyright law, “reverse engineering” or “decompilation” to achieve interoperability 
between programs is a permitted act by any lawful software user. 86  So in this 
particular respect, copyright creates a symmetrical relation between copyright 
holders and lawful users. However, it is not rare for a proprietary software licence to 
include a clause forbidding reverse engineering or decompilation for any purpose.87 
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By doing so, they destroy the symmetrical relation by shrinking the commons and 
expanding their private ownership interests in software beyond copyright. Benkler 
calls this kind of behaviour “contractual enclosure” of the software commons.88 In 
contrast, FOSS licensing schemes go down the opposite direction of “contractual 
enclosure” by enlarging software commons through shrinking software copyright 
holders’ exclusive rights. 
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation 
This opening chapter has set the scene for the exploration of the three aspects of 
FOSS licensing that is used in support of radically decentralised FOSS collaboration. 
The rest of the dissertation will continue this exploration of the historical aspect (in 
Chapter 2), legal aspect (in Chapters 3 and 4) and authorial aspect (in Chapter 5) of 
FOSS licensing and its role in collaboration in more detail and depth.  
Chapter 2 traces the historical development of FOSS licensing. It identifies three 
historical stages during which the early computer Hacker Ethic begun, evolved, and 
matured into software stewardship obligations detailed by FOSS licences. Chapter 3 
examines how FOSS programmers struggle to articulate a legal expression of 
software freedom through the device of software licensing. It focuses on two areas of 
“intellectual property”—copyright and patent—and their respective threat to 
software freedom. It uses the GPL as an example to show how FOSS programmers 
assess possible threats to software freedom respectively from copyright and patent 
and how they attempt to contain these threats through many generations of the GPL 
since its inception until the latest 2007 version. Chapter 4 tackles some difficult 
issues concerning the FOSS licences as non-negotiated standard from contracts from 
a Relational Contract Theory (RCT) perspective. It attacks the neoclassical contract 
approach (as represented in the ProCD ruling) that has been dominant in the 
mainstream software licensing jurisprudence. It tries to demonstrate that RCT is a 
more suitable theoretical tool to analyse FOSS licensing schemes as a legal means to 
support relation-rich FOSS projects. Chapter 5 examines FOSS authorship at both 
individual and collective (project) levels. It shows how FOSS programmers manifest 
their authorial consciousness through their licensing scheme. The focus will be on 
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project leaders’ legal persona as author-stewards for their collaborative projects. 
Chapter 6 summarises three aspects of FOSS licensing in relation to this 
dissertation’s contribution to the scholarly literature and it also points out two 
avenues to future research. 
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Chapter 2   From the Hacker Ethic to “Open Source”: A Brief 
History 
 
2.1 Introduction: Three Historical Stages 
FOSS licences that are used by programmers in collaboration do not appear suddenly 
in a historical vacuum. The idea of radically decentralised collaboration was 
fermented at the very beginning of computer hacker culture, and it took decades for 
its unique Hacker Ethic to evolve into today’s FOSS licences in their fully-fledged 
form. The evolution from the Hacker Ethic to FOSS licensing schemes is by no 
means a smooth succession of discrete events, but it is complicated and contentious. 
In order to do full justice to the complexity of the topic, this chapter sketches out 
three historical stages during which the early computer Hacker Ethic begun, evolved, 
and matured into software stewardship obligations detailed by FOSS licences. The 
first stage starting in the 1950s till the early 1980s is the pre-licensing period when 
collaboration among programmers was based on the Hacker Ethic. This Hacker Ethic 
was challenged by the rise of proprietary software and then the early hacker 
community underwent gradual disintegration when many computer hackers were 
hired away to write proprietary software. The second stage spanning a period from 
early 1980s to 1998 witnessed the birth and growth of a most influential copyleft 
licence—GNU General Public Licence (GPL)—which tried to translate some 
elements of the lost Hacker Ethic into a legally binding document. The ingenuity of 
the GPL lies in its copyleft mechanism which is an anti-privatisation device to ensure 
publicly distributed code to always remain in software commons. The third stage 
started with 1998 when the movement of “open source” was officially launched by 
Eric Raymond and his colleagues, who intended to integrate non-proprietary 
software into the commercial mainstream. This period witnesses the growing 
commercial and legal strength of open source that can compete with proprietary 
software products.  
It is also an important task of this chapter to show the subtly different characteristics 
of collaborative relations in building FOSS projects at the three historical stages. 
Very briefly, in the first stage, collaboration was largely forged by the non-binding 
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Hacker Ethic that took place in a relatively organic and spontaneous fashion from the 
old hacker community. In the second stage, the old collaborative efforts were largely 
disrupted by the rise of proprietary software. The disruption prompted free software 
programmers to craft their own licensing schemes in order to repair the damaged 
community-based collaborative relations. In the third stage, the prospect of making 
money out of “open source” software attracted an increasing number of corporate 
collaborators to join various projects. Although it was impossible to restore the 
hacker custom to its original purity, FOSS licences would at least play a role in 
preventing for-profit companies from entirely dictating or “recentralising” the 
production and circulation of FOSS in what was meant to be a radically decentralised 
collaborative environment. 
There are two caveats about historicising the development of FOSS collaboration and 
licensing in this chapter. First, my account of the three historical stages cannot be a 
chronicle of every single factual event, but concentrates only on the conceptual 
trajectory along which stewardship and private ownership in software have co-
evolved to have an impact on FOSS licensing. Secondly, the three stages are not 
necessarily discretely separated from each other but they can also be seen as a 
continuum where one stage shades into the next. For example, Linux is exactly a 
cross-stage project, which had its pre-life as the pedagogical Minix system derived 
from the UNIX operating system in the first stage, and it took off as a viable GPLed 
product in the second stage, and then was showcased as a continuously successful 
“open source” product in the third stage. Again, there is no natural clear-cut 
demarcation line in history, but I do wish to highlight some of the most critical 
events (such as the Emacs dispute that prompted Stallman to write the GPL) in order 
to bookmark the changes that are critical in the development of FOSS licensing. To 
appreciate three stages as a continuous whole would lead to a rounded understanding 
of FOSS licensing as a legal phenomenon in its historical context. This 
understanding will form the foundation for the analysis of the legal mechanism of 
FOSS licensing that leverages intellectual property law to preserve software 
commons in the following chapters. 
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2.2 From the 1950s to the Early 1980s: The Pre-Licensing Era  
The first historical stage can be roughly subdivided into two halves. The first half 
witnesses the formation and growth of the Hacker Ethic from the 1950s to the mid-
1970s. This ethic was a moral code stipulating hackers’ duty to share information for 
the sake of solving technical problems collaboratively. The second half of this stage 
covers a period from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, when the Hacker Ethic was 
challenged and eclipsed by an emerging new norm of “owning” software as private 
intellectual property. Collaboration in this stage does not depend on any licensing 
scheme that could restrict privatisation of software, but it only resorted to the non-
legally binding moral force of the Hacker Ethic, which was becoming nonetheless 
increasingly vulnerable to the encroachment of proprietary software.  
2.2.1 Beginning of the Hacker Ethic 
The software stewardship tradition began in the computer hacker community which 
was mostly based in a few US academic institutions such as the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) in the 1950s and 1960s. This tradition is embodied in 
the Hacker Ethic, which was dutifully observed and carried out in full measure by 
programmers well into the early 1970s. Richard Stallman recalls that when he first 
joined the MIT Artificial Intelligence (AI) Lab in 1971, he naturally “became part of 
a software-sharing community that had existed for many years.” The software-
sharing ethic, according to him, is “as old as computers, just as sharing of recipes is 
as old as cooking.”1 Though the norm of software-sharing was ubiquitous during that 
period, the term “free software” did not exist and there was no need for one. This is 
because intellectual property law such as copyright had not yet been extended to 
software and there was no need to differentiate “free” from “proprietary” software. 
Stallman explains:  
We did not call our software ‘free software,’ because that term did not exist, but 
that is what it was. Whenever people from another university or a company 
wanted to port and use a program, we gladly let them. If you saw someone using 
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an unfamiliar and interesting program, you could always ask to see the source 
code, so that you could read it, change it, or cannibalize parts of it to make a new 
program.2 
The Hacker Ethic of software sharing that Stallman witnessed and experienced in the 
AI Lab since 1971 is important in two senses. First, it provides a shared body of rules 
that define who the hackers are and what they should do. Second, it forms the ethical 
foundation of the stewardship obligations that will later make their way into 
Stallman’s copyleft licensing scheme. However, for a long time, the Hacker Ethic 
remained largely unwritten and it is said to be “an ethic seldom codified, but 
embodied instead in the behaviour of hackers themselves.” 3  The difficulty of 
studying this ethic exactly lies in the difficulty of pinning down a rather fluid body of 
unwritten norms which are only known by hackers themselves and are much less 
visible and obvious to outsiders. (The later FOSS licences mitigate this problem by 
writing down what exactly are the core sets of obligations that hackers should bear.) 
With the benefit of hindsight, Steven Levy’s 1984 book Hackers—Heroes of the 
Computer Revolution (hereafter Hackers) was the first attempt to systemically 
document the Hack Ethic that was originally formulated in the 1950s and the 1960s. 
Levy identifies six tenets of the Hacker Ethic and they are organised around the first 
tenet known as the “Hands-on Imperative”, which encourages hackers to share 
information by allowing “unlimited and total” access to computers. The six tenets are:  
 Access to computers—and anything which might teach you something 
about the way the world works—should be unlimited and total. Always 
yield to the Hands-on Imperative! 
 All information should be free. 
 Mistrust Authority—Promote Decentralisation. 
 Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus criteria such as 
degrees, age, race or position. 
 You can create art and beauty on a computer. 
 Computers can change your life for the better.  
The first tenet, which is often shortened to “Hands-on Imperative”, is a sine qua non 
for computer hackers to solve engineering problems and then share solutions in a 
most effective and collaborative way. It is based on the fact that hackers are first and 
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foremost “engineers” who make computer machines work4, and computer hacking 
(as well as the later “open source” programming) starts exactly in “an engineering 
culture” that is “grounded heavily in experience rather than theory.” 5  Hackers’ 
“thinking” is not merely conducted through pure theoretical speculation, but it is 
more closely derived from their engineers’ instinct to fix or tweak defective 
machines. The sociologist Richard Sennett, based on his observation of Linux 
developers, argues that FOSS programmers are not unlike traditional “craftsmen” 
who engage in practical manual work: they are craftsman-like technicians who 
conduct “a dialogue between concrete practice and thinking” and “this dialogue 
evolves into sustaining habits, and these habits establish a rhythm between problem 
solving and problem finding.”6  Suppose that the “unlimited and total access” to 
computers was obstructed, this dialogue between “concrete practice and thinking” 
would be severely disrupted. Levy also explains the importance of this first tenet that 
comes out of programmer-engineers’ practical need to experiment with things 
including computers: “Hackers believe that essential lessons can be learned about the 
systems—about the world—from taking things apart, seeing how they work, and 
using this knowledge to create new and even more interesting things. They resent 
any person, physical barrier, or law that tries to keep them from doing this.”7 
The rest of the five tenets are essentially under the umbrella of the first tenet. The 
second tenet that mandates an unobstructed free flow of information (“all 
information should be free”) is clearly a corollary of the Hands-on Imperative. 
Levy’s commentary on this tenet is in the form of a rhetorical question: “If you do 
not have access to the information you need to improve things, how can you fix 
them?” The answer is that “[a] free exchange of information, particularly when the 
information was in the form of a computer program, allowed for greater overall 
creativity.” 8  Weber observes that Stallman later became one of the most ardent 
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supporters of this tenet, which would have huge consequence on the free software 
movement.9 However, it is also important to know that the later development of 
FOSS licensing shows that the informational freedom is not an absolute freedom, but 
it can be circumscribed in an environment affected by intellectual property (IP). 
Wagner argues information freedom in “open source” is achieved through the 
controlled use of IP: “the ‘open’ in open source is actually rather tightly controlled, 
albeit in the name of generally greater access along certain philosophically favored 
dimension. And it is fundamentally the control of intellectual property rights that 
allows such arrangements to be struck.”10 Furthermore, Raymond also warns that not 
all information should necessarily be free, especially that which is related to 
individuals’ privacy.11 In this light, my thesis is built upon a nuanced understanding 
of the second tenet, which means that all information should be free to the extent that 
programmers can freely collaborate to build a common project. 
The third tenet registers hackers’ great dislike of centralised authority and their 
advocacy for decentralisation. It is squarely targeted at centralised bureaucratic 
systems, including corporations, government and universities, because they are 
believed to be “dangerous” and “cannot accommodate the exploratory impulse of 
true hackers.”12 (Ironically, in the 1960s, IBM was seen by hackers as an epitome of 
this danger of centralisation,13 though it later turned out to be an important corporate 
participant in the open source movement in the third historical stage.) This anti-
centralisation tenet also anticipates the radically decentralised Bazaar-type open-
source production as opposed to the centralised Cathedral-type software 
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manufacturing, which is a distinction drawn by Raymond many years later.14 It also 
has its reincarnations in later academic discussions such as those about “peer 
production” 15  or “Wikinomics” 16  in terms of the radically decentralised way of 
creating information enabled by networked computer technology.  
The fourth tenet envisions that the hackerdom should be strictly built upon a 
meritocracy where hackers “should be judged by their hacking not bogus criteria 
such as degrees, age, race, or position.” It is made clear that conventional non-
hacking related credentials are superficial and irrelevant, and that what hackers can 
contribute to the community matters the most. “This meritocratic trait was not 
necessarily rooted in the inherent goodness of hacker hearts—it was mainly that 
hackers cared less about someone’s superficial characteristics than they did about his 
potential to advance the general state of hacking, to create new programs to admire, 
to talk about that new feature in the system.”17 This tenet shows hackers’ longing for 
their hackerdom to be an autonomous sphere independent from the “real” non-
hacking world. It also tallies with Raymond’s observation that the most able and 
devoted hackers tend to get more reputational reward than others in a collaborative 
project.18   
The fifth tenet concerns the aesthetic of programming. It says that hacking is not just 
a mindless technical job but it can also involve “art and beauty on a computer”. 
Recall that in the first tenet, hackers are first and foremost craftsmen or technicians. 
However, there can be a very thin line between craftsmanship and art. Hackers can 
move beyond coding as craftsmanship and they become programming artists by 
writing code ‘elegantly’. The aesthetic dimension of coding makes programmers 
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appear rather like literary authors, who may imprint their creative personality into 
their works.19 
The sixth tenet believes that computers “can change your life for the better.” It sends 
an evangelical message that computer technologies would not only benefit computer 
hackers but also more broadly the whole of humanity. The Hacker Ethic should 
spread outside “the monastic confines of the Massachusetts Institutes of Technology” 
and reach the non-programming part of the society. “If everyone could interact with 
computers with the same innocent, productive, creative impulse that hackers did, the 
Hacker Ethic might spread through society like a benevolent ripple, and computers 
would indeed change the world for the better.”20 (original emphasis) This tenet is 
corroborated by the later development of “free culture” 21  and “cultural 
environmentalism”22, where the Hacker Ethic of information sharing spills over into 
non-programming creative spheres enabled by networked computer technology. For 
example, projects such as Wikipedia are among the most successful applications of 
this tenet beyond software. 
In summary, the Hacker Ethic identified by Levy portrays a picture of what computer 
programmers in the 1950s and the 1960s thought about themselves. The six tenets 
form the “shared identity and belief system” that would underpin hackers’ core set of 
common commitments to building software projects collaboratively.23 Though they 
were not legally binding but only voluntarily observed by computer hackers 
themselves at this stage, they started the hacker stewardship tradition which would 
form the ethical foundation for the later FOSS licensing schemes. 
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2.2.2 Decline of the Hacker Ethic 
In the mid-1970s the Hacker Ethic began to be eroded by a new norm of owning 
software as private property. Software programmers started to feel proprietorial 
about software that was written and many of them stopped sharing code with other 
programmers. In 1976, the then young Bill Gates24 , in the capacity of General 
Partner of Microsoft, authored an open letter, accusing other computer hackers of 
being property-stealing hobbyists. Gates’s letter can be boiled down to an argument 
that writing software was not a matter of indulging one’s curiosity, but it involves 
professional programmers’ hard labour that should be economically rewarded. It 
openly challenged the Hacker Ethic of information sharing: “As the majority of 
hobbyists must be aware, most of you steal your software. Hardware must be paid for, 
but software is something to share. Who cares if the people who worked on it get 
paid?”25 In short, the production of software for Gates is a serious business that 
requires economic incentives. The letter was, during his time, considered to be 
tactless,26 and it was littered with blunt accusatory words such as “stealing” and 
“theft”:  
One thing [hobbyists] do do is prevent good software from being written. Who 
can afford to do professional work for nothing? What hobbyist can put 3-man 
years into programming, finding all bugs, documenting his product and 
distribute for free? The fact is, no one besides us has invested a lot of money in 
hobby software. We have written 6800 BASIC, and are writing 8080 APL and 
6800 APL, but there is very little incentive to make this software available to 
hobbyists. Most directly, the thing you do is theft.27 (added emphasis) 
It is important to learn that this open letter was not produced ex nihilo, but it was an 
outlet of his anger after a specific incident that Gates encountered. Before the letter 
was published, Microsoft, under the partnership of Gates and Paul Allen, produced a 
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popular version of the BASIC computer language. It ran on the microcomputer 
known as Altair, which was a precursor to mass-manufactured personal computers 
(PC) for less sophisticated end-users. Countering the Hacker Ethic, Gates insisted on 
a new norm that the Microsoft version of Altair BASIC should be paid for instead of 
being shared and copied free of charge. This suggestion did not go down well with 
the hackers who were still in their old sharing habit at that time. For example, those 
hackers who were members of the Homebrew Computer Club were among the most 
enthusiastic sharers of Altair BASIC.28 Gates felt extremely frustrated when very few 
people actually sent payment to him after using the software:   
The feedback we have gotten from the hundreds of people who say they are 
using BASIC has all been positive. Two surprising things are apparent, 
however, 1) Most of these ‘users’ never bought BASIC (less than 10% of all 
Altair owners have bought BASIC), and 2) The amount of royalties we have 
received from sales to hobbyists makes the time spent on Altair BASIC worth 
less than $2 an hour.29  
Given the later extraordinary commercial success of Microsoft’s proprietary software, 
Gates’ letter is often retrospectively singled out as a notable bookmark signaling the 
future sea-change of the old Hacker Ethic giving way to the norm of proprietary 
software.30 This letter is significant also in the sense that for the first time a new 
norm against the Hacker Ethic was emphatically verbalised in a widely circulated 
written document.31 To be more precise, the significance has twofold meaning. First, 
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Gates envisioned that software could be neatly separated from hardware and be sold 
on its own as commodity. This is different from the world of the old Hacker Ethic 
where there was “no meaningful distinction between hardware and software” and 
“code was the machine”.32  (Recall that “computers” in the Hands-on Imperative 
calling for the unlimited and total access refers to both hardware and software 
programs.) In order to pave the way for full commodification of software, Gates’ 
letter challenges the norm that “Hardware must be paid for, but software is 
something to share”. He wished to elevate software to the status of being fully 
alienable commodity in its own right. Secondly, the open letter’s repeated use of 
words like “steal” and “theft” indicates that Microsoft BASIC started to be 
interpreted as a kind of private property exclusively belonging to its authors. Gates 
here clearly was advocating a new norm of private ownership in software, which was 
radically new and disturbing in 1976. Boyle sees Gates’s open letter as an attempt to 
drive home a basic point that “software needs to be protected by (enforceable) 
property rights if we expect it to be effectively and sustainably produced”33. This 
new norm is at least four years ahead of its time because US Congress would not 
amend its copyright legislation to cover software until 1980. The letter also raised the 
issue of economic “incentive” for producing software, which was closely related to 
the orthodox understanding of the function of private property as the reward of 
authors’ labour. Following Gates’s logic, short of a system that could exclude 
members of the public from copying Microsoft BASIC, the incentive for 
programmers to write this software cannot be really guaranteed. In short, the open 
letter contains the seminal idea that software should become fully fledged private 
property, which would pave the way for the full commodification of software in the 
future. 
Gates’ open letter no doubt dropped a bombshell on the hackerdom, but it would be 
an exaggeration to say that it directly led to the demise of the MIT-style hacker 
                                                 
32
 “As in the early days of computing, the code was the machine in a real sense. And code was 
something you naturally collaborated on and shared. This was natural because everyone was just 
trying to get their boxes to do new and interesting things, reasonably quickly, and without reinventing 
the wheel.” Weber, Success, supra note 5, p.36 
33
 James Boyle, The Public Domain—Enclosing the Commons of the Mind (New Haven& London: 
Yale University Press, 2008) p.164 
 53
community.34 Hackers’ reaction to Gates’ letter was extremely negative. Only five or 
six people were persuaded to send Gates the payment that was insisted in the open 
letter.35 The Hacker Ethic was not immediately defeated but it would take another 
half of a decade for its fragility to be fully exposed.36 However, it would be safe to 
say that after 1976 there started to emerge two camps of software programmers. One 
includes the old “ethical” MIT-style computer hackers who shared everything with 
their fellow-hackers and the other attracts the more business-minded programmers 
who wanted to sell software to make profit. It also creates a schism where two 
competing norms that would eventually run into intense clash. The former claims 
that it is programmers’ stewardship duty to share software and the latter insists that 
there are private property subsisting in software from which programmers should be 
economically rewarded. This is a tension suggesting that neither stewardship nor 
private property is natural to software. Software as “property” has always been a 
hotly contested social construct and it cannot be impervious to the changing social 
milieu. Weber observes the camp sticking to the old Hacker Ethic and the camp 
following the new norm of software ownership would battle for supremacy endlessly 
from then on: “Both sides claimed (and continue to claim) that their worldview was 
self-evident, obvious, and an inevitable consequence of the material forces and 
constraints that exist in computing. But neither proprietary nor free software is ‘blind 
destiny.’ Both continue to coexist, in a kind of software industry ‘dualism’ […]. 
Neither is a technological necessity, and neither can claim to have ‘won out’ in any 
meaningful sense.”37 
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2.3 From the Early 1980s to 1998: Clash between the Two Traditions 
The second stage started in the 1980s when the Hacker Ethic was further weakened 
by the rising norm of proprietary software. The schism between the two camps of old 
MIT-style hackers and Microsoft-type proprietary programmers was further enlarged 
by the new legislation of US copyright law to include software. The ascendancy of 
private ownership in software effortlessly eclipsed the old software stewardship 
tradition. In response to this change, Richard Stallman almost singlehandedly started 
the “free software” campaign in order to regain some lost ground of the Hacker Ethic. 
Apart from continuing to writing non-proprietary software, Stallman also crafted the 
very first “copyleft” software licence as an anti-privatisation device to ensure that 
modified versions of free software cannot be subjected to a proprietary regime. 
Copyleft must be used in conformity with Free Software Definition, whose spirit is 
derived largely from the first two tenets of the Hacker Ethic.  
In the following subsection, I will show two contexts in which a selected few 
important changes have affected hackers’ collaborative relations in the second 
historical stage. The first is a broad context in which the new norm of private 
ownership in software gradually gained ascendency. It concerns the changing 
economic situation and legal environment that became more conducive to 
commoditisation of software since the 1980s. The second is the narrow and specific 
context situated in the MIT AI Lab where Richard Stallman as an individual reacted 
to the trend of privatisation of software by devising a copyleft licence in order to 
repair the broken collaborative relations among hackers. I will explain both contexts 
in turn. 
2.3.1 Changes in Market and Law 
The broad context contains two elements, of which one is about market and the other 
about law. The new market situation, combined with the new legal environment, 
helped software to metamorphose into a kind of exclusive and fully alienable 
“property” in its most orthodox sense.38  Firstly, there emerged a reasonably big 
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market for software products (especially operating systems for microcomputers) to 
be traded as commodities in large quantities. This was the kind of market that did not 
exist in the first historical stage where software was shared within the hacker 
community. Most significantly, thanks to the plummeting cost of hardware 
components, the advent of affordable personal computers (PC) for domestic use 
substantially increased the number of computer users with varied levels of computing 
literacy. Many of these new users possessed little or no programming knowledge at 
all and they did not have to. For these non-sophisticated users, what they need was 
workable software more than modifiable software and they were properly end-users. 
This is a crucial shift because in the older hacking community there was no clear 
distinction between programmers and users, i.e., everyone is actually or potentially a 
co-developer. In the new situation, a new group of end-users was created and they 
only consume software. Proprietary software thrives on the “dumbing down” of 
computer culture, because it creates a market where there are consumers more 
willing to pay for readymade software but less curious and inquisitive about the 
technology beneath it. 
Secondly, the legal environment in the 1980s also changed dramatically in favour of 
programmers who wanted to exert exclusive control of their software over users. 
This was the beginning of an era when a body of law known as “intellectual 
property” was developed to take software under protection. Most significantly, 
software, across the Atlantic, was made eligible for copyright protection. In 1980, the 
US Congress amended the 1976 Copyright Act to include software as a subject 
matter. 39  In the UK, the 1985 Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment 
analogised software to the literary works protected by the 1956 Copyright Act. Three 
years later, software unequivocally became a protectable subject matter as a species 
of “literary work” in under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.40  
The introduction of software copyright appeared upsetting to Richard Stallman who 
was steeped in the Hacker Ethic. Though Stallman later changed his view about 
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copyright, his then knee-jerk reaction was viscerally negative. When he first 
encountered programs displaying “copyright notices” on the screen, he thought that 
they were “blasphemy”41 to the Hacker Ethic. Stallman was against treating software 
programs as literary works because he thought they were fundamentally different. In 
1985, he pointed out that software (containing both human-readable source code and 
executable object code) and literary works (i.e. books) were different in the sense 
that the former could instruct computer to perform certain functions and the latter 
were merely literary text to be read. There was little harm to copyright literary works 
as such, but to copyright software programs would lead to the result of “harming 
society as a whole”: 
The idea of copyright did not exist in ancient times, when authors frequently 
copied other authors at length in works of non-fiction. This practice was useful, 
and is the only way many authors’ works have survived even in part. The 
copyright was created expressly for the purpose of encouraging authorship. In 
the domain for which it was invented—books, which could be copied 
economically only on a printing press—it did little harm, and did not obstruct 
most of the individuals who read the books. […] The case of programs is very 
different from that of books a hundred years ago. The fact that the easiest way 
to copy a program is from one neighbor to another, the fact that a program has 
both source code and object which are distinct, and the fact that the a program 
is used rather read and enjoyed, combine to create a situation in which a person 
who enforces a copyright is harming society as a whole both materially and 
spiritually; in which a person should not do so regardless of whether the 
[copyright] law enables him to.42 (added emphasis) 
Stallman’s argument that copyright is not an ideal legal form that should regulate 
software on the ground that “a program is used rather than read and enjoyed” is not 
entirely unfamiliar to legal scholars, some of whom suggest replacing copyright with 
sui generis software protection for very similar reasons.43 We will soon find that 
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Stallman later became less hostile to copyright, after he discovered that the broad 
exclusive rights granted to software authors could actually be leveraged to deter 
privatisation of software in a “copyleft” licensing arrangement.44  
Another legal development is to protect software under trade secrecy, which became 
an increasingly common practice after the 1970s45. This development affects two 
groups of people: the first group includes programmers and the second includes users. 
First, in order to get software under trade secrecy protection, proprietary software 
companies needed to make sure that their own employees do not leak and spread the 
source code outside. So programmers-employees were asked to sign non-disclosure 
agreement on the software they developed. Second, proprietary developers no longer 
release software with the source code available to users. The executable code-only 
software usually came with a proprietary software licence forbidding reverse 
engineering altogether. However, non-sophisticated end-users tended to accept this 
change, because they did not really care much about whether the source code was 
kept secret or not. Recall that widespread PCs had a “dumbing down” effect in the 
computer world where a lot of PC users did not read, let alone modify, source code 
of software. Feller and Fitzgerald find that the move of distributing only non-human 
readable object code brought a convenient result to both non-programming end-users 
and commercial software developers. For end-users, when millions-of-line source 
code is compiled into object code, it saved a lot of storage space, which was still very 
precious on 1980s’ microcomputers; for software developers, source code, when kept 
secret, became a valuable asset in its own right, and it effectively prevent competitors 
from knowing how their software was actually coded.46  
Looking back, Gates’ norm, that payment must be made for software for its own sake, 
sounded radical and unfamiliar in 1976, but it became commonplace in the 1980s. 
The new market situation and legal environment combine to create an atmosphere 
conducive to the production of more profitable proprietary software. Software was 
effectively unbundled from hardware, and it can be traded in its own right. Copyright 
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and trade secrecy gave software a legal basis to exclude non-paying users. Moglen 
observes that the changes clearly gave rise to the “right to exclude” that was desired 
by proprietary software developers. 
After 1980, everything was different. The world of mainframe hardware gave 
way within ten years to the world of the commodity PC. And, as a contingency 
of the industry’s development, the single most important element of the 
software running on that commodity PC, the operating system, became the sole 
significant product of a company that made no hardware. High-quality basic 
software ceased to be part of the product-differentiation strategy of hardware 
manufacturers. Instead, a firm with an overwhelming share of the market, and 
with the near-monopolist’s ordinary absence of interest in fostering diversity, 
set the practices for the software industry. In such a context, the right to exclude 
others from participation in the product’s formation became profoundly 
important. Microsoft’s power in the market rested entirely on its ownership of 
the Windows source code.47 (added emphasis) 
The changes in market and law give the broad context of the rise of exclusive private 
property in software and the decline of the Hacker Ethic. It explains how software 
programmers gradually became the exclusive owners of the software that was 
produced.  However, this broad context does not explain much how the very first 
“copyleft” free software licence known as the GNU General Public Licence was 
produced and how it was employed to save the declining Hacker Ethic. I now need to 
move to the more specific context based at the MIT AI Lab where Richard Stallman 
would react by inventing copyleft as an anti-privatisation device to rebuild 
collaborative relations among programmers. 
2.3.2 The Birth of Copyleft 
It is difficult to identify one single moment when Stallman conceived the idea of 
copyleft. However, I endeavour to highlight, with the benefit of hindsight, three 
crucial incidents that precipitated the invention of copyleft. The significance of these 
incidents might not have been fully apparent at the time when they took place, but 
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retrospectively they were so frequently told that they became an indelible part of free 
software developers’ collective memory. The three stories share a common theme 
that runs through a narrative explaining the birth of copyleft: Copyleft is a hacker’s 
reaction to the rise of proprietary software and it is an attempt to rebuild the 
collaborative ethos under the Hacker Ethic by means of software licensing. 
The Xerox Printer Incident 
The first incident is a much repeated story involving a Xerox paper-jammed printer.48 
In around 1980, Stallman at the MIT AI Lab was using a cutting edge laser printer 
donated by Xerox.49 He encountered a glitch which failed to allow him to print out a 
50-page file. With the hacker’s typical “Hands-on Imperative”, Stallman felt 
compelled to identify and fix the problem immediately. “As a person who spent the 
bulk of his days and nights improving the efficiency of machines and the software 
programs that controlled them, Stallman felt a natural urge to open up the machine, 
look at the guts, and seek out the root of the problem.”50 Stallman’s “natural urge” is 
emblematic of the first tenet of the Hacker Ethic identified by Levy: “Always yield 
to the Hands-on Imperative”, which spurs a hacker “to fix something that […] is 
broken or needs improvement.”51 Unfortunately, Stallman was not able to track down 
the source-code file because Xerox this time did not provide it to the AI Lab as was 
the case before. Stallman vividly recalls his frustration when he could not access and 
modify the source code many years later:  
Later Xerox gave the AI Lab a newer, faster printer, one of the first laser 
printers. It was driven by proprietary software that ran in a separate dedicated 
computer, so we couldn't add any of our favorite features. We could arrange to 
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send a notification when a print job was sent to the dedicated computer, but not 
when the job was actually printed (and the delay was usually considerable). 
There was no way to find out when the job was actually printed; you could only 
guess. And no one was informed when there was a paper jam, so the printer 
often went for an hour without being fixed.  
The system programmers at the AI Lab were capable of fixing such problems, 
probably as capable as the original authors of the program. Xerox was uninterested in 
fixing them, and chose to prevent us, so we were forced to accept the problems. They 
were never fixed.52 
Stallman later learned that a leading computer scientist just left Xerox and was hired 
by Carnegie Mellon University’s computer science department. He made a journey 
to Carnegie Mellon and made a request in person for the source-code file that ran the 
printer. Much to Stallman’s disappointment, the request was turned down to his face. 
This is because the ex-Xerox employee had already signed a non-disclosure 
agreement with Xerox and the source code must be kept as the trade secret of the 
company.53 Stallman felt emotionally scarred by the refusal to provide source code 
by another programmer. From this experience, he finds that unmodifiable proprietary 
software would cause a “psychosocial harm” to software users just like a resident is 
not allowed to make any changes to a house where lives: “It is demoralizing to live 
in a house that you cannot rearrange to suit your needs. It leads to resignation and 
discouragement, which can spread to affect other aspects of one's life. People who 
feel this way are unhappy and do not do good work.”54  
The Symbolics Incident 
Although the Xerox incident has been repeatedly singled out as “a major turning 
point” when proprietary software started to hurt the collaborative relations under the 
Hacker Ethic, it is nothing more than a wake-up call about the creeping influence of 
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proprietary software on the MIT Lab.55  The real “fatal blow” that destroyed the 
Stallman’s hacker community came from the second incident about “Symbolics”, 
which was a spin-off company from the MIT AI Lab. In the early 1980s, Russell 
Noftsker, a former AI Lab administrator, formed Symbolics to commercialise an AI 
Lab project on the LISP programming language. Its business competitor was the 
hacker-friendly company called LISP Machine Incorporation (LMI) led by the MIT 
hacker Richard Greenblatt, who stuck to the Hacker Ethic and disclosed their source 
code dutifully as usual. In a nutshell, there were three parties in this incident: 
Symbolics, LMI and the AI Lab. The first two parties were in business competition 
and the last was in a neutral position. Stallman’s job at the AI Lab was to keep the 
lab’s version of the LISP operating system abreast with the two companies’ 
improvements. The three parties shared improvements of LISP OS for over a year. In 
March 1982, Symbolics stopped sharing source code with the AI Lab and LMI in 
order to protect their software as trade secret. This was a move that was intended to 
undermine its competitor LMI, but the person who felt most betrayed and hurt was 
Stallman at the AI Lab. Stallman’s personal revenge was to reverse engineer 
Symbolics’ now “closed-source” software by studying their newly added features, 
whose source code would then be completely rewritten from scratch by Stallman.56 
He then shared his code with Symbolics’ competitor the LMI. Angered by Stallman’s 
retaliation, the President of Symbolics Noftsker accused Stallman of “stealing” the 
company’s trade secrets: 
We developed a program or an advancement to our operating system and make 
it work, and that may take three months, and then under our agreement with 
MIT, we give that to them. And then [Stallman] compares it with the old ones 
and looks at that and see how it works and reimplements [for the LMI 
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machines]. He calls it reverse engineering. We call it theft of trade secrets.57 
(added emphasis)  
Stallman’s revenge did not go very far. Many fellow-hackers at the MIT Lab had 
already disagreed with him and they were gradually hired away to write more 
lucrative proprietary software for Symbolics.58 They saw Stallman’s reaction as a 
“troubling anachronism” which was blind to the irreversible trend of software 
commercialisation: “In commercializing the Lisp Machine, the company pushed 
hacker principles of engineer-driven software design out of the ivory-tower confines 
of the AI Lab and into the corporate marketplace where manager-driven design 
principles held sway.”59 The upshot of the Symbolics incident is the full decline of 
the Hacker Ethic at the AI Lab. For Stallman, the hacker-led AI Lab in the early 
1970s was not only his workplace, but also his spiritual home. Stallman held 
Symbolics responsible for destroying this “home”. Just as Williams observes that 
“the Symbolics controversy dredged up a new kind of anger, the anger of a person 
about to lose his home.”60 As a “homeless” hacker, Stallman felt that there was no 
point in continuing to work at the AI Lab where the hackers’ collaborative ethos no 
longer existed. He resigned his job and became a full-time campaigner for “software 
freedom”.  
The Emacs Programming Editor Dispute 
The third and final incident concerns Stallman’s dispute with James Gosling over the 
GNU Emacs software, which eventually led to the creation of the first copyleft 
licence in the period between 1983 and 1985. After Stallman left the AI Lab, he 
embarked on the ambitious GNU project in order to create a complete non-
proprietary operating system to replace the proprietary UNIX system. In an initial 
announcement dated 27 September 1983, Stallman planned to “write a complete 
Unix-compatible software system called GNU (for Gnu’s Not Unix), and give it 
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away free to everyone who can use it.” 61  In the same announcement, Stallman 
stressed a “golden rule” of software sharing that he himself must stick to: “I consider 
that the golden rule requires that if I like a program I must share it with other people 
who like it. I cannot in good conscience sign a nondisclosure agreement or a software 
license agreement.” More significantly, in the following paragraph, the word “free 
software” was mentioned: “So that I can continue to use computers without violating 
my principles, I have decided to put together a sufficient body of free software so 
that I will be able to get along without any software that is not free.”62  (added 
emphasis) Although it would take a few more years for “free software” to be clearly 
defined (as in the FSD), the announcement shows Stallman was contemplating the 
idea of “free software” as early as in 1983. 
One of the flagship sub-projects of GNU is the Emacs programming editor, which 
was initially developed by Stallman (in collaboration with many of his colleagues at 
the AI Lab) in the mid-1970s. Emacs embodied a then radically new idea of 
displaying and editing text on computer screens (replacing the old method of 
scrutinising printed-out code on paper). It was a pioneer of “the real-time display 
editor” and it was “customizable” by its users. The customizability of Emacs was the 
most outstanding feature intended by Stallman to facilitate radical collaboration 
between developers and users. According to Levy, Stallman “used the Hacker Ethic 
as a guiding principle for his best-known work, an editing program called EMACS 
which allowed users to limitlessly customize it—its wide open architecture 
encouraged people to add to it, improve it endlessly.”63 Very importantly, users are 
given a tool known as the Emacs Lisp (Elisp) programming language to make any 
adaptation that they need. The official website of GNU Emacs explains: 
If Emacs doesn’t work the way you’d like, you can use the Emacs Lisp (Elisp) 
language to customize Emacs, automate common tasks, or add new features. 
Elisp is very easy to get started with and yet remarkably powerful: you can use 
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it to alter and extend almost any feature of Emacs. You can make Emacs 
whatever you want it to be by writing Elisp code […]64 
Because of its radial openness and customizability, Emacs became so popular among 
programmers that it was widely copied and modified in various forms. Stallman 
suggested that anyone who made improvements of the Emacs editor should 
contribute modifications back to the so-called “EMACS software-sharing commune”. 
In a 1981 Emacs user manual, it became clear that Stallman had by then conceived a 
prototypical “share-alike” condition for using Emacs, though it was not intended to 
be legally binding: 
[…] you are joining the EMACS software-sharing commune. The conditions of 
membership of [the EMACS commune] are that you must send back any 
improvements you make to EMACS, including any libraries you write, and that 
you must not redistribute the system except exactly as you got it, complete. […] 
All sources [i.e. source code] are distributed, and should be on line at every site 
so that users can read them and copy code from them. […]65 
The Emacs commune “share-alike” condition66 stipulating that “you must send back 
any improvements you make to EMACS” is significant. The Emacs commune, 
according to Kelty, is “designed to keep EMACS alive and growing as well as to 
provide it for free” and it indicates a kind of “community stewardship”67, which is 
different from private ownership of software. It fleshed out the first two tenets of the 
Hacker Ethic documented by Levy. 68  It would take another four years before 
Stallman actually wrote a fully-fledged copyleft licence—GNU Emacs General 
Licence—in 1985, but the idea of “copyleft” was clearly being fermented as early as 
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in 1981 when copyright was about to become an established legal form of software 
protection. 
Unfortunately, not everyone shared Stallman’s ideal of “community stewardship” of 
the Emacs editor. Since 1981, James Gosling started to work on a variant of Emacs 
running under the UNIX operating system. Gosling’s version (sometimes also known 
as “Gosmacs”) was initially shared with the community and Stallman incorporated 
some of Gosling’s code into his GNU Emacs. In 1983, Gosling decided not to share 
his software any more, on the ground that the increasing popularity of Gosmacs 
made him unable to keep up with the growing administrative side of the job.69 He 
eventually sold Gosmacs to a proprietary software company called Unipress, which 
was believed to be more suitable for the future development of Gosmacs. Stallman 
was saddened by Gosling’s decision and felt that his communal ideal was seriously 
eroded.  
Furthermore, also around this period of time copyright gradually overtook trade 
secrecy as the main form of legal protection of software,70 and the threat of copyright 
infringement became increasingly real rather than merely hypothetical to software 
developers. In order to avoid being bogged down by the copyright ownership dispute 
with Gosling, Stallman did two things. First, he removed Gosling’s code completely 
from GNU Emacs and issued a “Gosling-free” version with his own replacement. 
Second, he produced the first free software licence that specified the conditions of 
using, modifying and redistributing GNU Emacs. The new licence was called GNU 
Emacs General Public License (EGPL), which was first published in 1985 and 
revised twice respectively in 1987 and in 1988. The licence opened with a preamble 
marking the difference between GNU Emacs and software produced by proprietary 
“software companies” (with Unipress clearly being one of them in Stallman’s mind): 
“The license agreements of most software companies keep you at the mercy of those 
companies. By contrast, our general public license is intended to give everyone the 
right to share GNU Emacs. To make sure that you get the rights we want you to have, 
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we need to make restrictions that forbid anyone to deny you these rights or to ask 
you to surrender the rights.”71 Note that the “share-alike” clause of the EGPL is not 
qualitatively different from the content of the Emacs commune condition mentioned 
above. The EGPL’s “copying policies” stipulate that Emacs users must 
cause the whole of any work that you distribute or publish, that in whole or in 
part contains or is a derivative of GNU Emacs or any part thereof, to be 
licensed at no charge to all third parties on terms identical to those contained in 
this License Agreement (except that you may choose to grant more extensive 
warranty protection to some or all third parties, at your option).72 
This clause would be later famously (or notoriously) known as the “viral” clause, 
which constitutes the defining feature of copyleft. It enjoined GNU Emacs users to 
contribute back any publicly released modification, i.e. any work that “in whole or in 
part contains or is a derivative of GNU Emacs”, under the same GNU EGPL. This 
was clearly designed to prevent programmers like Gosling from withdrawing their 
contributions from the Emacs commune.  
Most significantly, in the course of the Emacs dispute from 1983 to 1985, Stallman’s 
attitude towards copyright underwent an important but sometimes unnoticeable 
change: he became less cynical about copyright in software and found that he could 
leverage copyright law to further his cause of free software.73  It is important to 
remember that this happened in a historical context where an increasing number of 
software developers began to rely on copyright to protect their software. 74  The 
dispute with Gosling caused Stallman to gradually familiarise himself with the US 
copyright law. He discovered that the very broad right granted to copyright owners 
could actually be inflected for the “share-alike” purpose intended by the Emacs 
“commune”. He used copyright as the basis for imposing the “copyleft” 75 
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requirement—which is effectively a variant of the Emacs commune condition—on 
downstream users and deterred them from privatising source code of released 
modifications and improvements. In the same year when the 1985 GNU Emacs 
licence was published, Stallman also founded the Free Software Foundation (FSF), 
which later becomes an important powerbase for the free software movement. 
In 1989, Stallman finally turned the Emacs-specific GNU EGPL into a generic 
template licence, which could be used for any free software. It became the very first 
version of GNU General Public Licence (GPL). Stallman made it clear that the GPL 
v1.0 relied upon copyright: “We protect your rights with two steps: (1) copyright the 
software, and (2) offer you this license which gives you legal permission to copy, 
distribute and/or modify the software.”76 This text would remain unchanged in all the 
later versions of the GPL. Legally speaking, the GPL is a kind of standard form 
licence that lacks explicit bargained-for exchanges. It is important to note that, 
despite its venerable ideal of protecting software freedom, the legal form of GPL is 
not drastically dissimilar from other conventional off-the-shelf standard form 
software licences, which are also used by proprietary software developers. In Chapter 
4, I will try to tackle this issue in more depth by examining the doctrinal rules 
governing the enforcement of FOSS licences and I will also propose to analyse the 
issue by harnessing the insights from relational contract theory, which has been 
largely neglected in the literature of FOSS licensing. 
To summarise the whole second historical period of FOSS licensing, the three 
incidents of the Xerox printer at the AI Lab, Stallman’s confrontation with 
Symbolics and the Emacs dispute travelled down a trajectory where Stallman 
formulated a narrative about the birth of the free software movement as an attempt to 
repair the collaborative ethos damaged by the rise of proprietary software. The 
narrative is closely linked with the development of intellectual property law in the 
US from the mid-1970s onward: the first two incidents are mainly concerned with 
protecting software by trade secrecy (through non-disclosure agreements), while the 
last one shifts to copyright protection. This shift signals a trend where copyright 
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became a more convenient and accepted form of software protection than trade 
secrecy after 1980. It is not a surprise that Stallman’s many versions of GPL licences 
are actually copyright licences because they are essentially the product of this trend. 
The next historical stage will reveal how the free software movement took another 
critical turn after 1998 and its social and political influence started to spill over into 
the non-hacking world as anticipated by the sixth tent of the Hacker Ethic. 
2.4 From 1998 Onwards: Challenge from “Open Source” 
The year 1998 marks the beginning of the third stage in the history of FOSS 
collaboration. In early February of that year, Eric Raymond, an ex-Emacs contributor, 
openly broke away from Stallman’s free software movement. Raymond’s agenda is 
to redirect the energy of free software developers to a more business-friendly 
approach under a new label called “open source”. The term was deliberately coined 
by Raymond on 3 February 1998 during a meeting with some entrepreneurially 
minded programmers in California. It was hoped that this “rebranding” of the 
movement as “open source” would tone down the anti-commercialism associated 
with the Stallman-led free software movement and get “open source” software 
accepted in the business world.77  
Deviating from Stallman’s position, Raymond’s neologism is not intended to hold 
the moral high ground over proprietary software, but it is keen to propagate a vision 
that the decentralised bazaar-style “open source” is capable of producing better-
quality software than the hierarchically organised Cathedral-like structure. This 
vision was actually first gestated, one year before the coinage of the term, in the 
much-cited essay The Cathedral and the Bazaar first written in 1997 and later 
revised numerous times by Raymond. This essay is significant in the sense that it 
opened up an alternative line of narrative, deviating from Stallman’s narrative of 
“software freedom” as a matter of regaining the lost ground of the MIT-style Hacker 
Ethic. The new narrative contains a series of carefully chosen stories, which would 
later become part of open source’s own “folklore”. There are two oft-told stories that 
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tellingly illustrate how Raymond takes trouble to introduce the new twist of “open 
source” to the “free software” world. The first is about the Linux kernel system as an 
epitome of the Bazaar model and the second is about the Netscape web browser as an 
example of corporations’ embrace of the idea of “open source”.  
First, Raymond capitalises on the runaway success of the Linux kernel project, which 
already took off in the early 1990s.78 One of the main goals that The Cathedral and 
the Bazaar wants to achieve is to further catapult Linus Torvalds, the initiator of 
Linux, to the centre-stage of the “open source” movement. Raymond opens his essay 
with a verdict that “Linux is subversive”, followed immediately by a thought-
provoking question: “Who would have thought [in 1991] that a world-class operating 
system could coalesce as if by magic out of part-time hacking by several thousand 
developers scattered all over the planet, connected only by the tenuous strands of the 
Internet?” 79  Raymond admitted that he himself, before the mid-1996, failed to 
appreciate the strength of decentralised production of software until the success of 
Linux awakened him to the tremendous advantage brought by the open-source bazaar. 
He explains why the “subversive” Linux is crucial to the understanding of the 
“bazaar” model as opposed to the hierarchical “cathedral” structure. 
Linux overturned much of what I thought I knew. I had been preaching the Unix 
gospel of small tools, rapid prototyping and evolutionary programming for years. 
But I also believed there was a certain critical complexity above which a more 
centralized a priori approach was required. I believed that the most important 
software (operating systems and really large tools like the Emacs programming 
editor) needed to be built like cathedrals, carefully crafted by individual wizards 
or small bands of mages working in a splendid isolation, with no beta to be 
released before its time.80 
Note that the above paragraph obliquely criticises programmers like Stallman for 
behaving like “individual wizards or small bands of mages working in splendid 
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isolation”81 and it attacks Stallman’s Emacs as an example of “really large tools” that 
“needed to be built like cathedrals”.82 In contrast, Linus Torvalds does not work in 
“splendid isolation,” but his style of development—“release early and often, delegate 
everything you can, be open to the point of promiscuity”—resembles “a great 
babbling bazaar of differing agendas and approaches”.83 Far from working alone, 
Torvalds, since he was a college student in Helsinki, did not hesitate to enlist the help 
of thousands of volunteer programmers to contribute to the Linux project. Raymond 
wants to emphasise that the success of Linux is a result of mass collaboration on the 
global scale. It does not matter much how talented each of the individual 
programmers is, but it does matter a lot how collaborative all contributors are. 
It is worth noting that the way that programmers are portrayed in Raymond’s writing 
is markedly different from Levy’s journalism on hackers. Levy’s 1984 book Hackers 
is a collection of larger-than-life programming geniuses and its subtitle revealingly 
hailed them as the “Heroes of Computer Revolution”. In contrast, the younger 
generation of Linux programmers including Torvalds do not enjoy the “heroic” status 
that their predecessors have, but they are ordinary people who are just willing to 
work collaboratively “to the point of promiscuity” as is recorded in The Cathedral 
and the Bazaar. Again, a brief comparison of Levy’s portrait of Stallman and 
Raymond’s writing about Torvalds is illustrative of the more “democratic” and less 
elitist characteristic of the new “open source” movement. In Levy’s book, Stallman 
is portrayed as “the last of true hackers” whose heroism includes almost 
singlehandedly fighting for the lost Hacker Ethic. Recall that when Stallman joined 
the MIT AI Lab in 1971, he was still an undergraduate studying at an elitist Ivy 
League university.84 The then AI Lab was likened by Levy to a “monastery”, where 
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Stallman “had experienced the epiphany” of “pure hacker paradise” and thus 
developed “a deep affinity for the Hacker Ethic, and was militant in his execution of 
its principle.”85 In contrast to the rarefied monastic atmosphere at MIT, Torvalds is 
said to write Linux in a more “promiscuous” and democratic environment, which is 
more conducive to mass collaboration from almost all walks of life. According to 
Raymond, most Emacs tools (with a couple of exceptions) are built by elitist 
cathedral-builders like Stallman, while Linux is a promiscuously open bazaar where 
individual programmers like Torvalds are “lazy as a fox.”86 In particular, Raymond 
points out that Torvalds is not an exceptionally original programmer. The Linux 
system is heavily derivative from the pre-existing Minix system and there involves 
no “conceptual leap forward” from Minix to Linux as something radically novel. 
Compared with the older-generation hackers like Stallman, Torvalds is by no means 
an “innovative genius” of programming (and he does not have to be one), but his 
main contribution lies in his ability to select, implement and reuse and piece together 
other people’s code. Though not a programming genius, Torvalds is recognised as a 
kind of lesser “genius” who is exceptionally good at more mundane tasks of 
“engineering and implementation” of other contributors’ ideas. This is a recognition 
of the importance of Torvalds’s role as coordinator of a large-scale radically 
decentralised collaborative project:    
[...] Linux didn’t represent any awesome conceptual leap forward. Linus 
[Torvalds] is not (at least, not yet) an innovative genius of design in the way 
that, say, Richard Stallman or James Gosling […] are. Rather, Linus seems to 
me to be a genius of engineering and implementation, with a sixth sense for 
avoiding bugs and development dead-ends and a true knack for finding the 
minimum-effort path from point A to point B. indeed, the whole design of 
Linux breathes this quality and mirrors Linus’s essentially conservative and 
simplifying design approach.87 
Although Raymond’s comparisons between the Cathedral and the Bazaar, between 
Linux and Emacs, and between Torvalds and Stallman, are not universally accepted 
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among critics88, Raymond largely succeeded in achieving what he wanted to achieve: 
to promote an easy-to-grasp image of what “open source” is for the general public 
(especially the non-programming business world) by showing how the decentralised 
Bazaar model works and how it might be applied to collaborative projects like Linux. 
The second important story in Raymond’s narrative of “open source” is about 
Netscape, a software company that was keen to apply the Linux model. It is an 
example of a high-profile corporation abandoning the Cathedral model for the new 
Bazaar model. On 23 January 1998, the Netscape management team took a brave 
decision to release the source code of their flagship product—the web browser 
known as Navigator—to the public and became an “open source” company.89 This 
move was taken in reaction to a dire prospect that was faced by Netscape when their 
browser was rapidly losing market share to Microsoft, which bundled its Internet 
Explorer browser to its Windows operating system. Before decision was made, Frank 
Hecker wrote a whitepaper, citing Raymond’s The Cathedral and the Bazaar in an 
attempt to persuade Netscape executives to “open source” their web browser.90 On 4 
February 1998, Raymond was invited by Netscape for a strategy conference at 
Silicon Valley. Six days after the conference (on 10 February), Raymond revised The 
Cathedral and the Bazaar again by adding an “Epilogue” (in Revision 1.31) that 
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fanfared Netscape’s shift as “a large-scale, real-world test of the bazaar model in the 
commercial world”: 
The open-source culture now faces a danger; if Netscape’s execution doesn’t 
work, the open-source concept may be so discredited that the commercial world 
won’t touch it again for anther decade. On the other hand, this is also a 
spectacular opportunity. Initial reaction to the move on Wall Street and 
elsewhere has been cautiously positive. We’re being given a chance to prove 
ourselves, too. If Netscape regains substantial market share through this move, 
it just may set off a long-overdue revolution in the software industry.91 
In late February, Raymond, along with Bruce Perens (the then-leader of the Debian 
project92), co-founded the Open Source Initiative (OSI) and produced the Open 
Source Definition (OSD). The purpose of the OSI is to monitor and facilitate the use 
of the OSD by software projects. The OSD was not written from scratch. Earlier in 
1997, the Debian Community produced the Debian Free Software Guideline and 
Perens rehashed this guideline into the OSD by just leaving out the Debian-specific 
references in it.93 The OSD itself is not a license but a list of common elements that 
could be adopted by any collaborative “open source” project and its corresponding 
licence. It specifies ten common criteria against which a software project can be 
found to be “open source” or not. According to these ten criteria, an open “source 
project” must 1) allow free distribution of software, 2) make source code publicly 
available, 3) allow modifications and derived works, 4) ensure integrity of the 
author’s source code, 5) allow no discrimination against persons or groups, 6) allow 
no discrimination against fields of endeavour, 7) require no signature to accept the 
licence, 8) be not specific to a certain product, 9) allows no “contamination” of other 
software distributed on the same medium and 10) be technology-neutral in licensing 
software.94 Compared with Stallman’s Free Software Definition (FSD)95, the OSD 
obviously contains a more detailed and specific list about what an “open source” 
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project and its corresponding licence scheme should be. However, the basic licensing 
principles of the OSD do not drastically deviate from the spirit of the FSD. 
Especially, the first three criterions of the OSD, which list some defining features of 
open source software, are not drastically dissimilar from the requirements specified 
in FSD. 
-OSD Criterion (1) Free Redistribution 
The license shall not restrict any party from selling or giving away the software 
as a component of an aggregate software distribution containing programs from 
several different sources. The license shall not require a royalty or other fee for 
such sale. 
-OSD Criterion (2) Source Code 
The program must include source code, and must allow distribution in source 
code as well as compiled form. Where some form of a product is not distributed 
with source code, there must be a well-publicized means of obtaining the 
source code for no more than a reasonable reproduction cost preferably, 
downloading via the Internet without charge. The source code must be the 
preferred form in which a programmer would modify the program. Deliberately 
obfuscated source code is not allowed. Intermediate forms such as the output of 
a preprocessor or translator are not allowed. 
-OSD Criterion (3) Derived Works 
The license must allow modifications and derived works, and must allow them 
to be distributed under the same terms as the license of the original software.96 
Perens hails the OSD as the “bill of rights for the computer users” because it defines 
“certain rights that a software license must grant [users] to be certified as Open 
Source.”97 He distils these rights under the OSD into three principles:  
 The right to make copies of the program, and distribute those copies.  
 The right to have access to the software’s source code, a necessary 
preliminary before you can change it 
 The right to make improvements to the program.98 
The above open source principles are almost identical with the FSD (except that the 
wording is slightly different). Stallman also observes that the OSD is only “derived 
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indirectly from” the rules set by the FSD, because FSD is also focused on the 
protection of software users’ “rights” (though in the FSD they are called “freedoms”) 
in these respects.   
It is interesting to note there are two “labels” that can be applied to the same type of 
non-proprietary software after 1998—“free software” and “open source”—both of 
which allow free access, modification and redistribution. The Linux project would 
continue to be “free software” since its inception, but it could also be called “open 
source” software after 1998. More importantly, Linux used the same licence—the 
GNU GPL—before and after 1998. Kelty points out an irony that the advocates of 
“free software” and proponents of “open source” seem to enter into a debate over 
something upon which they practically agree: “the creation of two names allowed 
people to identify one thing, for these two names referred to identical practices, 
licenses, tools, and organizations”: 
Free Software and Open Source shared everything “material,” but differed 
vocally and at great length with respect to ideology. Stallman was denounced as 
a kook, a communist, an idealist, and a dogmatic holding back the successful 
adoption of Open Source by business; Raymond and users of “open source” 
were charged with selling out the ideals of freedom and autonomy, with the 
dilution of the principles and the promise of Free Software, as well as with 
being stooges of capitalist domination. Meanwhile, both groups proceeded to 
create objects—principally software—using tools that they agreed on, concepts 
of openness that they agreed on, licenses that they agreed on, and 
organizational schemes that they agreed on. Yet never was there fiercer debate 
about the definition of Free Software.99 
So if the two labels refer to the same kind of software (and the same type of software 
licences as well), what is the real consequence of Raymond’s “open source” 
movement? Does it only introduce a distinction without a difference? Does the 
invention of “open source” really alter the course where “free software” would have 
gone after 1998?  
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My answer is that “open source” movement is more than a matter of changing label, 
but there have been at least two real impacts on the “free software” movement. The 
twofold impacts operate mutually on both movements: “open source” expands the 
influence of “free software” beyond the computer hacker community, while “free 
software” puts an “ethical” limit on how far this expansion can go. Firstly, the “open 
source” campaign significantly expands the reach of the “free software” and puts it 
firmly into the consciousness of the general public. Especially, it raises substantial 
awareness about the commercial potential of “free software” in the business world. It 
convinces quite a significant part of the conventional non-hacking world that the 
decentralised Bazaar model of mass collaboration “to the point of promiscuity” can 
be employed to produce high-quality software. The post-1998 “free software”, after 
being rebranded as “open source”, was no longer a monastic hacker subculture 
subsisting on the lingering Hacker Ethic, but it became increasingly in vogue among 
corporate executives and salespeople. Of course, this newly acquired popularity is 
achieved by toning down Stallman’s strong political language about the full 
commitment to “software freedom”.  
The second impact of “open source” is that it challenges Stallman to further defend 
the ultimate value of “free software” more rigorously in order to put an “ethical” 
limit on the otherwise unbridled commercialism of open source. Different from 
merely having a few knee-jerk reactions to some specific incidents in the 1980s (such 
as in Xerox and Symbolics incidents in the early 1980s100), Stallman after 1998 
needed to make conscious effort to clarify the “ethical” underpinning for the latter-
day Hacker Ethic. The most obvious example of these efforts is embodied in 
Stallman’s article—“Why Open Source Misses the Point of Free Software”—which 
is written as a direct response to the challenge posed by “open source”. In this article, 
he stresses that there is a pronounced difference between “free software” and “open 
source” in terms of the message about “freedom” that was intended to be sent or kept 
quiet about: 
Nearly all open source software is free software. The two terms describe almost 
the same category of software, but they stand for views based on fundamentally 
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different values. Open source is a development methodology; free software is a 
social movement. For the free software movement, free software is an ethical 
imperative, because only free software respects the users' freedom. By contrast, 
the philosophy of open source considers issues in terms of how to make 
software “better”—in a practical sense only. It says that nonfree software is an 
inferior solution to the practical problem at hand. For the free software 
movement, however, nonfree software is a social problem, and the solution is to 
stop using it and move to free software.101 (added emphasis)   
In the same article, Stallman further clarifies that software freedom needs to be 
guarded as an intrinsic value for its own sake. The measurement resides solely in the 
four kinds of software freedom given to software users, but not the performance of 
software. “Open source” is not necessarily a superior “development methodology” 
and it may well produce lower-quality software than the “closed source” software 
model. Open source advocates miss this point by wrongly believing that “open 
source” software is guaranteed to be more “powerful” and “reliable” than any 
proprietary one. 102  The reality is that it is possible for proprietary software to 
outperform non-proprietary software. Without a strong belief in the intrinsic value of 
“software freedom”, users can easily be lured away by some practical advantages 
offered by proprietary software. 
Sooner or later these users will be invited to switch back to proprietary software 
for some practical advantage. Countless companies seek to offer such 
temptation, some even offering copies gratis. Why would users decline? Only if 
they have learned to value the freedom free software gives them, to value 
freedom in and of itself rather than the technical and practical convenience of 
specific free software. To spread this idea, we have to talk about freedom. A 
certain amount of the “keep quiet” approach to business can be useful for the 
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community, but it is dangerous if it becomes so common that the love of 
freedom comes to seem like an eccentricity.103 
However, Stallman’s insistence that “open source is a development methodology; 
free software is a social movement” is not universally accepted. His argument tends 
to attract two kinds of objection. The first kind argues that “open source” is more 
qualified as a consciously organised “social movement” than “free software” is. 
Stallman’s free software campaign before 1998 could be seen as no more than an 
outlet of a lonely hacker’s frustration in reaction to a series of unhappy incidents.104 
In contrast, “open source” was consciously started as a movement in 1998 and it 
immediately attracted a lot of supporters who had already been working on leading 
“open source” projects such as Linux, Sendmail, Perl, Python, Apache. The official 
history of the Open Source Initiative documents that after the meeting organised by 
Tim O’Reilly on 8 April 1998, all the above participating “open source” 
programmers “voted to promote the use of the term ‘open source’, and agreed to 
adopt with it the new rhetoric of pragmatism and market-friendliness that Raymond 
had been developing.”105  
The second objection argues that it is futile to find whether “open source” or “free 
software” is a “movement” (or two “movements”). What really matters is the fact 
that “open source” and “free software” programmers share the same “platform”, 
which invites and encourages debate and discussion over issues pertinent to software 
development. This is the view held by Kelty, who calls this “platform” a “recursive 
public”. In this public, unmediated discourses are freely exchanged among 
programmers through their human language as well as their technological language 
in source code. This public is also said to be a “recursive” one, because Kelty 
believes that it dissolves the traditional distinction of software being a technical 
system and the organisation of software programmers being a social system. In this 
sense, FOSS “recurses” through the technical and social dimensions into one single 
“self-grounding” public sphere, which operates independently from other established 
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social structures such as the price mechanism of the market and the for-profit agenda 
under a corporate structure.106 (In contrast, most commercial proprietary software 
developers tend not to have such free-following “discourses” in a self-grounding 
public, because their technical output is mostly likely to be dictated or incentivised 
by either market or firms.) It is also important to note that the recursive public is 
neither a formal organisation nor an aimless crowd, but it sits somewhere between. 
Kelty believes that “recursive public” is a better term than “movement” to describe 
the unique phenomenon of “free software” and “open source” as sharing one and the 
same “public” platform: 
Free Software and Open Source are neither corporations nor organizations nor 
consortia (for there are no organizations to consort); they are neither national, 
subnational, nor international; they are not “collectives” because no 
membership is required or assumed—indeed to hear someone assert ‘I belong’ 
to Free Software or Open Source would sound absurd to anyone who does. 
Neither are they shady bands of hackers, crackers, or thieves meeting in the 
dead of night, which is to say that they are not an “informal” organization, 
because there is no formal equivalent to mimic or annul. Nor are they quite a 
crowd, for a crowd can attract participants who have no idea what the goal of 
the crowd is; also, crowds are temporary, while movements extend over time. It 
may be that movement is the best term of the lot, but unlike social movements, 
whose organization and momentum are fueled by shared causes or broken by 
ideological dispute, Free Software and Open Source share practices first, and 
ideologies second. It is this fact that is the strongest confirmation that they are a 
recursive public, a form of public that is as concerned with the material 
practical means of becoming public as it is with any given public debate.107 
In other words, it does not matter whether “free software” and “open source” is one 
or two “social movements” or none at all, but what is most significant is that they 
share the same debating platform, which is the same “recursive public”. I largely 
agree with Kelty that the debates between “open source” and “free software” are 
essential to create one shared “recursive public” between the two camps. However, I 
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am also afraid that Kelty does not pay enough attention to the fact that it was the 
“Hacker Ethic” (and its latter-day versions, i.e., FSD and OSD) that tied this public 
together in the first place. One should not take for granted the happening of the 
recursive public, and this public can never dispense with a minimum consensus as 
agreed by “open source” and “free software” partisans on basic tenets in the Hacker 
Ethic. Unfortunately, Kelty is rather dismissive of the Hacker Ethic’s role in guiding 
programmers’ behaviour and its relevance in the recursive public: “While hackers 
themselves might understand the hacker ethic as an unchanging set of moral norms, 
their practices belie this belief and demonstrate how ethics and norms can emerge 
suddenly and sharply, undergo repeated transformations, and bifurcate into 
ideologically distinct camps (Free Software vs. Open Source), even as the practices 
remain stable relative to them.”108 As has been shown above, from the Hacker Ethic 
to “free software” to “open source”, the core stewardship obligations to protect 
software freedom as indicated in Tenets (1) and (2) of Levy’s Hacker Ethic have 
largely reincarnated in Stallman’s FSD and Raymond’s OSD. The Hacker Ethic, as 
well as its spirit in various FOSS licences, provides a minimum consensus between 
“open source” and “free software” programmers. It glues programmers from both 
camps together to collaborate towards common projects. In other words, the Hacker 
Ethic is the common ground that underpins the collaborative practice of open source 
and free software. Without this minimum consensus, Kelty’s “recursive public” 
would not exist in the first place let alone survive the ever-changing socio-legal 
environment of software production. In short, although “open source” adds a 
commercial twist to the non-proprietary software movement in the third historical 
stage, it does not fundamentally change the “glue”, i.e. the Hacker Ethic, which 
brings together the collaborative efforts that build common software projects. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed a brief history of the Hacker Ethic since its inception in 
the relatively close-knit computer hacker community in the 1950s and 1960s, 
followed by the decline of the Hacker Ethic in the late 1970s and then the non-
proprietary software movement in an attempt to revive the lost Hacker Ethic from the 
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late 1980s onwards. In particular, Stallman invented a copyleft licensing scheme that 
for the first time verbalised programmers’ minimum commitment that is intended to 
support large-scale radically decentralised collaborative software projects. In 1998, 
the “open source” campaign led by Raymond openly broke away from Stallman’s 
“free software” movement to form a business-friendly group that has the ambition to 
succeed on the mainstream commercial software market, but the underlying Hacker 
Ethic of the movement has remained largely unchanged. In the next chapter, I will 
examine how the FOSS programmers find their legal expression of software freedom 
through “intellectual property” licensing schemes in some detail. 
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Chapter 3    Intellectual Property and Software Freedom 
 
3.1 Introduction 
After the 1980s it gradually transpired that the rise of intellectual property (IP), 
especially copyright and patent, in software became an increasingly influential factor 
affecting FOSS communities. The impact of IP was twofold. Firstly, it weakened 
hacker custom as a great number of computer hackers were lured away to write the 
more lucrative proprietary software. However, secondly, a small number of stalwart 
software freedom fighters puzzled out that copyright licences could be drafted in a 
way to continue the threatened custom. The first impact has mainly been covered in 
the previous chapter. It is the job of this chapter to explore how computer hackers 
attempt to reconfigure the IP system through their licensing schemes (e.g. GPL) in 
order to reinstate the principles of software freedom for their community. 
The chapter is divided into five parts. The first part (Section 3.2) explores Richard 
Stallman’s argument against using the umbrella term “intellectual property” that 
conventionally lumps together a set of disparate bodies of law, mainly including 
copyright and patent laws. As FOSS licences are attentive to the subtle differences 
between copyright and patent as well as their respective impact on FOSS 
collaboration, it is necessary for this chapter to examine these two areas separately. 
The second part (Section 3.3) is a general introduction to software copyright law as 
the background against which FOSS licensing schemes are crafted. It discusses some 
major developments in Anglo-American copyright law that have positively or 
negatively affected software freedom. The third part (Section 3.4) explores the rise of 
“software patents” as a response to the IP expansionists’ failure to stretch copyright 
further to cover the non-expressive elements, i.e. functionality of software since the 
1990s. It canvasses the debate about the patentability of computer programs in both 
EPC countries (especially UK) and the US. I will show how FOSS programmers 
perceive patents as a threat to software freedom. The fourth part (Section 3.5) uses 
the GPL as an example to show how principles of software freedom are articulated 
mainly through the language of copyright law. It also examines how the GPL 
partially contains the perceived threat to the hacker ethic from patents. The fifth part 
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(Section 3.6) concludes that FOSS programmers do not endorse “IP” as a unified 
body of law but they selectively leverage two different branches of “IP” (i.e. 
copyright and patent) to protect software freedom in a non-exclusive commons 
regime. 
3.2 “Intellectual Property” and FOSS 
An exploration of “software freedom”, which is a necessary condition of commons-
based decentralised collaborative programming, ironically has to “start[] with the 
other side of the coin, property rights”.1 This is largely because the idea of “software 
freedom” in FOSS licensing was first triggered as the computer hackers’ response to 
the rise of intellectual property in software programs.2 It reflects what Houweling 
calls the “property turn” in the FOSS movement that has run concurrently with a 
broader movement known as “cultural environmentalism”. 3  The employment of 
FOSS licences is not drastically dissimilar to environmentalists’ efforts to enlist the 
property regime to impose land obligations such as the much used “conservation 
easement”.4 The “property turn” embodied in FOSS licensing indicates that a FOSS 
commons is different from the public domain that is a property-free zone. FOSS 
programmers do not relinquish their IP rights altogether, but they rearrange the initial 
entitlements as conferred by IP law. Along this line, Boyle differentiates two kinds of 
freedom as institutionalised respectively in the public domain and the licensing 
commons (the commons produced as a result of FOSS licensing): “In the public 
domain, freedom is based on the absence of property rights. In the licensing 
commons, freedom is based on the preemptive exercise of the property rights by the 
rights holder in order to grant use privileges to users of the commons, and sometimes 
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 Lawrence Rosen, Open Source Licensing—Software Freedom and Intellectual Property Law, (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall PTR, 2005) p.13 
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 See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, “Cultural Environmentalism and the Constructed Commons”, 
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4
 For “conservation easement” in the context of environmental protection, see, for example, Nancy A. 
McLaughlin, “Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements”, (2005) 29 Harvard 
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to bind those future users to add their own improvements back to the common 
pool.”5 (original emphasis)  
Although a licensed FOSS commons is built upon the institution of IP, it would be 
inappropriate to leap to the conclusion that FOSS programmers embrace 
wholeheartedly the idea of “property” in general and that of “IP” in particular. The 
reality is a bit more complex than that in two respects. First, the use of licensing 
schemes mainly reflects the pragmatic side of the FOSS movement. Licensing is not 
intended to, and cannot be, a complete overhaul of the existing IP system, but they 
are workarounds or makeshift solutions to particular defects of the legal system as 
identified by FOSS programmers.6 Not unlike computer hackers’ “patches” or “bug 
fixes” that are designed to fix some particular problems in a software program, FOSS 
licences are the equivalent of “computing hacks” in the legal world. They are 
privately made legal “patches” submitted to plug holes in publicly made IP law based 
on FOSS programmers’ diagnoses. For example, Kelty believes that GPL is exactly 
Stallman’s “hack” into the US IP regime. 7  However, this legal pragmatism of 
“patching” and “hacking” should not obscure the idealistic side of the FOSS 
movement, which attempts to reverse the programming environment back to a 
situation similar to the pre-1980s IP-free hacker community. 8  Although it is 
uncertain whether this ideal of creating an IP-free zone can be realised in the near 
future, it at least reminds us that the current arrangements under various FOSS 
licensing schemes are largely a compromise between private property and the hacker 
ethic.  
Secondly, FOSS programmers are aware that the so-called “intellectual property 
law” is not a unified body of law, but conventionally has at least three major sub-sets, 
                                                 
5See James Boyle, “Cultural Environmentalism and Beyond” (2007) 70 Law and Contemporary 
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6
 There is no shortage of suggestion that more changes should be done through legislative route by 
amending IP laws rather than private ordering though licensing schemes. See for example, Severine 
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7
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8
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of all forms of private property in ideas.” See Moglen, The dotCommunist Manifesto, January 2003, 
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 85
comprising copyright, patent and trademark.9 Stallman is famous for his persistent 
refusal to use the umbrella term “intellectual property”, and he argues that “IP” is 
merely a “seductive mirage” that does not exist in reality.10 It would be misleading to 
lump these three disparate categories together as if they are a unified whole, because 
each of them respectively plays quite a different role in FOSS licensing: Very briefly, 
FOSS licences rely primarily on copyright, which protects software programs as if 
they are literary works. To patent software is hugely controversial in the Anglo-
American world and hard-core free software programmers are normally against the 
use of patents. In order to protect their goodwill and reputation, it is not unusual 
nowadays for FOSS programmers to seek trademark protection for indicators of the 
origin of their projects and associated products or services. In short, it would be an 
inappropriate question to ask whether FOSS programmers are for or against “IP”, but 
it is necessary to have a more nuanced approach by examining separately the roles of 
copyright, patent and trademark in FOSS licensing.  
Furthermore, it is also important to note that Stallman’s rejection is closely linked 
with his criticism of mainstream economic (or in Stallman’s parlance, simplistic 
“economistic”) thinking behind the term “IP”:  
The term “intellectual property” also leads to simplistic thinking. It leads 
people to focus on the meager commonality in form that these disparate laws 
have—that they create artificial privileges for certain parties—and to disregard 
the details which form their substance: the specific restrictions each law places 
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 Apart from these three sub-areas of IP, software is also commonly protected as trade secrets through 
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owner may exercise dominion over that intellectual property”. (original emphasis) See Rosen, Open 
Source Licensing, supra note 1, p.14 
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on the public, and the consequences that result. This simplistic focus on the 
form encourages an “economistic” approach to all these issues.11    
Economistic thinking, he goes on, serves as “a vehicle for unexamined assumptions” 
where only the quantity of software production matters, but “freedom and way of life 
do not.” With this in mind, I will now examine copyright and patent in turn to see 
how they are respectively viewed by FOSS programmers. As trademarks have more 
to do with the FOSS programmers’ manifestation of their collective authorship in 
collaborative projects, they are not dealt with in this chapter but will be analysed 
later in Chapter 5 which is dedicated to the issue of FOSS authorship. 
3.3 Copyright and FOSS 
From the late 1970s onwards, developments in statutory and case laws in the Anglo-
American world gradually established copyright as the main mode of legal protection 
for computer programs. In the US, the 1978 final report prepared by the National 
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) 
recommended that copyright should be extended to software. This recommendation 
was enacted by the 1980 amendment of the US 1976 Copyright Act that expressly 
included “computer program” as a subject matter. In this amended Act, a computer 
program is defined as “a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or 
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result” and is protected as a 
kind of literary work.12 The copyright scholar Melville Nimmer, in his capacity as 
Vice Chairman of the CONTU, clarified that the existing general copyright 
principles should in a wholesale fashion be applied to software programs just like 
any other copyright subject matter: 
CONTU did not recommend, and did not intend, any change in the continuing 
applicability to programs of general copyright principles—e.g., as to the 
copyrightability and infringement—in effect following the enactment of the 
general revision of the Copyright Act in 1976. The general copyright principles 
applicable to programs have been, and remain, those which are applicable to 
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novels, plays, directories, dictionaries, textbooks, musical works, maps, 
motions pictures, sound recordings, and other categories of works.13 
In the UK, the Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act 1985 for the first 
time specifically included software programs in the “literary work” category under 
the 1956 Copyright Act. The subsequent 1988 Copyright Design Patent Act (CDPA) 
also provides that copyrights subsist in software programs as “literary works”. 
Section 3 (1b), defines “literary work” as “any work, other than a dramatic or 
musical work, which is written, spoken or sung, and accordingly includes […] a 
computer program […].”14 Unlike the US copyright law, the CDPA does not have a 
definition for “computer program”, which arguably has the advantage of being 
flexible to include new technologies such as HTML programs.15 
3.3.1 The Originality Threshold 
Copyright law requires that programs be original to merit protection. Anglo-
American copyright law does not set a very high threshold for “originality”, but it is 
not always an easy task to ascertain the degree of “originality” that qualifies a piece 
of code for copyright subsistence. In the US copyright subsists in “original works of 
authorship”16 and a work is “original” in the sense that it is “independently created 
by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least 
some minimal degree of creativity”.17 (added emphasis)  In the UK the threshold is 
arguably even lower, with no explicit requirement of a work to be minimally creative. 
Copyright may subsist in a work as long as it is not copied from other human-made 
sources and is a result of the author’s own skill, judgment or labour.18 In contrast, the 
European continental legal tradition tends to have a more demanding requirement of 
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originality for works including computer programs.19 In an attempt to harmonise 
national differences among countries in Europe, Article 1(3) of 1991 EU Software 
Directive gives a definition of “originality” as follows:  
A computer program shall be protected if it is original in the sense that it is the 
author’s own intellectual creation.20 (added emphasis)  
The Directive further makes it clear that the author’s “intellectual creation” is the 
sole criterion of copyright subsistence and “[n]o other criteria shall be applied to 
determine its eligibility for protection.” 21  Unfortunately, the UK draftsman 
responsible for preparing the implementing regulations assumes that the existing UK 
copyright originality standard has already been practically compatible with the 
Directive’s definition of originality as the “author’s own intellectual creation” and 
there was no need to change the wording in the corresponding section of UK 
copyright law. Lai suspects that this assumption may well not be true.22 In case of 
conflict, Bainbridge argues, the Directive’s requirement of originality for computer 
programs should prevail over the English one: “It is beyond doubt that a judge in the 
United Kingdom would apply [Directive’s] test rather than the traditional view of 
judges of what originality meant, even if a common thread could be determined.”23  
There can be three types of “original” copyrightable contributions arising from a 
FOSS project. First, if the code is completely written from scratch by contributors for 
the project, it is highly likely to pass any of the three aforementioned tests of 
originality for having a “minimal degree of creativity” (US), or using programmers’ 
“skill, judgement and labour” (UK), or being authors’ “own intellectual creation” 
(EU). Secondly, copyright may also subsist in modifications of preexisting code if 
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these modifications are “original” enough to be recognised by copyright law. In the 
US, a copyrightable modification can be a “derivative work” which means the work 
“based upon one or more preexisting works […] or any other form in which a work 
may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”24 Similarly in the UK, the modified code 
may give rise to a fresh copyright if it passes the minimum threshold of originality.25 
As software is also a functional artifact, there is a domino effect, where one tiny 
modification may lead to a series of follow-up changes in order to make the whole 
program operate properly. Bainbridge observes that even if a single modification is 
too trivial to be original, the many modifications together may cumulate to qualify 
for a fresh copyright:      
Where the modifications represent the author’s own intellectual creation, a 
fresh copyright will be created in the new version of the program. It may be that 
this applies to an accumulation of numerous modifications, each of which in 
themselves might not reach the standard for originality. However, even making 
a small modification to a computer may require the exercise of a great deal of 
skill as the programmer has to check that the modification works correctly and 
that the effect it has on the existing and retained parts of the program is as 
intended. This can call for a significant amount of testing and further 
modification. Even a small modification can have unpredictable consequences 
and end up involving far more work than originally envisaged.26 
That a fresh copyright is recognised as subsisting in modifications or derivative 
works is crucial to peer-produced FOSS projects. This is because FOSS collaboration 
is built upon incremental creativity by many collaborative programmers rather than a 
single breakthrough invention by the initial creators. Rosen points out that copyright 
ownership in FOSS can be seen as a chain of title, where “[a]n original work of 
authorship is the first link in the chain” and this “chain is elongated during the 
collaborative open source development process.”27 The strength of this chain of title 
in many follow-up modifications can be a measure of the robustness of the 
collaborative relations in a collaborative FOSS project. In other words, the maturity 
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 Bainbridge, supra note 23, pp. 65-66 
27
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of a FOSS project can be roughly shown by the length of the chain of title: “Mature 
open source projects often consist of software passed through many such stages of 
aggregation and modification, their original works of authorship proudly displaying a 
long chain of title including the names of many individuals and organizations that 
preceded them.”28 I will show later that GPL is important exactly because it makes 
sure the “chain of title” in a FOSS project is unbroken by imposing the copyleft 
condition on distributing the GPL covered code.  
Thirdly, there can be a “compilation” copyright that subsists in the aggregated work 
comprising all submitted contributions to a FOSS project as a collective whole. The 
UK copyright protects “compilation” as a kind of “literary work”, 29  which is 
different from the term “database” as defined in the CDPA30. Bainbridge argues that 
a software program can be a “compilation” but not a “database”, because the former 
is an undivided collective whole while the latter comprises separable independent 
works: “Where a computer program is made up of individual modules, those 
modules cannot be described as independent. They work together as a whole 
application. Therefore, the whole may have a separate copyright as compilation 
independent of any copyright in the modules as programs in their own right.”31 In the 
US context, the term “compilation” has a slightly different meaning than that in the 
UK. The US “compilation” copyright covers “collective works” where “a number of 
contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are 
assembled into a collective whole.”32 (Note that the US “collective works” cover 
“separate and independent” works, which are different from Bainbridge’s 
understanding of software as “compilation” comprising inseparable interdependent 
modules in the UK context.33) The copyright in software as a “collective work”, 
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according to Rosen, is “a reflection of the originality of the collection and its 
organizational structure rather than of the individual components. Most software is a 
copyrightable collection of modules. The arrangement and organization of the 
collection of individual modules are often the most original aspects of a software 
program.”34 The recognition of originality in “compilation” or “collective works” has 
a largely positive impact on FOSS projects, whose design of the modular 
“architecture”35 prizes the lead developers’ creative efforts in aggregating individual 
contributions into a coherent collective whole. These efforts of aggregation are not 
necessarily mindless mechanical work but they involve selecting, testing, and 
approving (and sometimes declining) code sent by contributors,36 and they are highly 
likely to be beyond the threshold of originality. This is especially true for the Linux 
kernel project, where Torvalds and his fellow subsystem maintainers have devoted 
themselves to aggregating a huge amount of peer-produced contributions into a 
coherent whole. In this light, Eric Raymond and Catherine Raymond strongly advise 
that it would be beneficial for FOSS project leaders to always register copyright in 
their project as original “collective works” with the copyright registration authority 
in the US.37  
In summary, although the threshold of originality to qualify for copyright subsistence 
is low, it does exist for computer programs. All sustained FOSS projects would 
contain a huge number of contributions with various degree of originality. The 
biggest problem that FOSS projects face is not about whether contributed code is 
“original” enough to attract copyright protection. Most contributions will easily pass 
the originality threshold individually on their own merit. On top of this, these 
contributions together will also cumulatively give rise to copyright in “compilations” 
or “collective works”. The really difficult problem that needs to be tackled is that 
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many original contributions will form a huge network of ownership interests by many 
copyright holders. It is not always an easy task to coordinate these many ownership 
interests for the purpose of building one coherent project and the copyright system 
will not automatically splice them together. In this scenario, FOSS licences step in to 
solve the problem of coordination by standardising the legal commitments of many 
copyright holding contributors. These licences make peer-produced contributions 
legally compatible with each other in a decentralised environment. 
3.3.2 Software as Expression and Function 
It is understandable that to analogise a computer program to a literary work38 has the 
advantage of fitting software as a new technological form into an existing 
copyrightable subject matter, but this is not an entirely accurate analogy. Software is 
not ordinary literary text written and read by human beings, but, more importantly, it 
contains instructions that operate computerised functions. In short, software has a 
dual nature of being both expressive like literal texts and functional like machines.39 
Recall that software is written in source code by programmers and it can be compiled 
into object code that can be executed by computers. On the one hand, the human-
readable source code is just like any other form of human expression such as novels, 
speech scripts or sheet music scores. On the other hand, the machine-readable object 
code turns software into functional artifacts that instruct computers to “manipulate 
symbols leading to virtual or physical effects, such as making calculations, 
displaying information on a screen, controlling the path of a cutting device or an 
industrial process.”40 This dual nature of software as expression and function is well 
reflected in Laddie et. al.’s definition of software “program” in the UK context 
(while the CDPA does not define what is software): a software program is “a series 
of instructions capable of being fed to a computer system, by typing in at a keyboard 
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or in any other way, and, when so entered, of controlling its operation in a desired 
manner.”41  
As a general rule, copyright protects expressions, but not functions, of software: “it is 
a programmer’s expression of some functionality that may be protected by copyright, 
and not the functionality itself.”42 (original emphasis) Unfortunately the water has 
already been muddied in reality, partially because it is not always easy to separate 
functionality neatly from expression in computer programs.43 There is no shortage of 
attempts by proprietary software developers to broaden copyright protection to cover 
functionality of software. Since the mid-1980s, there has been a series of cases 
concerning whether or not copyright protection could be stretched to give protection 
to the “non-literal” or “non-textual” (i.e. functional) elements in software on both 
side of the Atlantic. In the US, the Court of Appeal for Third Circuit, in the 1986 
landmark case Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, ruled that “even 
absent copying the literal elements of the program” the defendant infringed the 
copyright in the non-textual “structure” of a record-keeping program by the 
plaintiff. 44  This ruling effectively stretched copyright protection to the non-
expressive part of the software program. The Whelan decision was much criticised 
for giving the overbroad protection to software45 but it is welcomed, mainly by IP 
expansionist commentators, as a way of compensating for the lack of clear patent 
protection of the functionality of software programs in the mid-1980s. For example, 
Maier argues that the Whelan court reached an equitable result during a time when 
the US legal system was extremely uncertain about whether software-related 
inventions could get patent protection:  
In effect, copyright protection has been stretched in Whelan to fill the gap left 
when the courts denied software inventions patent protection. Stretching 
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copyright protection is understandable, from an equitable point of view, to 
protect software authors/inventors who were discouraged from seeking patent 
protection due to the changing status of the law regarding the patentability of 
software inventions. The equities are particularly important in cases involving 
misconduct. Prospectively, however, as the intellectual property community 
accepts the notion that software is patentable, there may ultimately be little 
need to so stretch the bounds of copyright protection.46 
The expansionist rationale in Whelan made its way into a few subsequent cases 
including the highly controversial Lotus Development Corporation v. Paperback 
Software International, where Judge Keeton decided that the menu command 
hierarchy in the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program was protected by copyright.47 It is 
important to know that although Lotus Development Corporation won this case, it 
failed, two years later, to secure copyright protection for the same non-literal menu 
system in a second Lotus case against another company. 48 The first Lotus ruling is 
generally regarded as the high-water mark of copyright protection of the “look and 
feel” or the user interfaces in software.49 Free software programmers reacted strongly 
against this expansionist tendency. Shortly after Lotus filed the first lawsuit against 
Paperback, Richard Stallman and his followers organised a mass picket outside the 
Lotus headquarters to publicise the danger of giving software companies overbroad 
protection of their software products.50 
The Whelan and the first Lotus decisions follow the so-called “broad constructionist” 
approach of software copyright, because they have broadened the reach of copyright 
to cover the non-expressive part of software. This “broad constructionism” is 
contended by the “narrow constructionism” that believes copyright should be limited 
to textual copying of software:  
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On one side, ‘broad constructionists’ have emphasized the need to compare the 
copyrighted and accused works as a whole, in order to give protection to the 
‘total concept and feel’ of the works. On the other side, ‘narrow 
constructionists’ have urged the methodical dissection of copyrighted works 
into their component parts in order to determine what exactly qualifies for 
copyright protection.51 
In 1992, things started to change when the Second Circuit made a landmark “narrow 
constructionist” ruling in Computer Associates v. Altai, which greatly reined in the 
“broad constructionist” tendency in US software copyright. In this case, Judge 
Walker devised a much more nuanced three-step test by 1) dissecting software into 
different levels of abstraction, 2) filtering out non-protectable elements and 3) 
comparing the remaining core expressive parts to see if there is a substantial 
similarity between the program alleged to have been infringed and the allegedly 
infringing program. 52  This abstraction-filtration-comparison Altai test has been 
followed in later US cases and it has also spread to non-US jurisdictions.53  For 
example, in the UK context, the use of Altai test was endorsed by Ferris J. in 
Richardson v. Flanders54 but was later rejected by Jacob J., who in Ibcos v. Barclays 
favoured using the indigenous English test of the “overborrowing of skill, labour and 
judgement which went into the copyright work”.55 Lai worries that the English test 
lacks prescriptive precision to guide future cases involving non-literal copying of 
software. Jacob’s rejection of the Altai test, which could have usefully filtered out 
non-protectable elements, might lead to a Whelan-type overprotection of software in 
the UK: “Due to the absence of a prescriptive test/criterion [similar to the Altai test], 
UK software copyright law will be placed in a more invidious position than the US, 
if Ibcos is followed. Arguably, the scope of software copyright protection is 
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presently greater in the United Kingdom than in the USA. Whelan-type fears of 
broad protection are there to be realised for the future.”56  
Campaign against Copyright Protection of Non-literal Element of Software 
After the 1980s, FOSS programmers generally accepted copyright subsistence in the 
expressive part of software. However, they reacted strongly against extending 
copyright protection further to the non-literal part, especially the “look and feel”, of 
computer programs. When Lotus Development Corporation brought its first 
copyright lawsuit to protect the menu system of their Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet 
program, the free software community were deeply worried that this move would 
jeopardise the creative freedom that software programmers would be allowed to have 
in the future. 57  On 24 May 1989, Stallman and two other prominent computer 
scientists (including Marvin Minsky, the founder of the MIT Artificial Intelligence 
Lab58) orchestrated a large-scale demonstration against the Lotus’s “look and feel” 
copyright litigation. Over two hundred people, most of whom were MIT professors 
and students, marched from the MIT campus to join a rally outside the Lotus 
headquarters based at Cambridge, Massachusetts. They carried placards bearing 
signs such as “Creative companies don’t need to sue” and “Oh no! Look and feel 
copyright!” and chanted a hexadecimal protest slogan: 
Hey, hey, ho, ho, software tyranny has got to go 
1-2-3-4, toss the lawyers out the door 
5-6-7-8, innovate don’t litigate 
9-A-B-C, 1-2-3 is not for me 
D-E-F-O, look and feel have got to go59 
It is important to know that the protest was not just targeted at Lotus, but more 
broadly it registered the computer hackers’ growing unease about the copyright 
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expansionist trend as represented by a series of similar undergoing copyright disputes 
over the non-literal copying of graphic user interfaces.60 It is feared that by giving 
protection to the “look and feel” of software, other programmers would be 
effectively stopped from independently writing their own code to achieve identical 
functions. Stallman likens the consequence to that of giving monopoly over steering 
a car: “If there were copyrights like this on cars, then every manufacturer would have 
to give you a different way to steer […] If you learned to drive a Ford, you wouldn't 
know how to drive Chevrolets. Some cars would have throttles, others would have 
joysticks, and each manufacturer would have to find a new way of doing it”.61 With 
the introduction of the “look and feel” copyright, it is a slippery slope where software 
programmers would be deprived of the freedom to mimic the non-literal aspect of 
other programmers’ software even though they do not involve the act of literal 
copying. 
The high turnout at the Lotus protest is a sign of the lingering impact of the old 
Hacker Ethic that originated from the MIT AI lab but was challenged by proprietary 
software in the late 1970s. It shows that the Hacker Ethic was not quite dead in the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s, and it still played a role in forging solidarity among 
programmers who are against copyright expansion. The most enthusiastic anti-Lotus 
protestors, in late 1989, formed the League for Programming Freedom (LPF), also 
under the leadership of Stallman, with an aim “to prevent monopolies on software 
development”.62 As the second Lotus case closed the door to the “look and feel” 
copyright completely (i.e., graphic user interface copyright could no longer pose any 
further threat to programming freedom)63, the LPF shifted to another battlefield, 
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where they campaigned hard against the growing monopolistic effect of software 
patents.64 
3.3.3 Scope of Exclusivity: Restricted and Permitted Acts 
Software programmers, as the original authors of their works, have some exclusive 
rights to do certain restricted acts in relation to their programs. However, these 
exclusive rights do not amount to the software authors’ total and absolute ownership 
of their works, and they are normally subjected to various exceptions mandated by 
copyright law. These exceptions in effect narrow the scope of exclusivity by 
allowing non-owners to do certain acts without the original programmers’ permission. 
In the US, the Copyright Act 1976 gives copyright holders five exclusive rights 1) to 
make copies, 2) to prepare derivative works, 3) to distribute copies of the original 
work or derivative works, 4) to perform certain kinds of works publicly and 5) to 
display certain kinds of works.65 . Specific to software, there are two important 
limitations on these exclusive rights. Firstly, users are allowed to make a copy or 
adaptation of the computer program “as an essential step in the utilization” of it.66 
Secondly, users are also allowed to make back-up copies of the program for archival 
purposes.67 In other words, lawful computer users can do these two acts without 
permission from software authors.  
In the UK, the copyright holders have a slightly different list of exclusive rights to do 
the certain acts “restricted” by copyright. They are the exclusive rights (a) to copy 
the work; (b) to issue copies of the work to the public; (ba) to rent or lend the work to 
the public; (c) to perform, show or play the work to the public; (d) to communicate 
the work to the public; (e) to make an adaptation of the work or do any of the above 
in relation to an adaptation.68 Outside the purview of these exclusive rights, there is 
also a host of general “permitted acts” that can be done without a copyright holder’s 
permission.69 Specific to computer programs, there are four important “permitted 
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acts” that further narrow the scope of programmers’ exclusive rights. It is not an 
infringement of copyright for a lawful user to 1) make back up copies of a program70; 
2) to decompile the program to achieve interoperability71; 3) to observe, study and 
test the functioning of the program72; 4) to copy or adapt the program necessary for 
his lawful use especially for the purpose of correcting errors in the program.73 It is 
important to note that it is not possible to contract out of the first three exceptions by 
means of licensing agreements. Under s. 294A(1) CDPA, licensing terms that forbid 
lawful users from doing these three permitted acts are unenforceable:  
Where a person has the use of a computer program under an agreement, any 
term or condition in the agreement shall be void in so far as it purports to 
prohibit or restrict– 
(a) the making of any back up copy of the program which it is necessary for 
him to have for the purposes of the agreed use;  
(b) where the conditions in section 50B(2) are met, the decompiling of the 
program; or  
(c) the observing, studying or testing of the functioning of the program in 
accordance with section 50BA.74 
However, it is possible to contract out of the fourth exception, which allows copying 
or adaptation of a program when necessary for the purpose of its “lawful use”.75 This 
permitted act is sometimes seen as an equivalent of the “non-derogation from grant” 
doctrine making its way into UK software copyright law. 76  According to Lord 
Temple, this doctrine means “that a grantor will not be allowed to derogate from his 
grant by using property retained by him in such a way as to render property granted 
by him unfit or materially unfit for the purpose for which the grant was made […]”.77 
Section 50C of the CDPA codifies this doctrine by preventing software copyright 
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holders from imposing unnecessary restrictions that would otherwise defeat the 
purpose of the lawful use of the software in the absence of a contrary agreement.  
In the spirit of Section 50C, it is worth noting that the CDPA does give lawful 
software users a highly circumscribed right to debug software. Section 50C(2) 
stipulates that it may “be necessary for the lawful use of a computer program to copy 
it or adapt it for the purpose of correcting errors in it” provided that there is no 
agreement to the contrary. It is understandable that most proprietary software 
companies would contract out of this permitted act by not giving users the right to 
correct errors by themselves in the licensing schemes. This is because these 
companies have “a vested interest in providing on-going maintenance, including 
error correction, to their licensees”.78 However, independent from this circumscribed 
right to debug, it is sometimes speculated that software users may resort to the “right 
to repair” (or the “spare parts” exception) created in British Leyland v. Armstrong as 
an analogous device to achieve the identical purpose of correcting errors. In British 
Leyland, the majority opinion of the House of Lords decided that customers had a 
“right to repair” that overrode car manufacturers’ copyright in the drawings of its car 
exhaust system.79 This “right to repair” was later confirmed in the software case 
Saphena v. Allied Collection, where the defendant was held to be entitled to modify 
the provided source code in order to debug the software.80 Unfortunately, despite the 
Saphena decision, it is highly uncertain whether British Leyland could always be 
cited as a firm authority for software users to claim their right to debug software. 
This is because the “right to repair” as invented in British Leyland is a doctrinally 
unsound policy decision, and it has been criticised for being an unsatisfactory 
product of “a blatant piece of judicial legislation” that overrode the statutory 
exclusive right of a copyright owner.81 Bainbridge argues that this “right to repair” is 
unlikely to play an important role in limiting software owners’ exclusive rights:  
On balance, it is difficult to say with any certainty that the British Leyland right 
to repair can apply to error correction of computer programs. There will usually 
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be an expectation that the software company will correct errors and, in the vast 
majority of cases, a maintenance agreement will be entered into by the parties. 
It is often part and parcel of the original agreement. The right to repair may be 
available in limited cases such as where the software company is no longer 
willing or able to correct errors but its wider application is doubtful.82 
It is not difficult to find that a wide scope of exclusive rights that have been given to 
software authors by copyright is not really conducive to FOSS collaboration based 
on the peer-production model. In order to build up a large-scale FOSS project, 
“peers” must work in an environment where each other’s code can be readily 
reproduced, modified, debugged and redistributed on a frequent basis. The copyright 
regime, by default, seems disproportionately skewed towards the economic interests 
of proprietary software developers who have little intention to collaborate with 
software users. It assumes that software programs are discrete products that are 
mainly developed by software programmers in isolation from the outside world and 
at the same time these programmers’ efforts must be rewarded by exclusive property 
rights. This assumption is too simplistic to account for many collaborative non-
proprietary software programming activities that do not rely on exclusive property 
rights. In this light, FOSS licences are designed to squeeze the broad scope of 
exclusive rights by copyright owners in order to create a software commons suitable 
for decentralised collaborative programming. Under these licences, programmers 
voluntarily relinquish almost all of their exclusive rights and everyone is invited to 
freely “copy” or “adapt” each other’s code. Perens’s three principles distilled from 
the Open Source Definitions illustrate how software users are empowered by having 
three “rights” to software under FOSS licensing schemes: they have “1) The right to 
make copies of the program, and distribute those copies. 2) The right to have access 
to the software’s source code, a necessary preliminary before you can change it. 3) 
The right to make improvements to the program.” 83  These three rights substantially 
expand the scope of software users’ “permitted acts” than are initially allowed by 
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copyright. I will come back to this issue through an examination of GPL in some 
detail in infra Section 3.5.1. 
3.4 Patent and FOSS 
There are two possible routes to get legal protection for the functions of software by 
intellectual property law.84 The first route is to stretch copyright to cover the non-
literal elements of software as what was achieved in early software copyright cases 
such as Whelan 85 , while the second route is to patent software as computer-
implemented inventions. As is discussed above, the first route now has been blocked 
in the US since the Altai decision introduced the abstraction-filtration-comparison 
test to disqualify the non-expressive part of software for copyright protection.86 
Software developers who are keen to offset the effect of the Altai decision now have 
to go down the second route by patenting their works. This second route is favoured 
by IP expansionists who are interested in creating a seamless protection spectrum 
where the post-Altai copyright regime is supplemented by the patent system. Maier’s 
argument for “a unique continuum of intellectual property protection” of software is 
representative of this view:  
One must not suppose that copyright and patent protection are in any way at 
odds. Copyright protection can mesh very neatly with patent protection to 
provide a unique continuum of intellectual property protection in the software 
environment. Copyright protects against literal copying and against slavish 
imitation of code or mode of expression. Patent protects against infringing use, 
whether through derivation or independent development, of the broader 
functional aspects of software thus the combination of available copyright and 
patent protection would appear to make software the most protectable of all 
technology […].87 
It is not difficult to see that Maier’s argument in favour of a maximalist protection 
under the copyright-patent continuum is one-sidedly presented from a profit-
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maximising perspective held by some, if not all, commercial proprietary software 
developers.88 In contrast to Maier’s view, many FOSS developers, especially those 
hard-core free software proponents, are vehemently against software patents, which 
are believed to be the potential and actual threat to FOSS projects. Free Software 
Foundation (FSF) and League for Programming Freedom (LPF), both of which are 
under the leadership of Stallman, are among the most vocal voices calling for 
abolishing “software patents”.89 However, it would be wrong to make a sweeping 
statement that FOSS is an antithesis to software patents. Not all FOSS developers 
wish to abolish software patents, but some of them take a more reconciliatory 
position that the patent system could be reformed. This reformist view is mainly held 
by corporate open-source participants, who are financially better-resourced, to defuse 
patent infringement allegations and even to build their own defensive portfolios of 
patents. This bifurcation of patent abolitionism and reformism is indicative of a 
growing schism between the camp of “pure” volunteer contributors and that of 
corporate contributors. Although Stallman has never been against corporate 
participation of FOSS projects, he draws the line at the issue of software patents. The 
following two subsections will delve into the impact of patents on software freedom 
by examining 1) the legal meaning of “software patents” and 2) the considerable 
controversy caused by these patents in relation to FOSS. 
3.4.1 Patentability of Software-Related Inventions 
Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as “software patent”, because software or 
computer programs standing alone or “as such” are normally excluded from being a 
patentable subject matter under the Anglo-American patent law. In fact, the term 
“software patent” is often merely used in a loose sense and it does not really have an 
agreed-upon legal meaning. Software Freedom Law Centre’s (SFLC), in their 
official guide advising patent defences for FOSS developers, deliberately choose to 
avoid this term: 
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[…] we avoid use of the term ‘software patent,’ which has no generally agreed-
upon definition. Under current U.S. law, software per se is (probably) not 
patentable, but it is generally a simple exercise in artful legal drafting to 
represent a software-related invention as a claim covering patentable subject 
matter (generally by reciting generic, well-known hardware features). Although 
the details differ, the basic situation is much the same in many other countries, 
despite a widely-held misconception in the FOSS community that the 
patentability of software-related inventions is peculiar to U.S. law.90  
This thesis prefers to use the term “software-related invention” (or simply “software 
invention”) 91  or “computer-implemented invention” (CII) 92 , either of which is 
slightly more accurate in reflecting the actual state of affairs. The reason behind this 
preference is as follows: what is under the heated “software patent” debate concerns 
not the easy case of clearly unpatentable software as such, but the more complicated 
case of the alleged “inventions” employing “software” as a component. Because the 
legal boundary of these software inventions is not always clear-cut, its wide reach 
may well profoundly affect FOSS collaborative projects. However, this 
terminological preference for “software-related invention” should not be read as a 
call for categorically banning the use of “software patents” in the literature. To the 
contrary, it is intended to give a clearer picture of what much-discussed “software 
patent” as a legal phenomenon is really about and why it is so strongly opposed to by 
hard-core abolitionist free software campaigners. As patent laws about software-
related inventions are not exactly the same in the UK (and within the bigger context 
of European Patent Convention) and the US, I will explain the two patent regimes 
separately. This explanation will set the scene for a critical understanding of the 
                                                 
90
 SFLC (Richard Fontana et. al.), A Legal Issues Primer for Open Source and Free Software Projects, 
3 March 2008, at <http://www.softwarefreedom.org/resources/2008/foss-primer.html>  FN3, p.21 
91
 Bainbridge defined “software invention” as “an invention within a range of inventions which are 
implemented by means involving or including a programmed computer.” See Bainbridge, supra note 
23, p.284 
92
 This term is used by the proposed Directive on patentability of CII, which is defined as “any 
invention the performance of which involves the use of a computer, computer network or other 
programmable apparatus and having one or more prima facie novel features which are realised wholly 
or partly by means of a computer program or computer programs.” In 2002, this Directive, as an 
attempt to codify the case law of the EPO, was proposed but it was rejected by the European 
Parliament in 2005 due to the lack of consensus among member countries. However, the term CII is 
still used in the scholarly literature. For example, Bainbridge believes that “CII” is synonymous with 
the term “software invention” as is defined by himself. ibid. 
 105
debate between the “software patent” abolitionists and reformists within the FOSS 
community. 
UK and the EPC Regime: Interpreting “Technical Character” 
In the UK, the statutory language makes it a clear rule that a computer program “as 
such”, however innovative it may be, cannot be a patentable “invention” as defined 
by the Patents Act (PA) 197793. This rule is the localisation of the Article 52 of the 
European Patent Convention (EPC), though its wording fails to adopt the official 
English text of the EPC.94 Under the EPC, whether a subject matter is patentable 
depends upon the definition of “invention” provided by the EPC: “European patents 
shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided that they are 
new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application.” (added 
emphasis)95  It is noteworthy that the text “in all fields of technology” was later 
inserted to the original wording of the EPC 1973, in order to synchronise the 
European patent system with the requirement in Art. 27 (1) TRIPS Agreement 199496. 
Very importantly, Art 52 (2) EPC narrows the meaning of “invention” as in Art. 52(1) 
by making a list of unpatentable subject matters including “programs for computers”. 
So far the rule seems to be reasonably clear that computer programs are excluded 
from the meaning of “invention” and are thus unpatentable, but the third paragraph in 
the Art 52 would cause much confusion and eventually lead to a divergence of 
opinion on software-related “inventions” between the UK Court of Appeals and that 
of the European Patent Office (EPO). This Art 52 (3) is often known as the “as such” 
proviso and it reads: 
[The EPC] excludes the patentability of the subject-matter or activities referred 
to therein only to the extent to which a European patent application or 
European patent relates to such subject-matter or activities as such. (added 
emphasis) 
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Far from spelling an end to the debate over the patentability of software, this “as 
such” proviso simply invites more confusion and demands further interpretation of 
its meaning. It is believed that the text of Art. 52 turns out to be the source of “the 
ongoing uncertainty of the scope of the exclusion form patentability of computer 
programmers” and the meaning of “as such” is “anyone’s guess during the past two 
decades”.97 After the mid-1980s, in an attempt to give some level of certainty to the 
meaning of “invention” in relation to software under the EPC, the Technical Boards 
of Appeal (TBA) of the EPO made a series of decisions focusing on whether a 
subject matter has the necessary “technical character” to be a patentable 
“invention”. 98 Among these cases, TBA’s 1987 landmark decision on 
Vicom/Computer-related invention, where a method of processing digital images was 
examined, stands out as the one of most significance. In Vicom, TBA established the 
famous “technical contribution” test: “Decisive is what technical contribution the 
invention as defined in the claim when considered as a whole makes to the known 
art”.99 In other words, a claimed subject matter would not be patentable if it fails to 
make a non-obvious “technical contribution” to the known art. This Vicom test is 
important because it sets the scene for the TBA to interpret the “technical character” 
that qualifies the subject matter to fall under the meaning of “invention” under Art. 
52, and it was also later adopted by the UK Court of Appeal in Merrill Lynch’s 
Application100 and Gale’s Application101. A variant of the Vicom test later made its 
way into the final text of the abortive EU Directive on Computer-Implemented 
Inventions, where the “technical contribution” was expressly required for 
patentability: “Member States shall ensure that it is a condition of involving an 
inventive step that a computer-implemented invention must make a technical 
contribution.”102 (added emphasis) 
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Unfortunately, the TBA, in the following years, gradually drifted away from its own 
technical contribution test used in Vicom, towards a more expansive interpretation of 
“technical character”. The abandonment of the “technical contribution” test did not 
happen at one stroke but it started almost imperceptibly and then unfolded through “a 
series of incremental changes without express disapproval of Vicom” by the TBA.103 
Three cases, i.e. PBS Partnership/Pension Benefits System 104 , Hitachi/Auction 
Method105 and Microsoft/Clipboard Format I&II106, are often singled out to show a 
trajectory of TBA’s gradual deviation from Vicom to embrace the new “any 
hardware” test. Note that the old Vicom test is actually an “inventive step” test in 
disguise because a patentable subject matter must make a non-obvious technical 
contribution to the known art in the first place. In contrast, the new “any hardware” 
test eliminates this built-in “inventive step” requirement. If the claim is made to a 
physical apparatus, it will be considered to be a patentable subject matter, regardless 
of whether this “invention” makes “technical contribution” to the known art. The 
“any hardware” test substantially expands the meaning of “technical character” and 
thus lowers the patentability threshold, which moves ever-closer to the removal of 
the statutory prohibition of patenting software as such under Art. 52 (2) and (3).107 
The EPO’s embrace of the “any hardware” approach has caused both confusion and 
frustration to the UK Court of Appeal, which struggles to stick to the “technical 
contribution” approach adopted by the its own binding precedents such as Merrill 
Lynch’s Application108 and Gale’s Application109. In Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings 
Ltd, Jacob L.J. argues that it becomes very difficult for the English court to be 
perfectly in keeping with the recent development of EPO’s ever-changing 
jurisprudence on patentability of software-related inventions. He finds that the TBA 
does not follow its own precedents rigorously but it has come up with six different 
interpretations of “technical character” of a patentable “invention” (including three 
variants of the “any hardware” test), none of them are consistent with each other 
among themselves. The UK court has no choice but to follow its own precedents by 
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using the more onerous technical contribution test due to the doctrine of stare 
decisis.110 The upshot of the Aerotel decision is that the UK insists on a higher 
patentability threshold than the current standard used by the EPO.111  
To summarise, there has been great definitional uncertainty surrounding the meaning 
of patentable “invention” as defined by the Art. 52 of the EPC. The EPO has tried to 
reduce the uncertainty by pegging the issue to the meaning of “technical character”, 
which turns out to be equally difficult to pin down. Although the EPO has failed to 
produce a consistently used test to determine the “technical character” of a claimed 
subject matter, it has the tendency to gradually stretch the elastic reach of “technical 
character” and thus lower the patentability threshold over the years. It has also led to 
an unfortunate divergence between the EPO and the UK Court of Appeal on this 
issue. 
United States: From Benson (1972) to Bilski (2010) 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the US law governing the patentability of software-
related inventions has no less a chequered history than its European counterpart. 
Section 101 of the US Patent Act 1952 defines patent-eligible subject matters as “any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof”.112 However, unlike the EPC, this Act does not 
contain a statutory list of non-“inventions” that are unpatentable. So what is actually 
excluded from patent-eligible subject matter relies on the US case law to fill the gap. 
A well-accepted list of exceptions to patentable matters can be found in a leading 
Supreme Court decision including “laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract 
ideas”, which can be roughly seen as an equivalent of Art 52 (2) of the EPC in the 
US context.113 
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Neither “software” nor “computer program” is explicitly mentioned in the statutory 
text of Section 101 of the Patent Act. It has remained extremely uncertain as to 
whether “software” or “computer program” falls under any of the four categories of 
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” defined by Section 101, 
until three leading cases were decided by the Supreme Court between the early 1970s 
to the early 1980. The first of them is Gottschalk v. Benson in 1972. The Supreme 
Court ruled that a computer program using a mathematical algorithm to convert 
binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary numerals was not a patentable 
subject matter under Section 101.114 The Benson approach was confirmed by the 
1978 decision in Parker v. Flook, where a computer program using another 
algorithm to control alarm limits in catalytic conversions of petrochemicals was 
again ruled to be unpatentable.115 The final case, arguably the most significant of the 
three, is Diamond v. Diehr decided in 1981. In Diehr, the court had to tackle the 
question as to whether a computerised process of curing raw synthetic rubber that 
employed a well-known mathematical formula known as “Arrhenius Equation” was 
a patentable subject matter under Section 101. The court ruled a “mathematical 
formula as such is not accorded the protection of patent laws, and this principle 
cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular 
technological environment.” 116 (added emphasis) However, although a mathematic 
formula “as such” is not patentable, when it is tied to a special-purpose computer, the 
claimed subject matter “as a whole” will pass the patentability threshold according to 
the Diehr court.117 In other words, the Diehr decision is a refinement of the previous 
court rulings. It has the effect of making computer program “as such” unpatentable, 
which makes the US law start to bear some resemblance to the law under Art 52 (2) 
& (3) EPC.118  
In the next thirty years after Diehr the US Supreme Court did not again hear any case 
on the patentability issue until the 2010 Bilski decision.119 This unfortunately has 
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created an opportunity for a lower patent court and the US patent office to gradually 
drift away from the holding in Diehr. During the intervening period between Diehr 
and Bilski, the task of adjudicating on the patentability disputes moved from the 
Supreme Court completely to a lower-level specialist patent court—Court of Appeals 
of Federal Court (CAFC)—which was established one year after Diehr in 1982 with 
an attempt to achieve some level of uniformity in enforcing US patent law at the 
federal appellate level. In 1998 the CAFC ruled that a computerised business method 
could be patented in State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group. 
Disregarding previous Supreme Court’s rulings on the patentability requirement, the 
CAFC created its own test that a claimed subject matter, with no need to have any 
particular physical embodiment, would be patentable so long as it produced a “useful, 
concrete and tangible result”.120 Some commentators believe that the State Street 
ruling effectively removes the threshold of patentability in the US between 1998 and 
2008, during which Section 101 of US Patent Act became “a dead letter”.121 During 
these ten years, US became a place that was very generous to issue patents to 
software-related inventions.122 
However, in 2008, the CAFC thought it was a time to rein in the proliferation of 
patents as a result of the State Street decision. In Bilski v. Kappos, where a business 
method of hedging financial risk were examined, the CAFC discontinued its own 
“useful, concrete and tangible result” test used in State Street. Resuming the line of 
jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court in Benson, Flook and Diehr, the 
CAFC decided to go back to Section 101 and rebuild the patentability threshold. 
Replacing the old State Street test, CAFC devised the so-called “Machine or 
Transformation” (MOT) test: a claimed subject matter is eligible under Section 101 
if “(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular 
article into a different state or thing.”123 Unfortunately, CAFC’s MOT test did not go 
down well with judges at the Supreme Court, which nevertheless also ruled Bilski’s 
claims unpatentable by applying a different test later in 2010. In the Supreme Court’s 
                                                 
120
 149 F. 3d 1368 at 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
121
 Mark Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman, R. Polk Wagner, “Life after Bilski” (2011) Stanford 
Law Review 101 at 103 
122
 It is observed that there was immediately a surge of “software patents” after the State Street ruling. 
See Kretschmer, Section 2.5, supra note 39  
123
 545 F.3d 943, at 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
 111
Bilski decision, the majority opinion by Justice Kennedy points out that the MOT is a 
flawed test and it should not be relied upon as the sole test for deciding patent 
eligibility but it is merely “a useful and important clue.”124 Also based on a review of 
three earlier cases Benson, Flook and Diehr, Kennedy argues that the correct ground 
for refusing Bilski’s claims is that the claimed subject matter is an “abstract idea”, 
which is a well-established excluded subject matter in US case law.125 However, this 
“abstract idea” test is not uncontroversial either. Lemley et. al. argue that the 
Supreme Court’s exclusion of “abstract idea” from being a patentable subject matter 
is unsatisfactory, because “[n]o class of invention is inherently too abstract for 
patenting.”126 The true reason has to do with the negative impact of a broad patent 
claim that may have on downstream innovation: “Rather, the rule against patenting 
abstract ideas is best understood as an effort to prevent inventors from claiming their 
ideas too broadly.” 127 It is also interesting to note that the MOT test, far from being 
reduced to merely “a useful and important clue” by the Supreme Court, continues to 
be frequently used by the USPTO and some district courts after Bilski, partly because 
of the practical difficulty of applying Supreme Court’s “abstract idea” test to 
determine patent eligibility.128 
In summary, the history from Benson to Bilski shows that the conceptual reach of 
“software patent” in the US context is also difficult to pin down. Although the US 
patent system has gone out of its most generous period of granting “software patents” 
ten years after the CAFC’s State Street decision, the Supreme Court Bilski decision 
does not really bring more certainty to the issue. In this sense, the US shares the 
same type of struggle with Europe, which has been unable to find one single 
consistently applied test of “technical character” to qualify patentable software-
related “inventions”. Just as Pila observes that the US Supreme Court Bilski ruling 
only “has left the scope of US law substantially uncertain, and underlined the 
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difficulties of attempting to interpret the EPC in a manner that tracks US 
jurisprudence.”129 
3.4.2 Perceived Threat of Patents to Software Innovation 
The above sub-section shows that although computer programs per se are not 
patentable, patents of software-related inventions have been in existence in both US 
and Europe since the 1980s. So how do FOSS programmers react to these patents? 
To which extent are patents perceived to be a threat to software freedom? Is it 
possible for the perceived threat to be contained? Again it would be wrong to make a 
sweeping statement that all FOSS developers are categorically against patents as a 
threat. In order to appreciate the complexity of this issue, I identify two historical 
stages to account for FOSS programmers’ evolving reaction to the growing influence 
of patents on their community. The first stage covers roughly the first decade after 
1981 when the US Supreme Court issued Diehr decision. During this period of time, 
FOSS programmers were not very much aware of the actual existence of software-
related invention patents, let alone their possible impact on decentralised 
collaborative FOSS projects. This situation is very unlike the advent of software 
copyright, whose impact was immediately felt and heatedly debated in the 1980s.130 
Stallman recalls that when the Diehr decision came out in 1981, this milestone in the 
history of software-related invention patents simply passed unnoticed by most 
programmers: “When the US started having software patents, there was no political 
debate. In fact, nobody noticed. The software field, for the most part, didn’t even 
notice.” 131  This lack of awareness in part explains why early versions of GNU 
copyleft licences (i.e., Emacs GNU Public License in 1985 and GNU GPL v1.0 in 
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1989) are merely copyright licences that did not mention the threat of patents to free 
software at all.132 This situation would change later in the 1990s. 
The problem of software patents to software freedom was largely hidden in the 1980s, 
but it gradually surfaced when it reached its second stage since the early 1990s. In 
June 1991, when Stallman upgraded GNU GPL to Version 2.0, he added a 
preambular text alerting that “any free program is threatened constantly by software 
patents”:  
We wish to avoid the danger that redistributors of a free program will 
individually obtain patent licenses, in effect making the program proprietary. 
To prevent this, we have made it clear that any patent must be licensed for 
everyone's free use or not licensed at all.133  
Around the same period of time, there has also been no shortage of anecdotal stories 
vindicating GPL’s warning of the disruptive effect of patents to software projects. 
For example, in September 1991, Stallman himself was forced to abandon a data 
compression program contributed by a volunteer programmer. This is because, just 
about one week before a release of GNU software, Stallman accidentally found a 
newly issued patent that might “read on” this contributed compression program.134 
Note that the risk of this patent as assessed by Stallman is merely potential but not 
actual. Lemley and Shapiro point out that a patent is not an absolute right to exclude 
but merely a “probabilistic” one if it is not litigated in court.135 It is not rare that risk-
averse FOSS project leaders like Stallman would choose to be on the safe side by 
declining contributions that are probable to infringe, because these volunteer-driven 
FOSS projects cannot afford to be bogged down by a hugely costly litigation in the 
first place, even though the patent involved might be proved legally invalid when 
litigated in court. 
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Although anecdotal evidence like the above abounded, a comprehensive and 
systematic assessment of the threat of patents was not available until the League for 
Programming Freedom published a report entitled Software Patents: An Industry at 
Risk in 1994. The title of this report is self-explanatory enough to show LPF’s anti-
patent position, which openly advocates to “abolish software patents completely” and 
that “software be made explicitly non-patentable.”136 More specifically, the report 
identifies six important reasons to support their patent-abolitionist policy. First, 
software is a highly complicated and sophisticated artifact which aggregates a huge 
number of technical components. Any of these components may unintentionally 
infringe upon patented technologies, which “make the legal risks and expenses 
associated with developing even well understood software frightening.”137 Secondly, 
apart from being a complex artifact, “the nature of software means that much of it is 
also very abstract”. The highly abstract nature makes many complex components of 
software unable to be neatly separated and analysed. This abstractness of software 
will lead to the abstractness of “software patents” that may potentially give its owner 
a broad range of monopoly. In short, “software’s abstraction makes it difficult to 
partition these technologies” and exactly for this reason software patents are very 
expensive to search, analyse and litigate in court.138 Retrospectively, LPF’s second 
argument, that software is too “abstract” to be patentable to some extent is not 
qualitatively different from the US Supreme Court’s 2010 Bilski majority opinion 
that a claimed subject matter cannot be patentable if it is an “abstract idea”.139 
Thirdly, the duration of patents is too long to suit software technologies that grow at 
a rapid rate. “This rapid rate of evolution means that those who are investing time 
creating and lodging patents are vastly outpacing those who are investing effort 
bringing such ideas to market. By the time an immature technology develops to the 
point where it can be incorporated into products, it has a dozen or more patents on it 
that render it commercially intractable.” 140  Fourthly, software is not like other 
physical consumer goods that can wear out. “A computer program that is fully 
debugged will perform its function forever without requiring maintenance or 
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modification”. So, in order not to lose customers, software companies have to keep 
updating and adding new features to their products and “the industry will remain 
innovative whether or not software patents exists”.141 Fifthly, software patents add 
huge legal costs to software development and would eat into the resources that 
should have gone into software innovation itself. Very often patents are employed as 
a strategic weapon to lock out competitors. Especially for those individual 
programmers and small companies who lack a legal infrastructure to defend 
themselves, “the prospect of being sued over a patent infringement even if the case is 
ungrounded and would ultimately fail is so terrifying, that many companies choose to 
give all patents they know about a wide berth rather than risk the possibility of any 
kind of patent challenge.”142 Finally, software’s commercial success relies on their 
“market-driven properties” more than their being given a monopoly protection for 
being absolutely “novel” as defined by the patent system.143 Software companies 
become market leaders not because they are the very first to invent a particular 
“new” technology, but because they are more attentive and adaptive to the 
consumers’ need for high-quality software products. In summary, the six arguments 
above show that the complex and abstract nature make software ill-suited to the 
patent system, and thus a “vision of patents entrenched in the software industry is a 
vision of stagnation.”144 
The LPF Report has presented an abolitionist argument tour de force by painting a 
dark and gloomy prospect of the software industry being plagued by the patent 
system. 145  However, this prospect may well be exaggerated according to some 
academic commentators. For example, with the benefit of hindsight, software-related 
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invention patents, as Merges observes, have not been able to entirely stifle 
innovation in the software industry after 1994. Patents have posed certain a risk to 
software innovation, but this risk is by no means a devastating one. Merges argues 
that the LPF, among other early patent abolitionists, is mostly wrong: “Patents have 
not killed the software industry, they have not led to a slowdown in entry, and they 
do not appear to have assisted in the entrenchment of large companies at the expense 
of smaller and newer ones. Despite the predictions of the League for Programming 
Freedom, the industry has not stagnated.”146  
Not all those who participate in, or sympathise with, the FOSS movement, share 
LPF’s abolitionist position. Some of them are less keen to abolish than to reform the 
patent system. The emergence of patent reformism within the FOSS community 
roughly coincides with the spin-off of the pragmatist “open source” approach from 
the purist “free software” approach. The “open source” campaign has made non-
proprietary software programming friendlier and more attractive to commercial 
software companies, many of which can afford to defend themselves against patent 
infringement allegations, or even build their own defensive patent portfolios. This 
has given rise to an interesting phenomenon of “open source patents” named by 
Leveque and Ménière, to account for those patents owned by corporate open source 
developers.147  For example, IBM is probably the most well-known “open source 
patents” owners. In 2005, IBM decided to “donate” 500 patents to the FOSS 
community. This “donation” was in the form of a pledge not to assert the 500 named 
patents against any FOSS project under a licence approved by the Open Source 
Initiative as of 1 November 2005.148 It is worth noting that these 500 patents only 
form a very small part of IBM’s whole patent portfolio. IBM’s pledge is not an 
ideological commitment to the “free software” ideal but largely a strategic move. 
Haas points out that profits can still be extracted from IBM’s non-pledged patents, 
which simply become more important assets to the company: “IBM may actually be 
giving up very little in its pledges, since the patents in the pledge may or may not 
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have value as revenue generators. IBM does not provide non-assertion guarantees for 
its ostensibly profitable closed source products or patent holdings.”149 It is important 
to know that IBM is not the only company that has “open source patents”. Another 
interesting example is the Open Invention Network (OIN), which is a consortium 
initially formed by five companies, including Red Hat, IBM, Sony, Novell and 
Philips in November 2005. It has acquired hundreds of “open source patents”, which 
are then made “available royalty-free to any company, institution or individual that 
agrees not to assert its patents against the Linux System” under an OIN licence, 
which is not hugely dissimilar from agreements used by conventional cross-licensing 
patent pools.150 In short, corporate FOSS developers perceive the threat of software 
invention patents differently from non-corporate volunteer FOSS programmers. The 
former believe that the abolition of patents is unnecessary largely because they have 
the resources to defend themselves, whilst the latter perceive patent infringement 
allegations are devastating to software freedom within community-led projects. I will 
show in infra Section 3.5.2 how Stallman, from the non-corporate FOSS developers’ 
perspective, insists on patent abolitionism and at the same time uses the GPL to 
minimise the patents’ threat to software freedom. 
3.5 GPL and Software Freedom  
Based on the legal background concerning copyright and patent as introduced by 
previous sections, this section further examines the first and most prominent FOSS 
licence—GNU Public Licence (GPL)—and its struggle to find an accurate legal 
expression of software freedom since the mid-1980s. It shows that the drafters of the 
GPL are attentive to the subtle differences between copyright and patent, which will 
be discussed separately below. 
3.5.1 GPL as a Copyright and “Copyleft” Licence 
It has been shown in Chapter 2 that the GPL came out of a unique period when the 
old hackers’ stewardship duty to preserve software commons clashed intensely with 
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the rising proprietary right to own software privately allowed by copyright in the 
1980s. From 1983 to 1985, Richard Stallman was embroiled in a copyright dispute 
with James Gosling over a version of the Emacs programming editor, which was 
initially developed collaboratively by computer hackers since the 1970s. Gosling’s 
decision to withdraw and privatise his contribution caused great tension in the Emacs 
community. During this dispute, Stallman gradually familiarised himself with US 
software copyright law, which eventually led him to produce the Emacs GPL in 
1985.151 This Emacs-specific GPL, which is the predecessor of three later versions of 
the general-purpose GNU GPL, makes it clear that no Emacs user should be deprived 
of the rights to freely use, copy, change and redistribute the program in any future 
distribution: 
Specifically, we [i.e., Emacs programmers] want to make sure that you [i.e., 
users] have the right to give away copies of Emacs, that you receive source 
code or else can get it if you want it, that you can change Emacs or use pieces 
of it in new free programs, and that you know you can do these things. To make 
sure that everyone has such rights, we have to forbid you to deprive anyone else 
of these rights. For example, if you distribute copies of Emacs, you must give 
the recipients all the rights that you have. You must make sure that they, too, 
receive or can get the source code. And you must tell them their rights.152 
The actual terms and conditions of the Emacs GPL licence are specified in the five 
“Copying Policies” drafted by Stallman. Among these five, the most important one is 
no doubt the second “Copying Policy” that innovatively devises a “copyleft” 
provision, obligating downstream programmers to share their publicly released 
contributions of Emacs under the same licence: “You may modify your copy or 
copies of GNU Emacs source code or any portion of it, and copy and distribute such 
modifications […], provided that you […] cause the whole of any work that you 
distribute or publish, that in whole or in part contains or is a derivative of GNU 
Emacs or any part thereof, to be licensed at no charge to all third parties on terms 
identical to those contained in this License Agreement […].”153 This is the situation 
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where a “copyleft” clause is used for the first time in the software licensing history 
and it remains a defining feature of all later GPL licences.  
It is not difficult to find that the invention of “copyleft” in the Emacs GPL is to 
mimic the pre-copyright environment where software is not exclusively owned by 
any single programmer but it is collaboratively created and preserved in a 
commons.154 Paradoxically, copyleft’s attempt to secure software freedom is mainly 
couched in the legal language of copyright, which has given a wide scope of 
exclusive rights to software authors. This paradox of using a copyright licence to 
create a non-exclusive property regime is pointed out by Steven Weber: “property in 
open source is configured fundamentally around the right to distribute, not the right 
to exclude.”155 The 1985 Emacs GPL is no doubt a first step of an intrepid long 
journey of experimenting with a licensed non-exclusive software commons. 
Although this licence later has been replaced by the three generations of the general-
purpose GNU GPL respectively published in 1989, 1991, 2007, the initial design of a 
copylefted commons has remained largely unchanged. I will use the latest GPL 3.0 
as an example to show how the initial legal scaffolding is preserved more than two 
decades after the first Emacs GPL was created.  
Although GPL 3.0 is a much longer and more detailed document than the original 
Emacs GPL, the former does not deviate wildly from the latter when dealing with 
software copyright. There is a common licensing structure that can be broken down 
into three basic licensing components respectively dealing with 1) permissions, 2) 
conditions and 3) termination. The first component concerns clauses that give 
“permissions” to use, copy, modify and redistribute software in line with the Free 
Software Definition.156 Without these permissions, these acts would otherwise be 
restricted by copyright law. It is worth noting that the root meaning of “licence” 
begins merely as “permission”: Just as Laddie et. al. points out “[i]n the strict sense a 
licence is a mere permission to do that which would otherwise be unlawful and it 
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confers no proprietary rights on the licensee.”157 Along the same line, Bently and 
Sherman point out: 
At a basic level a licence is merely a permission to do an act that would 
otherwise be prohibited without the consent of the proprietor of the copyright. 
A licence enables the licensee to use the work without infringing. So long as 
the use falls within the terms of the licence, it gives the licensee an immunity 
from action by the copyright owner.158  
The GPL 3.0 makes it clear that it is a copyright licence that gives permission: 
“nothing other than this License grants you permission to propagate or modify any 
covered work. These actions infringe copyright if you do not accept this License”159 
(added emphasis). Apart from giving normal copyright permission, it is interesting to 
note that GPL 3.0 makes a new special permission that does not exist in earlier 
versions in the GPL family. It permits users to circumvent Digital Right Management 
(DRM) technologies if DRM is used in GPL covered works. This permission is 
drafted in response to the rise of the anti-circumvention law introduced by 1996 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) that forbids “the circumvention of effective 
technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise to 
their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect 
of their works, which are not authorised by the authors concerned or permitted by 
law.” 160  This WCT anti-circumvention clause and its progeny 161  are sometimes 
known as “para-copyright”, because the protected technological measures are not 
copyright measures themselves but they have the effect of expanding the scope of 
authors’ exclusive rights and potentially upsetting the balance intended by copyright 
law.162 The drafter of the GPL 3.0 believes that DRM is “fundamentally in conflict 
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with the freedoms of users that the GPL is designed to safeguard”.163 So in order to 
counter this, GPL 3.0 states that “[n]o covered work shall be deemed part of an 
effective technological measure under any applicable law fulfilling obligations under 
article 11 of the WIPO copyright treaty adopted on 20 December 1996, or similar 
laws prohibiting or restricting circumvention of such measures.” As a consequence, 
programmers of GPL covered software waive their anti-circumvention right: 
When you convey a covered work, you waive any legal power to forbid 
circumvention of technological measures to the extent such circumvention is 
effected by exercising rights under this License with respect to the covered 
work, and you disclaim any intention to limit operation or modification of the 
work as a means of enforcing, against the work's users, your or third parties' 
legal rights to forbid circumvention of technological measures.164 
In short, under the above anti-anti-circumvention clause, GPL 3.0 effectively extends 
permission to acts that would otherwise be restricted by the para-copyright created 
by technological measures. 
The second component of the GPL is its “conditions”. GPL is a often known as a 
“conditional licence”, because it sets up a series of carefully crafted “conditions” to 
safeguard software freedom, under which users are permitted to use, copy, modify 
and distribute GPL covered works. Largely inheriting a structure used by the Emacs 
GPL, GPL 3.0 divides itself into three categories—including “conveying verbatim 
copies”, “conveying modified source versions” and “conveying non-source forms”—
all of which will trigger the “conditions” attached to the “permissions”. (See Table 
3.1)  
It is important to know that not all acts of running, copying or modification of GPL 
covered software will trigger the conditions stated in GPL. Doing these acts privately 
is permitted unconditionally. Conditions apply only when “verbatim copies” or 
“modified source versions” or “non-source forms” are conveyed to the public. Note 
that GPL 3.0 deliberately avoids the familiar term “distribute”, which is used in US 
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copyright law165 and all previous versions of GPL, but it adopts two unfamiliar terms 
“conveying” and “propagation”. The reason behind this is that GPL 3.0 is intended to 
be globally applicable and the term “distribution” in different jurisdictions may have 
different meanings. The drafter of GPL 3.0 explains: “The scope of ‘distribution’ in 
the copyright context can differ from country to country. We do not wish to force on 
the GPL the specific meaning of ‘distribution’ that exists under United States 
copyright law or any other country’s copyright law.”166 For example, in a non-US 
jurisdiction such as UK, “distribution” does not cover the copyright holders’ 
exclusive right to “communicate the work to the public”167 which is not explicitly 
mentioned in the US statutory language. This right was harmonised by the EU 
Copyright Directive, which provides that authors must have, as part of their right to 
control public communication, the “exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any 
communication to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public 
may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.”168 This 
right is tailored to Internet transmissions such as the making available of copyright 
materials to the public (for example, via a P2P file-sharing network).169 Clearly, the 
GPL would be failing in its purpose if it did not cover transmissions of this nature. In 
this light, Stallman, as the main drafter of GPL 3.0, chose the term “propagation”, 
which is not used by any particular legal system. 170  Here is a definition of 
“propagation” offered by GPL 3.0: 
To “propagate” a work means to do anything with it that, without permission, 
would make you directly or secondarily liable for infringement under 
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applicable copyright law, except executing it on a computer or modifying a 
private copy. Propagation includes copying, distribution (with or without 
modification), making available to the public, and in some countries other 
activities as well. 171 
Not all acts of “propagation” will trigger the conditions in GPL 3.0, but only a sub-
set of it known as “conveying” will: “To “convey” a work means any kind of 
propagation that enables other parties to make or receive copies. Mere interaction 
with a user through a computer network, with no transfer of a copy, is not 
conveying.”172  To put it another way, a user can privately “propagate” the GPL 
covered software unconditionally, but “conditions” will apply only when copies of 
the software are “conveyed” to other parties. The second paragraph in Section 3, 
GPL 3.0 clarifies this point: “You may make, run and propagate covered works that 
you do not convey, without conditions so long as your license otherwise remains in 
force.” 
There is no doubt that the most famous and important “condition” in GPL is its 
“copyleft” requirement. Most basically, copyleft mandates using the same licence 
when conveying to the public a “modified source version” of the original GPL 
covered software. Section 5(c) stipulates: 
You must license the entire work, as a whole, under this License to anyone 
who comes into possession of a copy. This License will therefore apply […] to 
the whole of the work, and all its parts, regardless of how they are packaged.173  
This above quoted copyleft requirement is also known as the “viral” clause, because 
it seems able to “contaminate” any work that has established some level of 
connection with GPLed code. 174  However, the virality of copyleft is sometimes 
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unduly exaggerated.175 It is often overlooked that there are at least three limiting 
factors that would circumscribe the reach of copyleft. First, GPL does not 
“contaminate” privately made modifications. So long as a modification is not 
publicly conveyed, no condition applies. Secondly, GPL does not contaminate so-
called “compilations” in which a GPL covered work and other programs with which 
it is aggregated are separate and independent from each other, even though they are 
stored on the same distribution medium. So long as these programs are not combined 
into one larger integrated program, the “compilation” remains an “aggregate”, which 
is outside the reach of copyleft. 176  Thirdly, GPL does not seem to be able to 
“contaminate” a program that only unwittingly incorporates GPL covered code. For 
example, Epstein conceives a “nightmare scenario” where a Microsoft employee-
programmer incorporates a piece of GPLed program into Microsoft’s proprietary 
operating system without the company’s knowledge.177 So should Microsoft worry 
that its whole operating system is now irreversibly “contaminated” and thus fall 
under the reach of GPL? Kumar argues that this worry is unfounded. Because the 
company has no knowledge of the licence and it does not really “accept” the 
condition and thus “there is no meeting of the minds”. In other words, the copyleft 
provision is not contractually binding on the company.178 However, this view is not 
uncontroversial. The FSF’s official jurisprudence is that the GPL is not a contractual 
licence but a pure copyright licence. So the validity of copyleft does not depend on 
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whether there is a valid contract or not.179 To fully assess the legal validity of GPL is 
beyond the purpose of this chapter but it will be scrutinised in detail in Chapter 4. 
The third component of the GPL is its clause on when and how to “terminate” the 
licence when the second component, i.e., “condition”, is breached. It is interesting to 
note that the termination clause in GPL is based on software authors’ property “right 
to exclude” and it has a role to play in securing software freedom. McGowan 
famously argues that “[o]pen-source production rests ultimately on the right to 
exclude” on the ground that this exclusionary right can be employed to discipline or 
deter violation of FOSS licences.180 Stallman has long been aware of this disciplinary 
and deterrent function and he did write a termination clause into the Emacs GPL in 
1985: 
You may not copy, sub license, distribute or transfer GNU Emacs except as 
expressly provided under this License Agreement. Any attempt otherwise to 
copy, sub license, distribute or transfer GNU Emacs is void and your rights to 
use GNU Emacs under this License agreement shall be automatically 
terminated.181 
This text remains largely unchanged in the versions 1.0 and 2.0 of the later general-
purpose GPL. GPL 3.0 amends the termination clause to make it more lenient to 
violators of the licence. It allows grace time for violators to cure the violation 
themselves and then provisionally or permanently reinstate the licence. 182  This 
change is intended to alleviate the harshness of the automatic termination of the 
licence and incentivise violators to correct their own mistakes as soon as possible.  
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Table 3.1 Copyright: Conveying GPL Covered Works 
 
Emacs GPL 
(1985) 
GPL1.0 
(1989) 
GPL2.0 
(1991) 
GPL3.0 
(2007) 
Conveying Verbatim 
Copies (Permission & 
Condition) 
Copying Policy 
1 
Section 1 Section 1 Section 4 
Conveying Modified 
Source Versions 
(Permission & Condition) 
Copying Policy 
2 
Section 2  Section 2 Section 5 
Copyleft Section 2 
(b) 
Section 2 
(b) 
Section 5 (c) 
Conveying Non-Source 
Forms (Permission & 
Condition) 
Copying Policy 
3 
Section 3  Section 3 Section 6 
Termination (Violation of 
Condition) 
Copying Policy 
4 
Section 4 Section 4 Section 8 
3.5.2 GPL as a Patent Licence and its Limit 
In the first decade after the 1981 Diehr decision, software-related invention patents 
were not immediately perceived as a palpable threat to software freedom.183 It is not 
surprising that 1985 Emacs GPL and 1989 GNU GPL 1.0 did not mention patents at 
all. However, awareness of the negative impact of patents on software freedom was 
gradually built up from the early 1990s. In 1991, the text of GPL 2.0 for the first time 
condemned “software patents” as a threat, but it still did not give an explicit patent 
licence. In 2007, FSF substantially amended the licensing terms concerning patents 
in GPL 3.0 in order to partially contain the growing threat from patents. (See Table 
3.2)  
More specifically, there are four places where patents are explicitly dealt with in 
GPL 3.0. Firstly, the preamble reiterates FSF’s traditional anti-patent position, and it 
also signals that some changes have to be made in GPL 3.0: “[…] every program is 
threatened constantly by software patents. States should not allow patents to restrict 
development and use of software on general-purpose computers, but in those that do, 
we wish to avoid the special danger that patents applied to a free program could 
make it effectively proprietary. To prevent this, the GPL assures that patents cannot 
be used to render the program non-free.”184  
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 127
Secondly, Section 11 is a newly added clause explicitly granting a patent licence 
from GPL software contributors to users: “Each contributor grants you a non-
exclusive, worldwide, royalty-free patent license under the contributor's essential 
patent claims, to make, use, sell, offer for sale, import and otherwise run, modify and 
propagate the contents of its contributor version.” It is noteworthy that a patent 
licence like this is not the invention of GPL 3.0, but the FSF has largely borrowed 
the idea from the Apache License, which is a pioneer in dealing with patents in 
relation to FOSS contribution.185 
Thirdly, a licensee should not initiate patent litigation in respect of a GPL covered 
work. The consequence of asserting patent rights will trigger the termination clause 
in Section 8, which would stop the patentee-licensee from using the licensed work 
any further. This is because the condition in Section 10 stipulates that a licensee 
“may not initiate litigation (including a cross-claim or counterclaim in a lawsuit) 
alleging that any patent claim is infringed by making, using, selling, offering for sale, 
or importing the Program or any portion of it”. The combination of Sections 8 and 10 
effectively functions as a patent-retaliation clause, which has already been used by 
some other FOSS licences before.186 
Finally, GPL 3.0 contains a so-called “liberty-or-death” clause: a programmer should 
not convey a piece of code to a GPL project, if he is encumbered with an external 
obligation (for example, to collect a patent royalty) that is in contradiction with the 
conditions of the GPL. Section 12 reads: “If you cannot convey a covered work so as 
to satisfy simultaneously your obligations under this License and any other pertinent 
obligations, then as a consequence you may not convey it at all.” Note that this 
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clause in GPL 3.0 is not entirely new either, but it is a slight revision of Section 7 of 
GPL 2.0. 
The above four amended parts do not intend to fully, but only partially, contain the 
threat from patents. There is a limit to what a licence can achieve. Stallman believes 
that the root of the whole problem lies in the legal system issuing “software patents” 
in the first place.187 The changes made in GPL 3.0 only reflect a pragmatic move to 
work with rather against the existing patent regime in order to minimise the threat 
from patents to software freedom. GPL, however more legally sophisticated it may 
be, is simply not able to eliminate the root problem of “software patents” altogether. 
Table 3.2 Patent: Partially Containing Patent Threats Through GPL 
 
Emacs GPL 
(1985) 
GPL1.0 
(1989) 
GPL2.0 
(1991) 
GPL 3.0 (2007) 
Preambular text 
condemning “software 
patents” 
N/A N/A Preamble Preamble 
Liberty-or-Death Clause N/A N/A Section 7 Section 12 
Patent Licence N/A N/A Implicit Section 11  
Patent Retaliation N/A N/A N/A Sections 8&10 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter is a survey of two types of “intellectual property”—copyright and 
patent—and their respective impact on software freedom. FOSS programmers do not 
endorse “intellectual property” as a unified body of law, but argue that a more subtle 
understanding is required. There are three observations coming out of a scrutiny of 
the subtleties of this issue. Firstly, FOSS programmers generally endorse copyright, 
which is the main legal basis for them to license their software in a non-exclusive 
fashion. However, they are against some companies’ efforts to stretch copyright 
further to cover the non-expressive part of software. Secondly, standalone software is 
normally not a patentable subject matter in either EPC countries or the US. Under the 
EPC jurisprudence, the patentability of a software-related invention depends on 
whether the claimed subject matter has the right kind of “technical character”. Since 
the 1987 Vicom decision until now, the EPO has failed to apply a single consistently 
used interpretation about the meaning of “technical character”, a fact that has led to 
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great uncertainty over this issue. In the US, from the 1972 Benson case to 2010 Bilski 
case (via the 1998 State Street case), its legal system has also been struggling to 
produce a suitable test to assess the patentability of software-related inventions. 
Among FOSS programmers, patents have remained a divisive issue. Non-corporate 
volunteer FOSS programmers tend to have an anti-patent position because they are 
more vulnerable to patent infringement allegations, while corporate open source 
participants tend to be more interested in reforming the patent system than abolishing 
it altogether. Thirdly, the gradual maturing of GPL from 1985 to 2007 reflects a 
continuous struggle to find a way to protect software freedom in an ever-changing 
legal climate. GPL is primarily a copyright licence that creates a unique copyleft 
mechanism to build an unbroken chain of software freedom. It also responds to 
programmers’ growing concern about patents by substantially amending its latest 
version of GPL in order to partially contain the threat from patents. The next chapter 
will discuss the legal validity of the GPL and some other licences.  
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Chapter 4  Understanding FOSS Licences as Standard Forms—A 
Relational Contract Perspective 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As has been discussed in previous chapters, the main goal of FOSS licensing is to 
securing software freedom in radically decentralised FOSS projects. As programmers 
may well have different and evolving expectations about the outcomes of their 
collaborative efforts, it is important for a licence to standardise the minimum legal 
commitments for all contributors in order to prevent a given FOSS project from 
freewheeling into a Babel of legally incompatible fragments. These legal 
commitments, when verbalised by the licences, must be pursuant to the FOSS 
stewardship responsibility under the Free Software Definition and the Open Source 
Definition.  
Although the goal that FOSS licences intend to achieve is undoubtedly important, the 
legal basis on which these licences are made enforceable is not always clear. This is 
largely due to the fact that FOSS licences are mainly take-it-or-leave-it standard 
forms, which are electronically disseminated alongside software through the internet 
on a mass scale. These licences do not seek affirmative assents from licensees or 
adhering parties through traditional bargained-for exchanges, but they are most likely 
to be given in either of the two types of electronic standard forms, i.e. clickwrap and 
browsewrap. The clickwrap requires users to click through the “Yes, I Agree” button 
before downloading or installing a particular piece of software, while the 
browsewrap is merely an electronic notice containing licensing terms and conditions. 
As most users do not read, let alone fully digest, all information contained in 
clickwrap or browsewrap licences, their assents are said to be “presumed” rather than 
“actual”.1 The upshot is that there seems to be no obvious moment when the meeting 
of minds between licensors and licensees unequivocally happens in a non-bargained-
for process like this. When put under the strict scrutiny of classical contract law, the 
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absence of “actual” assents or that of the meeting of minds poses a serious challenge 
to the legal validity of all sorts of non-negotiated standard forms2, and FOSS licences 
are no exception. 
In this chapter, I attempt to show that standard form FOSS licences are better 
understood through the lens of Relational Contract Theory (RCT) than they are 
through the lens of the classical contract model. There are two equally important 
reasons for software licensing jurisprudence to incorporate insights from the RCT. 
First, proponents of RCT believe that the total obligation does not merely arise from 
a single moment when parties’ minds are supposed to meet, but more realistically the 
obligation may also be shaped by ongoing relations among parties. In FOSS projects, 
contributors’ consent to their obligation of making contribution takes place in a more 
incremental way and are often derived from rich collaborative relations among 
contributors. It is worth noting that RCT does not make “consent” completely 
irrelevant in a standard form. To the contrary, RCT only alleviates the heavy burden 
on explicit “consent” as the sole legitimating mechanism of imposing obligations 
against the adhering parties. Macneil, as the main exponent of this approach to 
contracts, includes “effectuation of consent” as one of the common contract norms 
and he believes that consent still plays an important triggering mechanism in 
consensual relations.3 
Secondly, a sustaining FOSS project relies on rich and dynamic collaborative 
relations among contributors in a community, but it is not a product from a single or 
even multiple discrete transactions between utility-maximising strangers as 
understood by classical contract theory. For this reason, RCT is an appropriate 
theoretical tool, which helps us to imagine how the collaborative relations in FOSS 
could be recognised and managed. In particular, the RCT approach differentiates 
itself from the influential (but not uncontroversial) jurisprudence developed from the 
landmark Seventh Circuit case ProCD v. Zeidenberg, where Justice Easterbrook 
made a mass-market standard form licence contractually enforceable.4 In this chapter 
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 David W. Slawson, “Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power” 
(1971) 84 (3) Harvard Law Review 529 
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 Ian Macneil,The New Social Contract—An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1980), pp.49-50 (hereafter NSC) 
4
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I aim to show that the justification of FOSS licensing does not have to be built upon 
the controversial ProCD ruling which assumes that parties merely as utility-
maximising agents. Instead, RCT provides a different ground to understand standard-
form FOSS licensing, where a variety of non-utility-maximisation motivations need 
also to be taken seriously in  understanding their aim to create software commons. 
The rest of the chapter is divided into four parts. The first part (Section 4.2) briefly 
exposes the two contrasting perspectives of seeing software licensing as “relational 
contract” and “discrete transaction” respectively. It shows that the difference 
between the two is again rooted in the early conflict between the tradition of 
“stewarding” software as commons and “owning” software as private property since 
the inception of FOSS licensing. The second part (Section 4.3) identifies three 
possible doctrinal routes to enforcing a given FOSS licence via “contractual licence”, 
“bare licence” and “promissory estoppel”. It demonstrates that some difficulties of 
applying these existing doctrinal rules to address the legal validity of FOSS licensing 
warrants an exploration of the more suitable framework offered by RCT. The third 
part (Section 4.4) re-examines GPL by applying some insights from the relational 
approach. It shows that GPL as a relational “umbrella agreement” does not prescribe 
any substantive obligation concerning actual contributions from individual 
programmers, but it only specifies a few minimum obligations to ensure all peer-
produced contributions are free software components that can be later aggregated 
together into one project. The fourth part (Section 4.5) concludes the chapter.  
4.2 FOSS Collaboration: Discrete Transaction or Relational Contract? 
A collaborative relation in a FOSS project is very different from the sum total of a 
host of one-shot discrete transactions of software code. Instead, the relation belongs 
to a continuum where peer-produced contributions are pieced together in a long 
timeline. In order to render the distinction clear, I need to spell out the difference 
between two approaches to software licensing. One is the “discretist” approach that 
treats software as stand-alone finished products developed by professional 
programmers for end-users, while the other is the relational approach that views 
software as an indefinitely long communicative process with no clear boundary 
between individual exchanges.  
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4.2.1 Discretist Approach: “Presentiation” of Total Obligation 
Truly discrete transactions are very rare in the real world. They are largely idealised 
situations assumed by classical contract law, which can be seen as a potent 
embodiment of “methodological individualism” in legal scholarship. This discretist 
view of contract artificially atomises social relations into isolated transactional 
segments, where parties are assumed to be complete strangers solely interested in 
maximising individual utility.5 The discretist view of contract can be traced back to 
Henry Maine, whose methodological individualist thinking has great influence in 
shaping the ideology of classical contract law. To put it bluntly, his famous 
observation about modern society’s transition from “status to contract” can be seen 
as no more than a movement of “from status to discrete transaction”.6 
Although completely discrete transactions are a legal fiction, there may be instances 
fairly close to them. Macneil’s famous example of an almost discrete transaction is 
“a cash purchase of gasoline at a station on the New Jersey Turnpike by someone 
rarely travelling the road”.7 This purchase happens between complete strangers who 
are very unlikely to meet again and repeat the same transaction. However, situations 
like this example are extremely rare, and even doing grocery shopping in a 
supermarket does not fit into this kind of discrete transactional model. Supermarkets 
do want to establish some kind of relationship beyond simple one-shot transactions. 
For instance, they may well have schemes to make customers collect loyalty points. 
Some of them may even encourage customers to reuse plastic bags by giving “green” 
points. A truly discretist supermarket do not care about how “loyal” or “green” their 
customers are. 
                                                 
5
 Campbell and Collins point out that classical contract law denies the “social character” of contract 
exchanges: “the classical law of contract reproduces the principal structural contradiction of bourgeois 
society—a society which has at its heart a denial of its social character.” David Campbell and Hugh 
Collins, “Discovering the Implicit Dimensions of Contracts”, in Implicit Dimensions of Contract—
Discrete, Relational, and Network Contracts, eds. by David Campbell, Hugh Collins and John 
Wightman (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2003) p.26 
6
 For Maine’s methodological individualist view of society, see Edward Shils, “Henry Sumner Maine 
in the Tradition of the Analysis of Society”, in The Victorian Achievement of Sir Henry Maine: A 
Centennial Reappraisal, ed. By Alan Diamond (Cambridge: CUP, 2001) pp.144-5 
7
 Macneil, “Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, 
and Relational Contract”, (1978) 72 (6) Northwestern University Law Review 854 at 857 
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There are two salient characteristics of the discretist thinking. First, discrete 
transactions are treated as though they happen in a social vacuum and do not bond 
parties into long and sustaining relationships. They are deemed to happen among 
“total strangers” who are “brought together by chance” rather than “any common 
social structure”. 8  In other words, parties in discrete exchanges are atomised 
individuals and each of them “would have to be completely sure of never again 
seeing or having anything else to do with the other”.9 Secondly, discrete transactions 
are transient and short-lived. They do not last beyond the point when they are 
consummated. The very brief life-span of transactions is essential to transactional 
discreetness: “everything must happen quickly lest the parties should develop some 
kind of a relation impacting on the transaction so as to deprive it of discreteness.”10  
It is important to note that too much bargain would expand the lifespan of a 
transaction and thus risk the loss of discreteness in exchanges. Macneil observes that 
“bargaining about quantities or other aspects of the transaction can erode discreteness, 
as certainly does any effort to project the transaction into the future through 
promises.” 11  For this reason, discretists do not welcome lengthy and elaborate 
bargained-for exchanges leading to contract formation, because bargains may well 
blur the discreteness of transactions and at the same time raise the transaction cost. 
Interestingly, this discretists’ hostility to bargaining reveals a built-in paradox of 
classical contract model. An unrelenting pursuit of transactional discreetness would 
inevitably erode the importance of bargained-for exchanges, which are ostensibly at 
the heart of a binding classic contract. The sacrifice of “bargaining” for 
“discreteness” is a departure point where classical contract law starts to relax its 
requirement about “meeting of the minds” in contract formation. This relaxation 
results in the classical contract law rapidly (and somewhat imperceptibly) mutating 
into the “neo-classical” law of contract, which attempts to soften the classicist 
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 Macneil further points out that the discretists prefer “only a barter of goods, since even money 
available to one and acceptable to the other postulates some kind of common social structure.” ibid., at 
856 
9
 ibid. 
10
 ibid. 
11
 ibid. 
 135
doctrinal rigidity to some extent.12 Throughout this chapter, I argue that the real 
hurdle to a relational understanding of FOSS licensing is not the unadulterated 
classical model itself but its neoclassical mutant. This neoclassical rationale in 
enforcing mass-market software licences is presumed in Easterbrook’s ProCD 
ruling13 , which will be shown to be fundamentally different from the Macneil’s 
relational approach in sub-Section 4.2.3 in some more detail. 
Turning Software Development into Discrete Products/Commodities 
As has been discussed in Chapter 2, software development, under its early hacker 
custom, is by no means the production and circulation of many discrete products, but 
it is always a work in progress or an indefinitely long collaborative process. (The 
over two-decade long Linux kernel project in progress is a case in point here.) When 
the publicly available source code was allowed to be modified by the public under 
the hacker custom, it was relatively difficult for individual programmers to privatise 
their intellectual inputs into alienable end-products.  
However, since the mid-1970s, some commercially minded programmers gradually 
figured out how to turn the non-discrete software development process into discrete 
end-products, which were a necessary prelude to selling software like any other 
“physical” commodity.14 In order to artificially create discreteness for software, they 
needed to go through two crucial steps. First, software developers needed to 
distribute only the object code of software without revealing the corresponding 
source code. Without seeing the hidden source code, it is made difficult for users to 
customise the software to their needs when necessary. The closed-source software 
thus loses its “extensibility” 15 , but at the same time it acquires quasi-physical 
“thingness” with a much more clearly defined boundary.  
                                                 
12
 Feinman observes that “[n]eoclassical method is a mix of rules and standards. This is still doctrine, 
by and large, but it is doctrine of a much softer sort than in classical law. See Jay M. Feinman, 
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law, which “transactionizes or commodifies as much as possible the subject matter of contracts”. See 
Macneil, supra note 7 at 863 
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 For the discussion of “extensibility” of software, see Section 1.3.1 Chapter 1   
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If the first step is about acquiring quasi-physical discreteness for the closed source 
software, the second step can be seen as an attempt to define the legal discreteness 
through using proprietary software licensing schemes. Because the first step itself 
cannot prevent the hidden object code from being reverse engineered back into a 
source code version by its users, programmers thus design an extra layer of 
protection by using proprietary software licences. These licences are usually drafted 
in a way that a broad, and often overbroad, range of activities by users—including 
reverse engineering, copying, modifying, redistributing—are strictly prohibited.16 In 
short, the purpose of these proprietary licences is to make the software as tightly 
discrete a product as possible in legal terms, though some of the prohibitions may 
risk upsetting the balance preset by copyright law. 17  Furthermore, software as 
discrete product is often released via a legal vehicle of standard-form contracts on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis. In this way, the traditional manifestation of consent through 
bargained-for exchanges is minimised to a level where the non-negotiable licensing 
terms start to resemble those unmodifiable physical features imbedded in the 
software products. Radin incisively observes that these standard form licences 
undermine traditional consent as the centrepiece of contracts. She points that the 
“contract-as-consent” model is being replaced with the “contract-as-product” model, 
where licensing terms are an inseparable part of the discrete product. 
In this [contract-as-product] model, the terms are part of the product, not a 
conceptually separate bargain; physical product plus terms are a package deal. 
The fact that a chip inside an electronics item will wear out after a year is no 
less and no more a feature of the item and its quality than the fact the terms that 
come with the item specify that all disputes must be resolved in California 
under California law. In this model, unseen contract terms are no more and no 
less significant than unseen internal design features; and it is not remarkable 
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that there is no choice other than the take-it-or-leave-it choice not to buy the 
package.18 (added emphasis) 
In the US, the contract-as-product model becomes the dominant approach to software 
licensing after the US Seventh Circuit’s case ProCD v. Zeidenberg.19 It is explicitly 
endorsed by Easterbrook who argues that “[c]ontractual terms are product 
attributes—no different functionally from the quality of a car’s tires, a TV’s 
capacitors, or a software package’s features […]”.20 Contrary to this view, I will later 
show, in Section 4.4, that licences that felicitates FOSS collaboration need to keep a 
critical distance from the “contract-as-product” model, but a vision of “contract as 
relation” is more appropriate to account for the real lived cooperative experience 
among FOSS programmers.    
Presentiation and Proprietary Software Licensing 
Closely related to proprietary software licences’ attempt to discretise software 
development process into separate non-extensible end-products is what Macneil calls 
the “presentiation” of total obligation into these licensing documents. “Presentiation”, 
in short, is a technique used by classical contract law to bring the future into the 
present.21 It is “a way of looking at things in which a person perceives the effect of 
the future on the present”.22  Classical contracts use this technique to reduce the 
uncertainty of contractual exchanges that may last for a period of time into the future.  
Recall that ideally discrete transactions are assumed to be transient and short-lived as 
if they almost have no duration. However, this view of zero-duration transactions 
does not always tally well with reality, where most contractual exchanges do not 
consummate at one single moment, but last into the future. In order to cope with this 
problem, classical contract law has to employ the technique of presentiation by 
compressing the future relation into a single point as if it had no duration at all. 
Macneil describes how presentiation takes place: 
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[Presentiation] is a recognition that the course of the future is so unalterably 
bound by present conditions that the future has been brought effectively into the 
present so that it may be dealt with just as if it were in fact the present. Thus, 
the presentiation of transaction involves restricting its expected future effects to 
those defined in the present, i.e., at the inception of the transaction.23 
From proprietary software developers’ point of view, the very indefinitely long-term 
collaborative relations under the hacker customs are indeed too open-ended to be 
predicable. Proprietary software developers have to use classical contract law’s 
technique to presentiate total obligation into a licensing document. In this light, 
users’ activities that may prolong the lifespan of transactions (e.g. through reverse 
engineering, user customisation, error corrections, redistribution etc.) are all deemed 
to be undesirable and they should be minimised under licensing terms in order to 
reduce future uncertainties. 
4.2.2 Relational Approach: Projecting Exchange into the Future 
The radically decentralised FOSS production and its licensing schemes defy classical 
contract law in two senses: they are neither discrete, nor can they be presentiated. 
First, FOSS is designed to be extensible and customisable, and it invites users to 
become co-developers to modify and improve the software wherever they see 
appropriate. Stallman observes that FOSS development is like “an evolutionary 
process, where a person would take an existing program and rewrite parts of it for 
one new feature, and then another person would rewrite parts to add another 
feature”.24 From proprietary software developers’ viewpoint, the indefinitely long 
“evolutionary process” is unwieldy and unmanageable, because it threatens the 
transactional discreteness that is more conducive to commercialisation of the 
software products. In contrast, FOSS developers see the long “evolutionary process” 
exactly as a strength that should be celebrated. Unlike short-lived discrete 
transactions, the non-discrete collaborative relations make FOSS projects capable of 
growing and perfecting for a considerable period of time. FOSS licences here play an 
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important role in facilitating the collaborative efforts among programmers, though 
they are not collaborative relation itself.  
Secondly, total presentiation is very unlikely to take place in a radically decentralised 
environment where FOSS is produced. This is because the collaborative relations in 
FOSS projects are rather open-ended and improvisatory and it is impossible to 
presentiate future creative efforts onto one present paper or electronic document that 
is intended to binding. To some extent, a FOSS project can be likened to a marriage 
or a family business where “the participants never intend or expect to see the whole 
future of the relation as presentiated at any single time, but view the relation as an 
ongoing integration of behavior which will grow and vary with events in a largely 
unforeseeable future.”25 Although there is no presentiation of total obligations for 
FOSS contributors, this does not mean that there is no planning whatsoever at all 
within FOSS projects. Instead, a modicum of preliminary planning by a few lead 
programmers is always necessary to make sure that all contributions can later be 
safely and effectively pieced together into one coherent artefact under a modular 
architecture.26  In other words, these projects do involve some level of planning, 
which prevents them from freewheeling into complete anarchy. However, this 
planning in FOSS projects is incremental and tentative, and it is not anywhere close 
to presentiation.27 It is up to a small group of lead developers to find out the right 
balance where partially presentiated obligations do not hurt the flexible and 
serendipitous nature of FOSS projects.28 
Relational Exchange and FOSS Collaboration 
Classical contract law is centred around the problem of enforcing promises in 
discrete transactions. It asks whether a promise or a set of promises made by a party 
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should be enforced or not in a discrete and presentiated exchange.29 In contrast, 
relational contracts are anchored in the more flexible and less presentiated exchanges 
and they are of great importance to sustain long-term FOSS collaboration.  
Macneil defines his conception of “contract” as “no more and no less than the 
relations among parties to the process of projecting exchange into the future”,30 or 
more succinctly, “the projection of exchange into the future” 31 . This definition 
reveals a crucial distinction between the relational approach and the classical 
approach in terms of their respective attitudes towards the element of “futurity” in 
contract: A classical contract sees future as the source of uncertainty and 
unpredictability, which must be tamed by the classicist technique of total 
presentiation at the time when the contract is made. In other words, the total legal 
obligation of the classic contract is set at the beginning of the exchange when an 
offer meets its acceptance. In contrast, a relational contract is more flexible and 
adaptable to the future. Far from abhorring the element of futurity in exchange, 
relationalists regard future as a source of serendipity that could be celebrated. To put 
the contrast fully in another way: a classical contract presentiates the future into the 
present, while a relational contract projects the current exchange into the future. This 
contrast is also readily applicable to the difference between proprietary software 
developers and FOSS programmers. The former equate future with uncertainty that 
must be minimised at all cost, while the latter celebrate the serendipitous element of 
future that may unfold gradually in a radically decentralised creative environment.  
Promissory and Nonpromissory Projectors 
For Macneil, a relational contract is more than merely a matter of enforcing promises. 
It covers a broader scope than an explicitly bargained-for promissory exchange under 
a classical bilateral executory contract.32 A valid relational contract can have both 
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promissory and non-promissory aspects, both of which generate expectations for 
parties to project exchange into the future. To begin with, a “promise” is a most 
straightforward projector that parties use to make explicit verbalised agreement with 
others. Macneil defines “promise” as the “[p]resent communication of a commitment 
to engage in a reciprocal measured exchange” and it is an “extraordinarily powerful 
mechanism for projecting exchange into the future” 33 . However, promissory 
projectors do not form the whole picture of contractual exchanges. From a 
relationalist perspective, there are also nonpromissory projectors that play an equally 
important role in shaping parties’ expectations.34 For example, the previous course of 
repeated dealings unsupported by verbalised agreements can be important 
nonpromissory projectors from a relational perspective. 35  Macneil argues that 
nonpromissory projectors are important in shaping relational exchanges in both 
primitive and modern societies: 
Nonpromissory exchange-projectors […] come in a great many forms. In all 
societies, custom, status, habit, and other internalizations project exchange into 
the future. In some primitive societies these may be the primary projectors, with 
promise relating to exchange playing only a very minor role, if that. Moreover 
we err if we fail to recognize that such nonpromissory mechanisms continue to 
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play vital parts in the most modern and developed of societies. Even kinship, a 
form of status which plays major roles in so many societies, is by no means 
absent as an exchange-projector in [modern society], although it may now be 
overshadowed by class or other structures with partially related roles.36 
In the history of FOSS collaboration, the early hacker custom has long functioned as 
a nonpromissory projector influencing computer hackers’ “relational” exchanges 
since the 1950s and 1960s. This hacker custom, which was only retrospectively 
documented by Steven Levy in 1984, was initially only “an ethic seldom codified, 
but embodied instead in the behavior of hackers themselves”.37 The advent of FOSS 
licences like GNU GPL largely verbalise the some of the previously uncodified 
programmers’ stewardship responsibilities into express promissory projectors. Note 
that express licensing terms in FOSS licences only codify a minimum set of legal 
responsibility necessary for the preservation of software commons, but it by no 
means spells out every single detail in FOSS collaboration.38 In short, non-verbalised 
commitments play an important role in the day-to-day operation of FOSS 
collaboration and their importance cannot be eclipsed by the verbalised licensing 
terms. 
RCT’s Two Implications for FOSS Licensing 
Given the subject of this dissertation, it is impossible to give a comprehensive survey 
of Macneil’s RCT and its great influence on contemporary contracts scholarship.39 I 
narrow my research down to two implications that are most crucial to a relational 
analysis of FOSS licensing. These two implications are based on a general survey of 
Macneil’s theoretical contributions to contracts scholarship by Whitford, who 
concludes that Macneil has two important “messages” to lawyers. The first message 
is relatively well received and the second is still largely underappreciated by lawyers.  
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Macneil’s first message is that “there is no single moment at which the parties 
confirm a meeting of the minds respecting the important terms of the contract.”40 
This is clearly an attack on classical contract law’s insistence that there should be a 
single grand moment where parties’ minds meet and all their obligations would be 
fully presentiated from that moment on. In a more realistic fashion, RCT suggests 
that parties’ consent to an agreement may well be reached incrementally through a 
period of time. Whitford finds that this insight has been “generally accepted”: in this 
sense, RCT has superseded classical contract law and becomes the “now mainstream 
contract theory.” 41 In the US context, the recent judicial development in the more 
specific area of information product licensing has largely proved Whitford’s 
observation correct. The line of jurisprudence spearheaded by the 1996 landmark 
ProCD ruling again serves as an important example for the purpose of this chapter. 
In ProCD, Easterbrook challenged the classicist model by suggesting that a licensing 
contract was not formed at the single point when the software was purchased. Instead 
a user’s consent to the licence can be constructed in a period of time between the 
point of purchase and the actual use of the licensed product. In this period, the user 
arguably had ample opportunity to read and digest the content of the licence and 
there was no excuse for him to say no consent was formed.  Barnett, in approving this 
logic behind ProCD, comments that “[t]here is no reason in principle why contracts 
cannot be formed in stages, provided the circumstances or prior practice makes this 
clear or adequate notice is provided. This insight is neither revolutionary nor 
reactionary.”42 From a pure classicist point of view, ProCD and its progeny represent 
a “neoclassical” turn43 that started to erode the traditional mechanism of consenting 
where minds only meet at single one point. This move is sometimes lamented as the 
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cause leading to “waning of consent”44 or even “death of assent”45 in the neoclassical 
standard-form licensing jurisprudence, which is much less strict about the affirmative 
manifestation of licensees’ explicit assents. Although the neoclassical law seems to 
take on board Macneil’s first message, I call for a more careful and nuanced reading 
of RCT, which will reveal that “assent” or “consent” is not irreversibly “dead”, but 
they still play “a vital triggering mechanism” of relational exchanges46  and it is 
important to understand “consent” in relational terms. Just as Gudel observes there 
has never been a real “decline of assent,” but there is only “a decline of assent 
discretely understood” in contract jurisprudence.47   
Macneil’s second message is a cautionary one: when contracts scholarship moves 
away from the consent-driven classical model, it is in danger of recalibrating contract 
law as a neoclassical apparatus solely for the purpose of promoting parties’ “desire to 
maximize wealth”.48 This is not what a true relational approach should embrace, but 
in fact “parties in relational contracts frequently temper wealth maximization goals 
with other objectives.”49 In fact, Macneil himself makes it clear that people joining in 
relational exchange are by no means solely motivated by maximising their individual 
utility, but they are also driven by their desire for enhancing social solidarity.50  
Going back to the discussion of standard-form software licensing, the neoclassical 
ProCD ruling again is exactly an exemplary occasion, against which Macneil’s 
second message warns. Sidelining the role of classicist “consent”, Judge Easterbrook 
reoriented the ground for enforcing standard-form licences towards the need of 
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reduction of transaction costs.51 It is necessary to enforce the license in this case, 
because it would “make information more readily available, by reducing the price 
ProCD charges to consumer buyers.” 52  The kind of consent obtained through 
traditional ways of bargaining would only make transactions too costly to benefit 
information product suppliers and consumers economically.53 It is important to know 
that an economic justification of standard forms like this was not first invented by 
Easterbrook, nor is it unique to mass software licensing, but it is preceded by many 
non-software cases long time ago before the ProCD. Whitford nicely summarises 
this general shift from obtaining classicist consent to guaranteeing wealth-
maximisation as the basis of legitimating Standard-From Contracts [SFK]: 
It is now generally recognized that true consent to all aspects of the SFK is 
usually lacking. From a wealth maximisation perspective, this is as it should be. 
Individual negotiation of every contractual detail would take too much time. 
Because of the absence of true consent, a majority of commentators no longer 
regard agreement to a SFK as sufficient to validate its content. Rather, judicial 
and legislative oversight of some terms is deemed both appropriate and 
desirable. In suggesting ways to exercise that oversight, however, 
commentators very often look just to wealth maximization values. The question 
they frame is what terms the parties would have agreed to if they had negotiated 
the contract, were well informed, and were concerned solely with wealth 
maximization.54 (internal citations omitted) 
With this background in mind, I argue that any serious attempt to justify FOSS 
licensing must cautiously distance itself from the wealth-maximisation oriented 
jurisprudence developed in ProCD. Instead, it needs to take on board Macneil’s 
second message that relational contract promotes a multiplicity of values but the 
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wealth-maximisation objective is only one of them.55 The reduction of RCT to the 
neoclassical model would only risk impoverishing the Macneilian relational contract. 
A radically decentralised FOSS project attracts a large number of volunteer 
contributors rightly because utility maximisation is not the only predominant 
motivational force, but programmers are motivated by a variety of reasons. A 2005 
empirical survey shows that the top three motivations behind volunteer FOSS 
contribution are intrinsic intellectual enjoyment of coding, the prospect of improving 
programming skills and the belief that FOSS is a worthy cause for its own sake. 
None of them is directly about the increase of contributors’ material utility or 
wealth.56 It can be argued that relational contracts in FOSS projects are intended to 
create a kind “relational wealth” 57, which splices together a variety of motivational 
values, which can be either utilitarian or non-utilitarian. It is a kind of non-monetary 
wealth that is absent in ProCD, where the plaintiff and the defendant are in 
antagonistic competition and have no intention of collaborating to build a common 
project. Macneil’s contract norm of “preservation of the relation” therefore is of 
critical importance in maintaining the relational wealth in FOSS projects and it could 
be a new basis for evaluating the legal strength of FOSS licensing.58 With Macneil’s 
two messages in mind, I will move on to explore how FOSS licences are understood 
by existing doctrinal rules as a contrast to the relational perspective in the following 
section. 
4.3 Three Doctrinal Routes to Enforcing a FOSS Licence 
Are FOSS licences contracts? If so, are they enforceable contracts? If not, according 
to what other possible legal doctrines might they be enforced? Should the application 
of a chosen doctrine take into account of the relational aspect of FOSS licensing 
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practice? As FOSS licences are designed to facilitate decentralised collaboration, 
there is no doubt that it is important to find answers to these questions. However, 
given the complex nature of the issue, there is little consensus on the enforceability 
of these licences among scholars.59 There are at least three different theories, or three 
doctrinal routes, under which that a FOSS licence may be enforced. The first theory 
suggests that a FOSS licence can be enforced if it is a valid contract. The second 
theory argues that a FOSS licence may well lack a contractual status due to problems 
such as the lack of bargained-for exchanges. Instead, it should be enforced as a bare 
licence (or pure property licence) regardless of the licence being contractual or not. 
The third theory finds that the second theory has a weakness: a bare licence is 
revocable by the licensor. So in order to prevent a FOSS licensor from going back on 
his promise, the equitable doctrine of estoppel might be evoked when necessary.  
4.3.1 First Route: Contractual Licence 
The first route argues that a FOSS licence such as GNU GPL can be enforced as a 
contractual licence. One of most enthusiastic champions of this argument is 
Gomulkiewicz, who believes that the GPL fulfils all the requirements under a US 
model code known as the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA) 
to be a contract. 60  The UCITA explicitly recognises a “license” as having a 
contractual status because here “licence” is defined as “a contract that authorizes 
access to, or use, distribution, performance, modification, or reproduction of, 
informational rights, but expressly limits the access or uses authorized or expressly 
grants fewer than all rights in the information, whether or not the transferee has title 
to a licensed copy.”61 However, this resort to the UCITA is problematic because the 
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spirit of this Act has its provenance in the hugely controversial ProCD ruling62. In 
the FOSS community, Richard Stallman is openly against the UCITA, which is 
believed to suit proprietary software developers’ interests but not FOSS 
programmers.63 Largely for this reason, the Free Software Foundation has refused to 
categorise the GPL as a UCTIA-type contract.64 However, in order to do some justice 
to FSF’s argument later, I first need to give the licence-as-contract argument some 
benefit of the doubt at the moment by examining how a “contract” may be formed in 
a “licence”. 
Formation of Contract 
Anglo-American contract law insists on three main components being present to 
form a contract: offer, acceptance and consideration. If a FOSS licence has to be 
recognised as having a contractual status, then it must have all these three 
components.  
(A) “Offer” in FOSS Licensing 
It is a relatively straightforward issue to find an “offer” 65 in a FOSS licence. An 
offer is a licensor’s manifested willingness to give users permissions to access, use, 
modify or redistribute a piece of FOSS and these permissions are usually 
accompanied by some restrictions pursuant to Free Software Definition and Open 
Source Definition. Rosen points out that the willingness to offer can be manifested 
by posting the software to a publicly accessible FOSS repository website on the 
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internet (e.g. SourceForge) so that “all prospective licensees will be able to retrieve 
the software under the terms of the license”.66  
(B) “Acceptance” in FOSS Licensing 
According to the classical contract model, an acceptance should be the “mirror 
image” of the offer, that is, it must be “absolute” and must “correspond with the 
terms of the offer”.67 The offeree needs to unequivocally convey his intention to 
accept “without leaving room for doubt as to the fact of acceptance, or as to the 
coincidence of terms of the acceptance with those of the offer”.68 An offeree may 
accept an offer through verbalised agreements, but he may also manifest his 
acceptance through non-verbal forms of conduct, which is not unusual in the mass-
market off-the-shelf software world. 69  There are three main ways that software 
licensing terms may be offered to potential licensees for acceptance—shrinkwrap, 
clickwrap and browsewrap—each of which will be discussed in turn. 
Shrinkwrap and the ProCD case    Early mass-market software products are often 
sold in boxes wrapped with shrinkable clear plastic under the so-called shrinkwrap or 
box-top licences. When the purchasers pierce the plastic open, it is normally assumed 
that they assent to the licensing terms attached to the software within the boxes. 
Before 1996, shrinkwrap licences were routinely found to be unenforceable at the 
federal appellate level across the US. 70 However, in 1996, the situation was changed 
by the US Seventh Circuit’s landmark decision in ProCD v Zeidenberg, where Judge 
Easterbrook ruled that a shrinkwrap license was enforceable as a contract.71 In this 
case, the plaintiff ProCD sells a database product called SelectPhone(TM), 
comprising a national telephone directory and a software program for searching the 
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data. The product is delivered on CD-ROM disks shrinkwrapped by a notice: “Both 
the software and the data listings are subject to the terms and conditions of the 
enclosed license agreement which is part of this product and printed in full on the 
enclosed envelope. Please read fully the license agreement.”72 Note that this notice 
itself is not the actual licence containing the terms and conditions, but the former is 
merely an alert to the latter. It is impossible for the defendant-purchaser Matthew 
Zeidenberg to know, let alone consent to, the content of the licence when he 
purchased the boxed ProCD product.  
Since Zeidenberg did not make any explicitly verbalised assent to the licence that he 
was only able to view later after the purchase, the court faced a difficult question as 
to whether the licence was actually “accepted” by, and then binding on, the 
purchaser.73 Judge Easterbrook ruled that Zeidenberg did “accept” the licence and he 
was thus bound by it. The reason is that although Zeidenberg did not make a verbal 
assent to the licence in the classical sense, his “acceptance” of the licence can be 
inferred from his failure to return the ProCD product to the vendor after reading the 
licence. Easterbrook bases this judgment primarily on Section 2-204(1) of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) that relaxes the classicist offer-acceptance 
doctrine by allowing assents to be manifested “in any manner sufficient to show 
agreement”.74 In this sense, a buyer’s acceptance does not have to be obtained after a 
conventional bargaining process, but it can be indicated by any conduct of 
“performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance.”75  Because the 
ProCD vendor “proposed a contract that a buyer would accept by using the software 
after having an opportunity to read the license at leisure” (original emphasis), 
Zeidenberg’s actual use of the software should be construed as his assent to the 
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licence and he had “no choice, because the software splashed the licence on the 
screen and would not let him proceed without indicating acceptance.”76           
The ProCD ruling has provoked tremendous controversy in the academic world. Eric 
Posner observes that the decision has “precipitated a typhoon of academic hostility” 
and remains “probably the most criticized case in modern history of American 
contract law”.77 What is most disturbing to contract scholarship is that ProCD overtly 
challenges the consent-driven classical contract model, which relies on bargained-for 
exchanges to generate full and unambiguous meeting of the minds. Post finds it is 
hugely problematic for Easterbrook to use Section 2-204 of the UCC to construct 
Zeidenberg’s inactivity as the “tacit assent” to the ProCD licence: 
Even if we were to use the ‘gestalt’ approach to contract formation in S. 2-204 
[of UCC] which would look at all the communications between the parties 
without an attempt to isolate a particular document or communication that was 
the offer or the acceptance, there is still the problem of finding assent in the 
passivity of the buyers unless we are willing to assume ‘tacit assent’ from their 
silence or inaction. That too flies in the face of traditional contract doctrine.78 
Concurring with Post’s critique, Macaulay also finds Easterbrook’s interpretation has 
stretched a little too much the concept of “assent” (as “in any manner sufficient to 
show agreement” under S.2-204) to possibly cover unbargained or under-bargained 
non-consensual relations. This would allow manufacturers of consumer goods such 
as the ProCD supplier to gain unilaterally a wide range of “freedom from contract” 
by “packing inside the box contract clauses that attempt to repeal various laws that 
business dislike.”79 From the viewpoint of a classical “contract purist”, it is just “very 
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difficult to offer a convincing argument that these hidden clauses work to create a 
contract with the desired effect”.80 
The ProCD decision is important in the sense that it forcefully kick-starts a 
neoclassical reengineering of the classical contract law in software licensing 
jurisprudence. By sidelining the strictly bargain-oriented classical doctrine, 
Easterbrook shifts to an economical justification of standard-form licensing couched 
in Coasean language of transaction cost.81 From a neoclassical point of view, the 
traditional fully-dickered bargaining is not a viable option in the mass-market 
software world because it would only slow down the transactional speed and blur the 
discreteness of transactions.82 In the ProCD case, without enforcing the attached 
standard-form licence, it would otherwise “drive prices through the ceiling or return 
transaction to the horse-and-buggy age” even the terms could only be viewed after 
the purchase.83 In summary, the great significance of ProCD lies in the fact that 
Easterbrook articulates a dominant neo-classical rationale for software licensing 
jurisprudence despite the incessant academic resistance to it. The rationale mandates 
that routine enforcements of standard-form information product licences is a 
predominant economic necessity for increasing market efficiency and decreasing 
transaction cost in the mass-market software world, while customers’ manifestation 
of assents to these licences is demoted to be a secondary issue, which should be as 
flexible as possible. This rationale by Easterbrook has twofold consequences. On the 
one hand, it clears the classicist hurdle to enforcing standard-form licences under 
contract law. On the other hand, the dominance of the ProCD rationale also 
impoverishes the software licensing jurisprudence where the possibility of non-
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neoclassical alternatives risks being ignored and underdeveloped. To fill this gap, I 
will analyse a relational rationale for FOSS licensing in Section 4.4. 
Clickwrap and Browsewrap     Given the high penetration of fast broadband 
Internet connection among the population worldwide, FOSS nowadays is more likely 
to be downloaded directly from a repository website to the local computers rather 
than being delivered on the physical medium of CD-ROMs using a shrinkwrap.84 In 
fact, clickwrap and browsewrap licences are more frequently used by FOSS and they 
raise slightly different concerns in terms of contract formation. Clickwrap licences 
require affirmative actions from licensees to manifest their acceptance: they are 
asked to press the button “Yes, I Agree” as a way of assenting to the licensing terms 
and conditions before they actual download or install the software. Kim has observed 
that click-wrap licences “do not raise the same contract formation concerns as 
shrinkwrap agreements because the user typically has notice of the terms and has an 
opportunity to read them prior to engaging in the contractual relationship.” (original 
emphasis) 85  The clickwrap technology employs a slightly more licensee-friendly 
measure by using an interactive interface, which usually is a pop-up dialogue box 
displaying the licensing terms. Software users are thus notified of the existence of the 
licence, though they may not actually read or understand everything in it. FOSS 
projects, especially those are keen to rapidly build a non-sophisticated end-user base, 
often employ clickwrap as its licensing interface.  
Although clickwrap is a slightly more user-friendly technology than shrinkwrap, this 
does not mean the problem of assumed “assents” to licensing term is completely 
gone. In fact, FOSS software developers often make users to manifest “acceptance” 
in two ways: “acceptance” can be manifested not only through clicking the 
“Acceptance” button but also through the actual conduct of installing and using the 
software. For example, when Google released its FOSS browser “Chrome” in 
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September 200886, Google Chrome Terms of Service assumed users to accept the 
licence through either of the two ways: 
2.2 You can accept the Terms by: 
(A) clicking to accept or agree to the Terms, where this option is made 
available to you by Google in the user interface for any Service; or 
(B) by actually using the Services. In this case, you understand and agree that 
Google will treat your use of the Services as acceptance of the Terms from that 
point onwards. 87  (see Figure 4.1 Screenshot of Google Chrome Terms of 
Service) 
Note that the clickwrap here is lumped together with actual use of software as 
assumed manifestation of assents88. In this light, a user may give his assumed assent 
to the licence even though he fails to click the “Accept” button, which means the 
clickwrap mechanism may be bypassed completely.89 
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Figure 4.1 Click-wrap: Screenshot of Google Chrome Terms of Service   
 
Note: This is a licence is for distributing the executable code version of Chrome and it should 
be used together with BSD License for distributing the source code version of the software. 
Compared with shrinkwrap and clickwrap licences, browsewrap licences are the 
most problematic of the three types. It assumes that by using or installing the 
software, “licensees” automatically “agree” to the terms and conditions that can be 
viewed somewhere as a webpage or merely an electric notice. Not all browsewrap 
licences had been enforced by courts after ProCD90. As a rule of thumb, in order to 
decide whether a browsewrap licence is valid or not, it is important to know if the 
browsewrapped software carries prominent notices for a user to be aware of the 
licensing terms. In other words, “a user is not bound by a [browsewrap] contract of 
which he is not made aware.” 91  This means that the licensing terms should be 
reasonably easy and straightforward to be located and read by users. For example, in 
the case Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc. the court ruled that the “terms of 
use” on the plaintiff’s webpage was enforceable, because there was evidence 
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showing that the defendant had actual knowledge of it.92 In contrast, in Specht v. 
Netscape Communications Corp., a disputed arbitration clause in a browsewrap 
licence was ruled to be unenforceable, because users was not given a prominent 
notice about the existence of the licensing terms on the defendant’s webpage.93  
FOSS developers must put a lot of emphasis on notifying their licensees about the 
licensing terms when the browsewrap is used. For instance, Section 5 of the GPL v.3 
makes it clear that all downstream distributors of modified source versions have the 
responsibility of giving “prominent notices” about the licensing status of the code 
involved:  
[…]  
b) The work must carry prominent notices stating that it is released under this 
License and any conditions added under section 7. This requirement modifies 
the requirement in section 4 to ‘keep intact all notices’.  
[….] 
d) If the work has interactive user interfaces, each must display Appropriate 
Legal Notices; however, if the Program has interactive interfaces that do not 
display Appropriate Legal notices, your work need not make them do so.94 
(added emphasis) 
Note that Section 5 (d) contains a proviso that GPL programmers are not required to 
use “interactive interfaces” to display appropriate legal notices. The consequence is 
that GPLed works are allowed to be conveyed without using the clickwrap 
technology. This is in line with the “technology-neutral requirement” stipulated in 
the Open Source Definition (OSD). In 1998, Open Source Initiative amended the 
OSD by adding a tenth criterion making sure that non-clickwrap technologies 
(including those with no graphic interface at all) should not be discriminated against 
in distributing FOSS. The official Rationale attached to Criterion 10 “License Must 
Be Technology-Neutral” in the OSD explains:  
Rationale: This provision is aimed specifically at licenses which require an 
explicit gesture of assent in order to establish a contract between licensor and 
licensee. Provisions mandating so-called “click-wrap” may conflict with 
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important methods of software distribution such as FTP download, CD-ROM 
anthologies, and web mirroring; such provisions may also hinder code re-use. 
Conformant licenses must allow for the possibility that (a) redistribution of the 
software will take place over non-Web channels that do not support click-
wrapping of the download, and that (b) the covered code (or re-used portions of 
covered code) may run in a non-GUI environment that cannot support popup 
dialogues.95 
(C) Consideration 
The last leg of contract formation—consideration—seems to be an even more 
unsettled issue in FOSS licensing. Under the doctrine of consideration, common law 
courts do not generally enforce a simple donative promise,96 but only enforce one 
party’s promise that is reciprocated with another party’ promise or performance. In 
Currie v. Misa, Lush J. points out that a “valuable consideration, in the sense of the 
law, may consist in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, 
or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken 
by the other.”97 In short, a consideration must confer some benefits and detriments to 
the promisee and promisor.98  
A consideration must have some value, though common law cares very little about 
how valuable it needs to be. Treitel points out that “an act, forbearance or promise 
will amount to consideration only if the law recognises that it has some economic 
values” and it “may have such value even though the value cannot be precisely 
quantified.”99 So when it comes to “non-monetary performance of doubtful economic 
value to the promisor”, it becomes a difficult issue to decide whether it can be 
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qualified as the right kind of consideration recognised by law100. In most FOSS 
projects, volunteer licensees’ contributions are mostly non-monetary performances 
(e.g. reporting bugs or testing submitted patches etc.) and it is not always clear 
whether these performances can have the right “economic values” to qualify as 
consideration as defined by Treitel above.  
In this scenario, now I try to explore a question that is often asked: does the GNU 
GPL involve a valid consideration with the right economic value to form a binding 
contract? The scholarly community again fails to reach a consensus and is divided 
into two camps on the issue. The first camp believes there is consideration in the 
GPL. This view is championed by Wacha who believes that there are reciprocal 
“mutual promises” between licensors and licensees. The licensors offer the software 
under certain conditions, while the licensees, “as consideration, agree[] to keep all 
copyright notices intact, to insert certain required notices, and to redistribute code 
only under certain conditions.”101 The second camp believes that the GPL fails to be 
a contract for a lack of consideration. This view is held by Kumar, who looks at the 
same set of restrictions that was examined by Wacha in the GPL, but she reaches a 
diametrically opposite conclusion. According to Kumar, consideration is exactly 
GPL’s “Achilles heel”. The licensors’ offer of software is a kind of conditional 
donative promise and the licensees’ adhering to the attached conditions is not a 
consideration to this offer: “The GPL places a number of restrictions on the user of 
GPL-licensed software […] However, adhering to restrictions on the use of a 
licensor’s copyrighted software is not consideration because the restrictions do not 
directly benefit the licensor.”102  In other words, there is no reciprocal exchange 
between the licensors and licensees, because the former do not get any a clear benefit 
in return. Kumar then argues that the GPL is “based on real property licenses”, which 
concurs with the FSF’s official explanation of the GPL as a bare licence. “Suppose 
that a landowner grants a revocable license to the public to cross through a strip of 
the landowner’s property to access a public beach. The landowner does not explicitly 
receive anything in return from the public. Though the landowner may limit the 
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public’s access to certain times of day, these ‘burdens’ on the public do not serve as 
consideration for using the landowner’s property. They are merely limitations on the 
access that the public is receiving.”103  
Following Kumar’s argument, the debate between the two camps can be also framed 
as the one about whether licensees’ obeying the conditional restrictions under the 
copyleft is a benefit to the licensors or not. Or to put it another way, is the relation 
between the licensors and licensees under the copyleft a reciprocal one? It could be 
argued that Kumar slightly over-simplifies the issues. In fact there are two groups of 
GPL licensees. The first group simply uses the software and makes no publicly 
released contributions back to the community. These licensees do not benefit the 
licensors.104 In contrast, the second group do not only modify software and but they 
also choose to share the source code of these modifications with the community. This 
use of the GPLed software is different from the situation of “real property licences” 
to give public access as discussed by Kumar above. The second group of licensees is 
not merely passively allowed public access to the GPLed code, but they also 
proactively make improvements to the code. The improved code will thus bring some 
benefit to the whole community including the original licensors, though this benefit 
may not be the type that can be immediately converted into monetary wealth. Of 
course, these two groups of licensees may not remain mutually exclusive and things 
can change. Some licensees in the first group may choose to join the second group 
and become proactive contributors over the time and vice versa. 
4.3.2 Second Route: Bare Licence 
As has been discussed above, the attempt to use the first route to enforce FOSS 
licences as contract are likely to encounter two uncertainties: 1) lack of explicitly 
verbalised assents from users and 2) lack of consideration understood by classical 
contract law. The second route attempts to bypass these two difficult issues by 
treating a FOSS licence as a bare licence, which is a unilateral permission given by 
the property owner to enable the licensees to use the work in a way which would 
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otherwise be infringing. 105  The idea of “bare licence” is a relatively unfamiliar 
concept to software licensing jurisprudence, because it is usually discussed in the 
land or real property context.106 It is interesting to see that the old doctrine of “bare 
licence” initially used in land law is now being revived in the FOSS world. This 
attempt is championed by Free Software Foundation (FSF), which interprets that the 
GPL is a bare licence but not a contract.107 According to them, the permission under 
the GPL is unilaterally granted to licensees, which seems to be a one-way operation. 
Unlike a classical contract where an offeree needs to unequivocally “accept” an 
“offer”, licensees of the GPL as a bare licence are not required to verbally “accept” 
the licence. Because all GPLed software is copyrighted in the first place, one would 
have infringed the copyright without the permission from its owner. In other words, 
to obey the terms of the GPL is the condition of using the GPL covered work. 
Section (9) of the GPL v3.0 makes it clear that the “acceptance” in a classical 
contract is not required in the GPL as a bare licence:  
You are not required to accept this License in order to receive or run a copy of 
the Program. […] However, nothing other than this License grants you 
permission to propagate or modify any covered work. These actions infringe 
copyright if you do not accept this License. Therefore, by modifying or 
propagating a covered work, you indicate your acceptance of this License to do 
so.108    
Eben Moglen, in the first International Conference on the GPL v3.0 (intending to 
clarifying FSF’s jurisprudence behind this new version of the GPL to the 
community), reiterates two points supporting FSF’s official position that the GPL is 
not a contract. First, bargained-for exchanges do not exist in the GPL. Second, the 
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GPL is a copyright licence, without which one’s use of the GPLed software would 
lead to copyright infringement. 
We [on behalf of the FSF] have not argued now, nor will we, nor can anyone 
argue, who reads the text of the language, that the receipt of the code is some 
quid-pro-quo for the acceptance of some terms. […] arguments based on the 
contractual exchange of the code for promises of compliance have nothing to do 
with us. We give permissions here and the enforcement weight of our license 
lies in the fact that you have no permission to propagate, that is, you have no 
permission to do what copyright law requires permission to do, but through this 
license. That's our legal theory and we are sticking to it.109 
Furthermore, there are also two policy reasons why the FSF insists that the GPL is 
not a contract but a bare licence. First, FSF’s position has to do with its attempt to 
avoid the unpopular model contract code UCITA, which derives its jurisprudence 
from the controversial ProCD ruling.110 The UCITA that treats software licences as 
contracts, according to Stallman, is essentially a product of proprietary software 
lobbying efforts. 111  By arguing the GPL is a bare licence, the free software 
movement keeps a critical distance from the legal theory behind the UCITA-type 
contract law. Second, Moglen argues that contract laws in different countries around 
the world are by no means uniform, and it would be difficult for the new globally 
applicable GPL v3.0 to handle the diversity within the world contract regimes.112 
When the GPL is a bare licence, it will base its validity solely on software copyright. 
Because most countries’ copyright laws are modelled upon the same set of 
international agreements such as the Berne Convention, it is more conceivable to 
reconcile approaches than when dealing with world contract laws. Even with a single 
country like the US where different states have their own contract laws (while the 
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Copyright Act is federal), the many state contract regimes can be unwieldy for 
individual licensors and licensees alike in the US to handle.113 For this reason, the 
enforcement of the GPL would be better off when treated as a non-contractual bare 
licence: 
The reason that’s our legal theory and [we] are sticking to it remains the one we 
gave before. There are [too many] contract law schemes in the world and the 
more you depend upon them, the more variability you will have. Berne 
[Convention] is good, the harmonisation of copyright is good, for us. Our rules 
will use a toolset that is as close to global standard as we can get.114  
Moglen’s concern is understandable that a big diversity of contract regimes around 
the world would Babelise the jurisprudence behind the GPL and reduce the legal 
certainty for enforcing the licence in a global context. However, this point is not 
universally accepted. The fragmentary contract regimes may have been exaggerated. 
Rosen points out that today’s globalised economy has required a high level of 
“consistency of commercial transactions” and “contracts are interpreted in much the 
same way around the world.”115 At the same time one should not underestimate 
inconsistency of the copyright regimes around the world. Again, Rosen argues, for 
example, that there is no agreed definition of “derivative work” in global copyright 
law, and its meaning vary from country to country. So it would be better to have the 
licence drafters to clarify its meaning through the vehicle of contract rather than 
merely relying on copyright.116 
It is also important to note that FSF’s reliance on Berne-type copyright law is mainly 
a pragmatic choice and it is just for the convenience of licence enforcement. The 
hacker custom is still against any private property regime including copyright. 
(Recall that Moglen’s call for “[a]bolition of all forms of private property in ideas” in 
the dotCommunist Manifesto. 117 ) Stallman followed up Moglen’s above quoted 
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speech by making their hackers’ ideological leaning clear that they are not 
uncritically endorsing the global copyright regime:   
That [‘Bern is good, the harmonisation of copyright is good, for us’] doesn’t 
mean that we are in favour of copyright law as a general matter. […] We're not 
totally against copyright law, in a simple or blanket sense either, but we're not 
defending the global copyright system that has mostly been imposed on the 
world merely because we use it because it's there. […] We are not endorsing the 
Berne plus WTO system of copyright law as it stands as a good thing, but it 
exists and whatever harm it may do in other areas, we're trying to do some good 
with it when we can.118 
Revocability of Bare Licences 
One of the most obvious weaknesses of a bare licence is that it is only binding on the 
licensee but not on the licensor. A bare licence can be unilaterally terminated or 
revoked at the pleasure of the licensor. In other words, a FOSS licence as a bare 
licence is not mutually binding. This problem might lead to unfairness when the 
licensee has contributed modified source code back to the project or merely formed 
reliance by using the licensed software. The US case Microsystems Software, Inc. v. 
Scandinavia Online has exposed this problem.119 In this case, two computer hackers, 
Eddy Jansson and Matthew Skala, developed a program called CPHack which was 
released under the GNU GPL. CPHack was designed to disable Microsystems’s 
censorware known as “Cyber Patrol 4”. The two hackers were then sued by 
Microsystems for their anti-censorware. In order to settle the dispute, the two hackers 
agreed to revoke the GPL and assign the copyright of CPHack to Microsystems. So 
the copylefted software thus became proprietary.120  The GPL, when it is a bare 
licence, cannot prevent the licensors from going back on their promised permissions 
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made in the licence. The unilateral withdrawal of the GPLed code understandably 
would pose another layer of uncertainty to any FOSS project.121 
4.3.3 Third Route: Promissory Estoppel 
The second route does not make obligations in a FOSS licence mutually binding. In 
other words, a bare licence can be enforced only against the licensee but not the 
licensor. In order to compensate this weakness, a third route via an equitable doctrine 
of “estoppel” is suggested to prevent FOSS licensors from revoking or terminating 
the licence at will when the licensee has clearly developed a detrimental reliance 
upon it. 122  Unlike the doctrine of consideration in contract law that enforces 
bargained-for exchanges, estoppel can be used to enforce reliance-based liability 
arising from unreciprocated promises.123 Some scholars have already proposed this 
third route to enforce FOSS licences (including the GPL) in the US context,124 where 
the doctrine of “promissory estoppel” is codified in Section 90, Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce 
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by 
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enforcement of the promises. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as 
justice requires.125 
As promissory estoppel protects software users’ detrimental “reliance”, so it is 
necessary to ask what constitutes “reliance” in the FOSS context.126 As a rule of 
thumb, users’ conduct of modifying the original FOSS would suffice to constitute 
reliance. Kumar argues that the mere use of the software will be difficult to prove 
reliance. However, if users make derivative works based on the FOSS licensed 
software, it is a strong sign that reliance has been established and his “reliance” 
should be protected against original software developers’ attempt to terminate the 
GPL.127 
Although the promissory estoppel in the FOSS context has never been actually tested 
in court, the danger of software developers’ termination of a FOSS licence is not 
entirely hypothetical. There is good strategic reason for a commercial company to 
make their software released under a FOSS licence in the beginning and later 
terminate it to back-claim royalties when they see appropriate. To spell it out, a 
company may strategically adopt a FOSS licence and then let its user-base grow 
because of the generous grants in this licence. When this FOSS licensed software 
becomes so popular that it turns out to be the de facto standard, it will be too costly 
for its users to switch to other software. At this point, the company may threaten to 
terminate the FOSS licence and start to collect royalties from users. If users refuse to 
pay back royalties, they can then choose to terminate the licence and then sue for 
copyright infringement. 128  In this scenario, promissory estoppel can be a useful 
doctrinal tool to be evoked to prevent users against this kind of strategic use of FOSS 
licences.129 
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4.4 Conceptualising the GPL as a Relational Contract 
Having canvassed the difficulties of applying existing doctrinal rules to FOSS 
licensing above, I will now try to re-examine the GPL from a relational 
perspective.130  The re-examination is divided into two subparts. Firstly, in Section 
4.4.1, I identify two obstacles to re-conceptualise GPL as a true Macneilian relational 
contract. One can straightforwardly be derived from the consent-driven classical 
contract law, whilst the other comes from the more insidious neoclassical ProCD-
type law. Secondly, in Section 4.4.2, I propose that GPL is better understood as a 
relational “umbrella agreement”, which is designed to harness the serendipitous 
nature of the peer production of FOSS and at the same time stabilise the long-term 
collaborative relation. 
Before I start, a caveat is worth making at the start. A paper document on which the 
GPL is written cannot be a relational contract. The GPL may become relational only 
when it is adopted and used by certain a FOSS project (e.g. the Emacs project or the 
Linux project) where there is an ongoing collaborative relation. To make it clear, my 
focus of this section is not about the GPL being merely as a textual document as such, 
but it concerns how the GPL is relationally understood in the context of the real lived 
collaborative experience as in peer-produced FOSS projects. 
4.4.1 Two Obstacles: Classical and Neoclassical Laws 
There are two conceptual obstacles to developing a new line of enquiry about the 
GPL in relational terms. A relationally understood GPL needs to overcome each of 
them before it can potently account for the collaborative relations in a decentralised 
and coordinated FOSS project. The first obstacle lies in the inconvenient fact that the 
GPL is a standard-form licence, which often does not require unequivocally 
verbalised manifestation of consent from the licensees. This is at odds with classical 
contract law that is anchored in explicitly bargained-for exchanges. Under the 
classical model (also known as the contract-as-consent model), a thoroughly dickered 
bargain gives rise to a meeting of the minds at a single moment when the offeree 
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accepts the offer. Only at that single point the total legal obligation is presentiated 
and becomes fully binding on the parties. 
In order to negotiate this first obstacle posed by classical contract-as-consent law, 
RCT provides a more realistic and sophisticated understanding of the role of explicit 
“consent” in contract formation. From a relational perspective, consent does not 
simply take place at one stroke, and nor does it always have to be fully verbalised. 
Instead, consent often happens incrementally over a period of time, and it may well 
come out of a mix of verbalised and non-verbalised commitments. Macneil points 
out that the exercise of choice in a consensual relation is “an incremental process in 
which parties gather increasing information and gradually agree to more and more as 
they proceed.”131 The incremental process of consent can hardly come out of an 
isolated discrete transaction but it has to be through a series of repeated dealings 
between parties in a timeline. As the gradual formation of consent through repeated 
dealings clearly does not fit into the discrete transactional model, a more nuanced 
understanding of the “bargaining” mechanism is warranted. Lon Fuller famously 
observes that either full bargain or zero-bargain is very rare in real contractual 
exchanges. Between these two extremes, people often reach agreement through 
“half-bargaining”: “where men cannot bargain with words, they can often half-
bargain with deeds; tacit understandings arising out of reciprocally oriented actions 
will take the place of verbalized commitments.”132 In a long-term FOSS project, 
there are plenty of chances to “half-bargain with deeds” in a rich collaborative 
relation, which can often alleviate the heavy burden on the one-shot explicit consent 
as the sole device to effectuate the obligations in a licence like the GPL. In contrast, 
a consumer of proprietary software is much less likely to develop an incremental 
consent, because a proprietary software developer normally has no intention to enter 
into a collaborative relation with his consumer and he would thus tries to make a 
software transaction as discrete as possible. As there is no future relation beyond this 
particular discrete transaction, it is impossible for the user of the proprietary product 
to incrementally assent to the licensing terms over a period of time. 
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The second obstacle to conceptualising the GPL as a relational contract does not 
come directly from the classical model, but from the more elusive neoclassical 
contract law, which assumes the supremacy of market efficiency in maximising 
individuals’ material utility. It is not uncommon to confuse the neoclassical model 
with Macneil’s relational contract model, though the two models may bear certain 
surface resemblance in terms of their tinkering with the classic model.133 However, 
the neoclassical model does not substantially deviate from the classical law’s 
ideology which assumes the supremacy of the goal of maximising individual utility. 
In fact, neoclassicism is even more decisive and ruthless in pursuing and executing 
the discreteness of transactions than classical contract law. Macneil observes that the 
extreme pursuit of transactional discreteness makes the neoclassicism unsuited to 
deal with the relational aspect of contracting:  
Neoclassical contract law is founded in theory and organization on the discrete 
transaction, but with many a relational concession. It can often deal adequately 
with the more discrete issues in contractual relations. But when discrete and 
relational principles conflict, neoclassical law lacks any overriding relational 
foundation, and thus lacks a resource often needed in relational law.134  
In the software licensing context, the neoclassical approach is probably good enough 
to supply an economic justification of proprietary software licensing that promotes 
discrete transactions, but it is rather incompetent in explaining non-market-based 
relational exchange in FOSS collaboration. There is a conspicuous “relational” gap 
to be filled by a true Macneilian understanding of relational contract, where 
exchanges are not solely conducted under the goal of maximising individual utility. 
As it is impossible to canvass the whole picture of neoclassical contract law in this 
chapter, 135  I only limit my discussion to the neoclassicist strategy to replace 
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“consent” with “market efficiency” as the main rationale in legitimating standard 
form contracts. This strategy is achieved by two steps: first, it dismisses thoroughly 
negotiated “consent” as unrealistic and unnecessary. The second step then 
recalibrates the legitimation mechanism against a new benchmark of market 
efficiency, which becomes the most salient feature of neoclassical contract law. 
Raymond Nimmer succinctly records this two-step shift from classicism to 
neoclassicism as follows:  
[…] the [classical contract’s] ideas of choice and agreement convey[] a 
romantic view of contracts, i.e., that the choices must follow actual negotiation 
between parties of equal bargaining power. Negotiation over terms seldom 
occurs in either a mass market or a commercial marketplace. Our economy, and 
the mass market in particular, is not, and never was, a bazaar economy 
characterized by recurrently dickered terms shaped to each transaction. Nor can 
it ever be so. Economics and efficiency concerns preclude it.136  
From a neoclassical point of view, it is clear that fully-dickered negotiations are 
unnecessarily costly, but they must give way to the goal of maximising parties’ 
individual utilities in the most calculably efficient fashion. Easterbrook’s ProCD 
ruling epitomises this neoclassical view where the enforcement of the standard-form 
licence in dispute is based on the ground of economic efficiency in promoting 
discrete transactions of the ProCD product. As has already been shown in above 
Section 4.3.1, Easterbrook disregards the classicist offer-acceptance doctrine but 
favours the neoclassical UCC’s approach137 that allows consent to be assumed “in 
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any manner sufficient to show agreement”. 138  Precluding time-consuming 
negotiations that traditionally legitimates consensual relations, he reduces the 
practice of standard-form licensing to an efficient money-saving device that is 
believed to be economically beneficial to consumers.139  Post finds Easterbrook’s 
neoclassic strategy to trade consumers’ consent for market efficiency is a “ruthless” 
one. Easterbrook assumes that “reduced cost is what all consumers want”, but fails to 
appreciate “the values and desires (not translatable into dollars and cents) that 
animate human beings”. 140  The ProCD-type law is a slippery slope that may 
eventually lead to an undemocratic assent-destroying result: “Constructive assent, 
manufactured through the manipulation of the rules of contract formation and the 
interpretation of silence as assent (because it is read by the light of judge’s belief that 
he knows what is best for the consumer or for the economy), is inappropriate and 
undemocratic.” 141  Post’s view is endorsed by Macaulay 142 , who in his own 
examination of ProCD case, openly favours Macneil’s approach over Easterbrook’s: 
“I like Ian Macneil’s approach much better than Easterbrook’s. Macneil concedes 
that [standard form contracts] are not real contracts, but he would enforce many of 
them. He argues that we enter many relationships where we do not know all the 
terms—marriage, the military, and jobs at university law schools. Our relationship 
with our computer or software supplier is just one more.”143 
Here Macaulay means “Ian Macneil’s approach” by the one advocated in the essay 
“Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion”, where Macneil proposes a relationally 
understood “consent” to standard forms.144 Unlike Easterbrook who ostensibly bases 
his judgement on a constructive “consent” (assumed from a consumer’s inactivity, 
i.e., his failure to return the product before use), Macneil is candid that the classical 
contractual consent, which is “individual manifestation of a willingness to be bound 
in relatively specific ways”, cannot work well in legitimating standard from 
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contracts.145 Scholars have to face the fact that it is impossible for adhering parties to 
comprehend every single detail in a standard form contract at the outset of a 
contractual relation. For Macneil, a consent to a standard form has to be understood 
as a consent to join an unfolding relation that is projected into the future. 
Liberal society has always recognized numerous legitimate relations into which 
entry is by consent, but the content of which is largely unknown at the time the 
consent was given. This is the idea of joining a relation. We can join a law firm 
or a university faculty or any other employment relation; we can join the army; 
we can join a corporation by buying its shares; we can join in holy matrimony. 
In each instance we can do so in spite of large-scale ignorance about the 
restraints we are accepting. In spite of our ignorance liberal society will bind us 
to those unknown restraints.146 
Macneil finds that the “consent to join an approved relation”, though ubiquitous in 
liberal society, lacks open recognition by liberalist thinking and is largely “hidden in 
the liberal intellectual closet”.147 In fact, any FOSS licence like the GPL deliberately 
does not presentiate the total legal obligation concerning making contribution to the 
project. So the consent to the GPL is largely a Macneilian consent to join a relation, 
which is gradually unfolding through ongoing collaborative efforts. This FOSS 
relation is not dissimilar from a marriage relation, which also normally avoids 
presentiation of the total obligation but is more based mutual trust to carry on the 
relationship among the couple. I will soon show that GPL is in fact a constituion-like 
umbrella agreement that only promulgates general rules for those who are willing to 
join the collaborative relation148 and its legitimacy is supported by Benkler’s peer 
production model.149 
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Although the neoclassical model (unsatisfactorily) removes the classicist hurdle in 
contract formation, its own rationale to promote market efficiency in furthering 
individual utility maximisation becomes a new hurdle to a relational understanding 
of FOSS licences. The economic rationale behind ProCD is probably good enough to 
justify a proprietary software licence that is used for a one-shot discrete transaction, 
but it is hugely inadequate in coping with the more complex relational exchange in 
FOSS collaboration, where contributors are not single-mindedly motivated by the 
sole desire to maximise their individual material wealth. Whitford worries that 
Macneil’s message of respecting a multiplicity of values held by participants in a 
relational contract would be unfairly overridden by the neoclassicist’s sole agenda 
for wealth maximisation. He urges that “the law, and the legal academics, should 
more fully recognize the place of other values, especially participation, where a 
[standard form contract] is used in a relational setting. While individual negotiation 
of each contract may be just too inefficient, there may be other ways to provide 
adhering parties a sense of participation in framing the contents of their agreements” 
(added emphasis).150 Note that Whitford here highlights “participation” as one of the 
values that can not be managed well in discrete transactions, but I think that this is 
exactly the value that should be taken seriously in FOSS collaboration. Whitford 
summarises the difference between discrete transaction and relational contract in 
terms of “participation”:  
Participation is another value commonly reflected in the behavior of parties to 
relational contracts. Participation, as I use the term, means that the parties seek 
influence in formulating the substantive content of a transaction. […] In discrete 
transactions, take-it-or-leave-it bargains seem quite satisfactory because the 
party not drafting the terms can exercise effective control over its own well-
being and, indirectly, over the terms of the standard form contract simply by 
declining to enter the transaction or refusing to enter another one. As 
transactions become relational, however, withdrawal becomes a less viable 
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means of control, and the parties seek direct participation the formulation of the 
rules of the relationship.151 
“Participation” is an important site where a relational FOSS licence is distinguished 
from discrete transactional proprietary software licence. In a discrete transactional 
proprietary licence, not all parties can equally “participate” to decide the substantive 
content of a contract. The parties with stronger bargaining power often proffer the 
total legal obligation for the weaker parties, who may only choose to take it or leave 
it. In contrast, a relational FOSS licence does not presentiate total obligation for the 
adhering parties, but it requires all parties to constantly and proactively “participate” 
to shape their own obligation in terms of making actual contribution to a project in an 
ongoing cooperative relation. I will use the GPL to substantiate this argument in 
more detail below. 
4.4.2 GPL as an Umbrella Agreement: Balancing Flexibility with Certainty 
Though the value of “participation” is an important one, it is not a straightforward 
task to apply it to GPL as a relational contract. The main difficulty lies in the fact 
that many standard-form contracts “involving consumers are used in transactions that 
are not highly relational.” 152  So how does GPL as a standard form become a 
relational contract and how do users of GPLed software to “participate” to shape 
their own obligation in a collaborative relation? In order to answer this question, I 
propose to examine the issue at two levels. The first level is the GPL as an umbrella 
agreement, which specifies the participants’ minimum legal commitments to 
guarantee software freedom but leaves open the substantive contents of actual 
contributions. The second level contains a myriad of sub-agreements about 
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programmers’ actual volunteer contributions, which are impossible without these 
contributors’ direct participation. These second-level obligations are not, and cannot 
be, fully presentiated in the umbrella GPL, whose main purpose is to make sure that 
all contributions can be later legally pieced together into one sustaining free software 
project. In short, the GPL as an umbrella at the first level is merely to facilitate the 
real lived collaborative experience happening at the second level. It makes sure all 
contributions are not merely isolated transactions, but they can be considered under 
the same relational umbrella. In contrast, a proprietary software licence like the 
ProCD user licence is more likely to be employed only for a few isolated 
transactions, and users are not expected to develop a long-term collaborative relation 
with the original product supplier to substantially improve the product. In other 
words, a transactional software licence is not underpinned by a long-term 
collaborative relation between the original software developers and its users, but it is 
only a device to regulate some one-shot transactions of software as discrete 
commodities. 
In the business sector, the use of umbrella agreements is by no means rare, because 
they are very useful to stabilise lasting commercial relations under which a series of 
interrelated transactions may take place.153  Mouzas and Furmston point out that 
umbrella agreements are generally “not concerned with immediate contractual 
decisions but rather they explicitly spell out the principles that guide future 
contractual decision.”154 The main reason for employing umbrella contracts is largely 
due to the tremendous difficulty of presentiating the total obligation for parties at the 
outset of a long-term cooperative relation. As it is impossible iron out every single 
detail for an unfolding relation, an umbrella document is needed to specify some 
general principles that prevent that relation meandering into nowhere. In this sense, 
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an umbrella contract is very close to a kind of “constitution”, which provides 
“certainty regarding the conditions under which exchanges may take place” and also 
“a platform for an on-going negotiation”:  
In this way, umbrella agreements take the form of ‘constitutions’ of contracts. 
To view an umbrella agreement as a constitution may be relevant to problems of 
interpretation remembering Marshall C.J.’s famous injunction that ‘we must 
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.’ The validity and 
legitimacy of constitutions is based upon the evolution of consent among related 
actors over time. This consent articulates a high order of shared conventions 
which comprise customary, expected, legal, and often non-legal rules and 
principles.155 (internal citation omitted)  
In the academic literature, it is not uncommon that the GPL is also often seen as a 
community’s “constitution”, which echoes nicely the above view that an umbrella 
contract is a “constitution” for participating parties in a relation. In his study of open 
source software, Weber repeatedly mentions that an open source licence is not 
narrowly a legal document for a particular transaction, but it is “a de facto 
constitution” that determines the governance structure of a project. Weber argues: 
Yet there is another way to see the license, as a de facto constitution. In the 
absence of hierarchical authority, the license becomes the core statement of the 
social structure that defines the community of open source developers who 
participate in a project. One way to manage complexity is to state explicitly (in 
a license or constitution) the norms and standards of behavior that hold the 
community together.156 (added emphasis) 
No secondary commentary can be more revealing than the text in the GPL itself, 
which indicates that the licence is a constitutional umbrella specifying “the norms 
and standards of behavior that hold the community together”. The preambular text of 
the GPL makes it clear that the licence is no more than codifying general rules for 
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guaranteeing software freedom in all publicly conveyed contributions in a 
collaborative relation. It reads: 
The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed to take 
away your freedom to share and change the works. By contrast, the GNU 
General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and 
change all versions of a program—to make sure it remains free software for all 
its users. We, the Free Software Foundation, use the GNU General Public 
License for most of our software; it applies also to any other work released this 
way by its authors. You can apply it to your programs, too.157 (added emphasis) 
Not unlike all other umbrella agreements, the GPL is also designed to achieve a 
balance between two interrelated needs, which are 1) “the need to remain flexible” 
and 2) “the need for certainty and calculability” in an ongoing cooperative relation 
among parties. 158  Recall that in Chapter 1, I argue that “collaboration” in any 
successful FOSS project has two defining aspects: it is not only 1) radically 
decentralised but also 2) coordinated among a large number of contributors.159 The 
first aspect concerning decentralisation corresponds to the need for flexibility, while 
the second aspect concerning coordination corresponds to the need of certainty and 
calculability. Now I will explain both aspects/needs in turn.  
Firstly, GPL does not, and cannot, presentiate the total obligation that licensees 
should bear in a radically decentralised collaborative environment,160 but the need for 
flexibility or serendipity precludes presentiation. The substantive decisions to 
contribute (e.g. what, when and how to contribute) are completely left to individual 
volunteers themselves.161  In this light, the GPL as a relational umbrella contract 
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dovetails well with Benkler’s peer production system, which refuses to specify the 
creative tasks for “peer” programmers. The peer production thus distinguishes itself 
from market and firms, both of which struggle to specify or presentiate as much as 
possible the objects to be produced via the price mechanism or managerial 
commands.162 It encourages individual programmers to pursue their own intellectual 
interests during the evolution of a project. This is based on the belief that human 
creativity is a highly individuated enterprise and only individuals themselves can best 
identify what they are most capable of doing. For this reason, Benkler argues that 
creative tasks cannot be fully specified or presentiated by classical contract:  
[…] human intellectual effort is highly variable and individuated. People have 
different innate capabilities, personal, social, and educational histories, 
emotional frameworks, and ongoing lived experiences. These characteristics 
make for immensely diverse associations with, idiosyncratic insights into, and 
divergent utilization of, existing information and cultural inputs at different 
times and in different contexts. Human creativity is therefore very difficult to 
standardize and specify in the contracts necessary for either market-cleared or 
hierarchically organized production.163 (added emphasis) 
Secondly, those “highly variable and individuated” contributions by peers also pose 
some uncertainties when they are needed to be pieced together into a coherent free 
software project. Without an explicitly agreed commitment, it is not automatically 
clear whether all individual programmers are willing to share their contributions 
permanently and irrevocably as free software. If some programmers are allowed to 
withdraw their contributions from the project at their will, it would cause great 
uncertainty to the project. For example, the legal uncertainty caused by the 
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withdrawal of Gosling’s code from “Emacs commune” in the pre-GPL era was real 
and tremendous.164 So the GPL as an umbrella agreement reduces this uncertainty by 
standardising a few minimum legal commitments that are necessary to prevent a 
project from disintegrating, although it never presentiates any detailed obligations 
concerning substantive contributions. These minimum obligations mainly concern 
the availability of source code when a contribution is conveyed to the public. In other 
words, the GPL makes sure all publicly conveyed code, verbatim or modified, must 
be made available for the public to freely copy, use, modify and redistribute.165 In 
this light, the GPL as an umbrella adds a level of certainty by making sure that it 
would provide a legal infrastructure where all unpresentiated peer-produced 
contributions can be legally compatible free software to stay in the same 
collaborative project. 
In summary, the GPL as an umbrella agreement addresses the need for flexibility by 
not presentiating the substantive content of peer production in a continuing relation, 
and at the same time it addresses the need for certainty by standardising the 
minimum legal commitment to make these peer-produced contributions legally 
compatible. Again it is worth reemphasising that although the GPL is an important 
umbrella agreement that balances these two needs in a collaborative relation, it does 
not equal, but only facilitate, this whole relation. Just as Macneil reminds: “Under 
the relational approach, express terms in contracts are no more than an extremely 
important part of a dense web of relations.”166 The next chapter will address the issue 
concerning FOSS authorship, which is another important part of the relational web 
but is too complex to be fully explained by the express text of the GPL. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examines some difficult issues concerning the FOSS licences as non-
negotiated standard from contracts. From a strictly classical contractual view, most 
FOSS licensing schemes would lack affirmatively expressed consent from licensees 
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to make themselves binding. There are two alternatives to this classical approach. 
One is the neoclassical contract law as represented by the ProCD ruling, which 
reorients the legitimation of standard forms towards the goal of maximising 
individual utility gains. The other alternative is the Macneilian relational contract 
approach, which is endorsed by this chapter. I argue that the relational approach is 
more appropriate to deal with a relation-rich FOSS collaborative experience than the 
classical or neoclassical contract model. My examination of the GPL as a relational 
umbrella agreement shows its role in maintaining a balance between the need for 
flexibility in identifying the creative tasks by programmers themselves and need for 
legal certainty in producing legally compatible contributions to stay in one project 
irrevocably as free software. Based on this relational insight, the next chapter will 
explore the diverse motivational forces behind FOSS authorship in relation to FOSS 
licensing.
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Chapter 5  The Idea of Authorship in FOSS Licensing 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Who are the “authors” of free and open source software? How do programmers claim 
their “authorship” in collaboratively created FOSS projects? To which extent does 
this FOSS “authorship” deviate from the eighteenth-century Romantic author vision 
that has purportedly shored up the modern copyright law1? Do FOSS licensing 
schemes correspondingly carve out a unique legal persona for programmers working 
in collaboration that is detached from Romantic aesthetics? Compared with many 
scholarly writings on legal enforcement of FOSS licences including copyleft licences, 
the size of the legal literature tackling above questions about FOSS authorship is 
considerably small2. Dusollier observes that “[t]he author is barely mentioned in 
copyleft, despite playing a prominent role in the system” and this marked absence 
“unfortunately conceals the importance of the author figure in the philosophical 
model of copyleft.”3 As all copyleft licences are copyright licences in the first place, 
Dusollier’s observation tallies with Ginsburg’s worry that “the figure of the author is 
too-often absent” in “contemporary debates over copyright” and this absence may 
only lead to an incomplete understanding of “copyright’s role in fostering 
creativity.” 4  Similarly, the lack of discussion of authorship in FOSS licensing 
schemes can also risk losing sight of the whole picture of the role of FOSS licensing 
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in coordinating FOSS collaboration. As the last lap of my journey of exploring 
FOSS licensing, my task in this chapter is exactly to map out the complex idea of 
collaborative authorship as manifested by FOSS licensing schemes. 
The main thrust of this chapter is that “authors” do exist in FOSS projects and they 
exist not only at the individual level, but more importantly, also at the collective 
(project) level. At the individual level, Dusollier suggests that authors are the 
“initiators” of each individually created piece of code,5 but she does not go further to 
elaborate in detail how these individual contributions are later integrated into a 
collective work, which can be attributed to a project as a whole.6 What is ignored 
here is exactly FOSS authorship at the collective level, which is an equally important 
but poorly understood matter. An “authorless” project at the collective level would 
simply be a failed project where individually created contributions do not aggregate 
into a coherent whole. An “authored” FOSS project is not content oriented towards 
producing a Babel of unrelated software fragments in a radically decentralised 
environment, but it also wants every contributor to coordinate with one another.7 It is 
exactly these coordinating efforts that give birth to the collective authorship, which 
can be held responsible and deserve credit for the production of an integrated FOSS 
                                                 
5
 Dusollier seems to think that these individual authors then fully withdraw their authorial control over 
their creation once and for all under FOSS licences. In this scenario, the software becomes a kind of 
constantly reformulateable free-flowing postmodern “work”, whose link with its initial individual 
authors is irreversibly lost: “Once the work is made available to the public, the formerly unwavering 
link to the author becomes blurred. The author is no longer considered ‘the initiator of the collective 
work.’ Furthermore, the integrity of the work—that element which reflects authorial personality and 
justifies an extensive moral right in Continental doctrine—no longer means much. In this sense, the 
author resembles the figure of postmodern literary aesthetics of Foucault’s ‘founder of discursivity.” 
As the initiator of an open discourse—of an ever-evolving work—the author of an element of a 
collective creation in copyleft finds her particular contribution diluted by the whole of successive 
contribution. The ‘work’ in the copyleft regime is software in constant (re)-formation; it is the 
production of meaning from different convergent or successive artistic practices.” Dusollier, supra 
note 2, pp. 294-5 
6
 Dusollier only mentions collective authorship in passing at the end of the concluding part of her 
essay. She seems to argue that the collective work is made possible with the help of copyleft, but she 
does not explain how the legal mechanism of copyleft exactly helps to coordinate individual authors’ 
interests in more detail: “The author is not only the initial founder of a discourse and instigator of a 
creation of which her contribution is only the first stage. She is also the figure by whom the whole of 
the collective creation finds itself marked by the stamp of freedom. In the chain of contributions, of 
works which will come to add incrementally to the first act, none will be able to escape the refusal of 
intellectual property rights exerted in a proprietary and exclusive manner. Foucault’s desire for greater 
cultural freedom is brought to life in copyleft.”(added emphasise) ibid., at 295  
7
 See also Section 1.3.1, Chapter 1, where I argue that “collaboration” in any successful FOSS project 
has two defining aspects: it is not only 1) radically decentralised but also 2) coordinated among a 
large number of contributors. This chapter elaborates the second aspect of collaboration in terms of 
FOSS licences’ role in coordinating contributors’ legal commitment.  
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project. Of course, this collective authorship in the whole project should not be 
conflated with the individual authorship in each individual contribution. The former 
by no means compromises the latter, which is also respected within the FOSS 
community. A full evaluation of FOSS authorship in relation to FOSS licensing 
should be scrutinised at both collaborative and individual levels, though the existing 
literature does not tend to be discerning enough to differentiate the two. In particular, 
I will highlight the pivotal role of a small core group of lead authors—who are the 
lead programmers or coordinators in a FOSS project—to integrate individual 
authors’ creation into a collective work. I call them “stewards”, whose coordinating 
efforts make their authorship quite different from the conventional author-owners 
claiming exclusive rights under the intellectual property regime.8 
The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part (Section 5.2), I examine 
whether the Romantic genius vision fits with FOSS authorship at both individual and 
collective levels. At the individual level, there is no shortage of extremely talented 
FOSS programming “geniuses” in the community. However, the making of a 
collaborative FOSS project always goes beyond celebrating the virtuosity of these 
individual “geniuses”. Individually created contributions must be aggregated into a 
workable coherent whole, which can then be collectively held responsible and 
deserve credit for an integrated project as a whole. Most interestingly, individual 
author-geniuses do not simply disappear under the shadow the collective FOSS 
authorship, but a few most active and enthusiastic ones, who usually become project-
leaders/coordinators, stand out as the author-stewards for certain projects for a 
sustaining period of time. I point out that, although these coordinators play a 
tremendously important role in channelling individual authorship into collaborative 
authorship, their author-stewardship is an understudied phenomenon by legal 
scholarship. In the second part (Section 5.3), I explore the FOSS programmers’ legal 
persona, which has developed to a large extent independently of the Romantic author 
vision. I try to demonstrate how FOSS programmers use their licensing schemes to 
claim their authorship at both individual and collective levels, despite the fact that 
                                                 
8
 The alignment of authorship with stewardship in FOSS projects is in counterpoint to Mark Rose’s 
famous observation that modern authorship is distinguished by its link with ownership: “the author is 
conceived as the originator and therefore the owner of a special kind of commodity, the work.” Rose, 
Authors and Owners—The Invention of Copyright, (Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University 
Press, 1993) p.1 
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Anglo-American law does not statutorily give software programmes a standalone 
attribution right. In particular, I will tackle the problem as to how project-leaders, in 
the capacity of author-stewards, enlist trademark law to protect the reputation or 
goodwill for their project as a whole. The third part (Section 5.4) concludes.  
5.2 Individual and Collective “Authors” in FOSS Programming 
This section discusses the authorial consciousness of FOSS programmers at both 
individual and collective levels. It examines the extent to which Romantic aesthetics 
is still viable in explaining the actual practice of FOSS programming. It shows that 
the individualistic Romantic author vision may still be applied to individual 
authorship of contributed code, but   it is too inadequate to account for FOSS 
authorship at the collective level. In particular, the Romantic vision seems to suffer 
from a blind spot by failing to recognise project-leaders’ unique authorial role as 
“stewards”, who are instrumental in channelling individual authors’ efforts into one 
collective authorship that can be held responsible and deserve credit for a FOSS 
project as a whole. 
5.2.1 Debating the Legacy of Romantic Aesthetics 
The individualised “author”, who is credited as the sole origin of a creative work, is a 
construct of relatively recent pedigree. Woodmansee, in her 1984 essay, has provided 
a definitive account of the rise of the self-inspired “genius” and its repercussion in 
modern copyright law since the Western Romantic Movement beginning in the 
second part of the eighteenth century. Literary creators, equipped with the 
ammunition from Romantic aesthetics, lifted themselves out of the unimaginative 
rank of craftsmen, and they become author-geniuses capable of making totally 
original contributions derived from their unique creative personality. The oft-quoted 
Wordsworth’s testimony made in 1815 is an exemplary statement asserting the 
literary author-genius to be the sole fountain of his original creation: 
Of genius the only proof is, the act of doing well what is worthy to be done, and 
what was never done before: Of genius in the fine arts, the only infallible sign is 
the widening the sphere of human sensibility, for the delight, honor, and benefit 
of human nature. Genius is the introduction of a new element into the 
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intellectual universe: or, if that be not allowed, it is the application of powers to 
objects on which they had not before been exercised, or the employment of 
them in such a manner as to produce effects hitherto unknown. 9  (added 
emphasis) 
The Romantic vision of author as a Wordsworthian genius capable of introducing “a 
new element into the intellectual universe” has arguably exerted an indelible and 
tremendous influence in shaping the contour of modern copyright law in the western 
world. Woodmansee points out that modern copyright is exactly built upon this cult 
of the author-genius:  
Our laws of intellectual property are rooted in the century-long 
reconceptualization of the creative process which culminated in high Romantic 
pronouncements like Wordsworth’s to the effect that this process ought to be 
solitary, or individual, and introduce ‘a new element into the intellectual 
universe.’ Both Anglo-American ‘copyright’ and Continental ‘authors’ rights’ 
achieve their modern form in this critical ferment, and today a piece of writing 
or other creative product may claim legal protection only insofar as it is 
determined to be a unique, original product of the intellection of a unique 
individual (or identifiable individuals).10 (original emphasis) 
In the more specific area of software copyright, there is no shortage of academic 
works that bear out Woodmansee’s worry about law’s uncritical acceptance of the 
Romantic mode of solitary and individualised authorship. Jaszi, an ardent champion 
of Woodmansee’s thesis, observes that “lawyers and judges have invoked the vision 
of the Romantic ‘author-genius’ in rationalizing the extension of copyright protection 
to computer software”, because software programs are “no less inspired than 
traditional literal works, and that the imaginative process of the programmer are 
analogous to those of the literary ‘author’.”11 It is worth noting that the main source 
that Jaszi relies upon to make his observation is another influential article titled 
                                                 
9
 William Wordsworth, “Essay, Supplementary to the Preface”, quoted in Woodmansee, “On the 
Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity” (1992) 10 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 279 
at 280 (Hereafter “On the Author Effect”) 
10
 Martha Woodmansee, “On the Author Effect”, ibid., at 291-2 
11
 Peter Jaszi, “On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity”, (1992) 10 
Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 293 at 297-8 
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“Silicon Epics and Binary Bards” (hereafter “Silicon Epics”) written by Anthony 
Clapes and his colleagues in 198712 (three years after Woodmansee’s essay on “the 
Genius and Copyright” was first published). In “Silicon Epics”, Clapes et. al. 
straightforwardly liken software to “the arcane epic poetry of the Information Age”13 
and a programmer is correspondingly the ‘poet’ of his poetic creation. It is 
emphasised that software should not be treated differently from literary works, 
because they are also “works of authorship in which the range and variety of 
expression are broad and deep” and software as “works of authorship exhibit all the 
attributes of literary works of a kind with which the general public and copyright 
laws are already quite conversant.”14 Note that the programmer-as-poet vision is not 
preached by “Silicon Epics” for the first time, but it comes from Frederick Brooks’ 
1975 classical work on software design, which is often credited as an earlier source 
equating programmer with poet: 
The programmer, like the poet, works only slightly removed from pure thought-
stuff. He builds his castles in the air, from air, creating by exertion of the 
imagination. Few media of creation are so flexible, so easy to polish and rework, 
so readily capable of realizing grand conceptual structures[…] 15  (added 
emphasis) 
From Brooks’ point of view, programming is by no means a mindless job but it 
involves author’s “exertion of the imagination” upon his creation, and it is also 
enjoyable and fun. The programmer-author has the “sheer joy of making things” that 
is new and original: “As the child delights in his mud pie, so the adult enjoys 
building things, especially things of his own design. I think this delight [in 
programming] must be an image of God’s delight in making things, a delight shown 
in the distinctness of newness of each leaf and each snowflake.”16 The authors of 
“Silicon Epics” seem content to use Brooks’s author-as-god metaphor to defend the 
extension of US copyright law to software as previously recommended by the Mel 
                                                 
12
 Anthony Clapes, Patrick Lynch, and Mark R. Steinberg, “Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: 
Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs” (1987) 34 UCLA Law 
Review 1493 
13
 ibid., at 1584 
14
 ibid. 
15
 Brooks, Mythical Man-Month, pp.7-8, quoted by Clapes et. al., “Silicon Epics”, ibid., at 1497 
16
 ibid., at 1496-7 
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Nimmer and National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted 
Works (CONTU).17 Note that this 1987 “Silicon Epics” essay is not a single isolated 
effort to invoke Romantic authorship to justify copyright protection for software, but 
it has a sustained appeal. For example, Miller, in a later Harvard Law Review article, 
makes a similar authorship argument that “imagination, originality, and creativity 
involved in writing a program is comparable to that involved in more time-honored 
literary works and far exceeds various mundane efforts that have long enjoyed 
protection under the copyright rubric” 18 . For this reason, he also reaches the 
conclusion that the unique creative expression from individual software programmers 
deserves copyright protection: 
[…] the communicative precision required of a computer programmer is not 
unlike the discipline that a poet must achieve to convey a complex message 
within the confines of a tightly constrained meter or that of a composer who 
must work within the limited ranges of musical instruments or of the human 
voice. In each case, the copyright law rewards the author's imagination and 
originality of expression in the hope of encouraging further creative 
productivity.19 (added emphasis) 
Both Clapes and Miller’s articles have vindicated Woodmansee’s observation that 
“creative product may claim legal protection only insofar as it is determined to be a 
unique, original product of the intellection of a unique individual (or identifiable 
individuals)” 20 (added emphasis). It is not difficult to find the Romantic creative 
mode, which is arguably the aesthetical mooring of modern copyright law, is based a 
presumption that the “original” contribution must come from a unique identifiable 
“individual”. I argue that this Romantic conception of “originality” and 
“individuality” fails to account for the complex phenomenon FOSS programming on 
two grounds. Firstly, the Romantic view of “originality” ignores the fact that 
                                                 
17
 “It is this factual underpinning that was persuasive to Mel Nimmer and the majority of CONTU 
members in recommending only modest changes in the Copyright Act so that the full body of 
copyright law would apply to computer programs.” Clapes, “Silicon Epics”, at 1583; For CONTU’s 
report that analogises software to literary work, see also the discussion in Section 3.3, Chapter 3 of 
this dissertation. 
18
 Arthur R. Miller, “Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-
Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU” (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 977 at 983-4 
19
 ibid., at 984 
20
 Woodmansee, “On the Author Effect”, supra note 9 
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programming is also an engineering discipline that has always prized intelligently 
reusing old elements in solving practical problems since its early hacker culture. 
Secondly, the Romantic conception of “individuality” (i.e., author as solitary and 
self-inspired genius) makes itself difficult to explain the practice of collaborative 
FOSS programming in a radically decentralised environment. I will explain both 
grounds in turn now. 
5.2.2 Programming as an Engineering Discipline: Questioning “Originality” 
The first ground calls into question the Romantic analogy of software programmers 
to Wordsworthian literary geniuses, whose unique “original” creative expression 
must introduce “a new element into the intellectual universe”. In fact, FOSS 
programming is not always about creating new things out of nothing in a rarefied 
atmosphere, but it is also an engineering discipline seeking to solve practical 
problems by using old and pre-existing technical solutions.21 Samuelson et. al. find 
Clapes or Miller’s attempt to treat programmers as literary author-geniuses 
ultimately fails 22, but argue that a “well-designed program is thus akin to the work of 
a talented engineer whose skilled efforts in applying know-how, accumulated from 
years of experience and training, yields a successful design for a bridge or other 
useful product.”23 There are two characteristics to this programmer-as-engineer view. 
First, programmers do not merely compose code as literary text, but more 
importantly they produce utilitarian artifacts that perform certain functions, from 
which the primary value of the program is derived.24 Secondly, programming as an 
                                                 
21
 The development of US software case law, especially after the 1992 Altai case where software was 
treated partially as a functional object and its non-expressive elements were accordingly excluded 
from copyright protection, seems to fly in the face of the Romantic argument that programmers are 
“original” literary writers. In other words, software copyright law after Altai seems not go down the 
exact trajectory as laid down by Romantic aesthetics, but it seems to veer onto a non-aesthetical 
course where programmers are recognised as “engineers”. See Computer Associates International, Inc. 
v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.1992)  
22
 Pamela Samuelson, “Enabling Metaphors” supra note 1 at 2038-9; See also Lemley, “Romantic 
Authorship”, supra note 1 at 894 
23
 Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, and J. H. Reichman, A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, (1994) 94 (8) Columbia Law Review 2308 at 
2332 (hereafter Manifesto) 
24
 “While conceiving of programs as texts is not incorrect, it is seriously incomplete. A crucially 
important characteristic of programs is that they behave; programs exist to make computers perform 
tasks. Program behavior consists of all the actions that a computer can perform by executing program 
instructions. […] Behavior is not a secondary by-product of a program, but rather an essential part of 
what programs are. To put the point starkly: No one would want to buy a program that did not behave, 
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engineering discipline is not just about bringing “a new element into the intellectual 
universe”, but it is also about intelligently reusing and combining old elements that 
have been “accumulated from years of experience and training”. The second 
characteristic directly challenges the “originality” of Romantic authors and calls for 
recognising the incremental and accumulative mode of creativity in software 
engineering: 
The products of software engineering almost invariably contain admixtures of 
old and new elements. Some consist almost entirely of old elements. The 
innovation in such programs may lie in the manner in which the known 
elements have been combined in a new and efficient manner. Or it may come 
from combining some new elements with well- known elements in order to 
achieve the same result in a new way. When we speak of programs as 
"industrial compilations of applied know-how," it is in recognition of the 
frequency with which software engineering involves the reuse of known 
elements. Use of skilled efforts to construct programs brings about cumulative, 
incremental innovation characteristic of engineering disciplines. 25  (added 
emphasis) 
Samuelson’s depiction of software programmers as engineers, whose innovation is 
incremental and cumulative and involves skilled reusing of old elements, shows that 
software programmers’ authorial consciousness cannot be solely determined by 
Romantic aesthetic thoughts but there is also a strong technical dimension to the 
issue. The awareness that programmers are engineers or technicians is critical to 
understand the non-Romantic (incremental and cumulative) mode of practical 
creativity in collaborative FOSS programming. Weber observes: “Open source is 
first and foremost an engineering culture—bottom up, pragmatic, and grounded 
heavily in experience rather than theory.”26 In fact, this engineering culture can be 
exactly stretched back to the early MIT-style hacker culture, where the ethos of 
sharing and reusing of existing solutions to technical problems was strong and robust 
                                                                                                                                          
i.e., that did nothing, no matter how elegant the source code "prose" expressing that nothing.” ibid., 
pp. 2316-7 
25
 Samuelson et. al.  Manifesto, supra note 23 at 2332 
26
 Weber, Success, p.164 
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among computer hackers 27 . For hackers and later FOSS programmers, it is 
unnecessarily wasteful to reinvent the wheel from scratch, however original this 
reinvention may be without copying from other sources. It is argued that there is “an 
ethical duty of hackers to share their expertise by writing open-source code and 
facilitating access to information and to computing resources wherever possible.”28 
However, the rise of private intellectual property in software and its accompanied 
pursuit for “originality” significantly diminished this sharing and reusing ethos since 
the late 1970s. It pushed the common activities of sharing and reusing under the 
hacker culture into a newly created category known as software “piracy” or “theft”, 
which was exactly the kind of “crime” that Stallman was accused of during his 
conflict with the proprietary software company Symbolics over the Lisp 
programming language initially co-developed at the MIT AI Lab.29 In this sense, the 
hacker culture grounded in engineers’ practical intelligence is to a large extent a 
victim of software copyright law’s obsession with Romantic mode of “originality”, 
which refuses to see the more incremental and cumulative type of creativity. 
5.2.3 Stewarding a FOSS Project: Questioning “Individuality” 
The second ground questions authors’ “individuality” as assumed by Romantic 
aesthetics. As a general matter, this individualistic vision tends to attract two types of 
criticism. First, literary theorists blame it for neglecting the prevalent collective 
creative processes in the contemporary time. 30  Secondly, legal scholars are not 
satisfied with the lack of precise guide that Romantic aesthetics is able to provide for 
the actual development of legal doctrines of intellectual property. In particular, the 
Romantic individualistic vision is least competent in telling what law can do when 
there is a dispute between upstream and downstream authors. In this light, Lemley 
points out that Romantic authorship ultimately fails to inform how to balance the 
interests among what he calls “first and second generations” of authors:   
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 See Section 2.2.1, Chapter 2 of this dissertation for more detail. 
28
 “The Hacker Ethic” in Jargon File, compiled by Raymond, at 
<http://www.catb.org/jargon/html/H/hacker-ethic.html> 
29
 For more detail of Symbolics incident, see Section 2.3.2 Chapter 2  
30
 For example, Woodmansee observes that “electronic technology is hastening the demise of the 
illusion that writing is solitary and originary” and the “writing” practice has become frequently 
collective in the electronic age. See Martha Woodmansee, “On the Author Effect: Recovering 
Collectivity” (1992) 10 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 279 at 289 
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The problem is that the idea of Romantic authorship does not necessarily lead 
one to favor one side or the other in a dispute between two types of authors—
the first and second generations. One could invoke the language of romantic 
authorship either to demand strong copyright protection for a first-generation 
author or to demand an expansive interpretation of fair use for a second-
generation author who has “transformed” a first-generation work.31 
In the case of large-scale decentralised FOSS programming, this inter-generational 
authorial conflict can be exacerbated because there can be unlimited numbers of 
generations of programmers who work on the same piece of software. What 
complicates things further is that even founding members (i.e. the first generation of 
contributors) of a FOSS project do not always stay upstream in a project. They can 
rapidly move downstream when they use and modify contributions from later-
generation programmers. FOSS licensing schemes to some extent pre-empt this 
problem by standardising all individual authors’ legal commitments when making a 
collaborative project.32 Having said this, I do not mean to give an impression that the 
collaborative efforts of a FOSS project can be reduced to its legal form as forged by 
these licensing schemes. Instead, I try to show that FOSS collaboration requires one 
lead programmer or a core team of programmers to make both legal and extra-legal 
arrangements to coordinate peer-produced contributions into a whole. I call these 
coordinators the “stewards” of FOSS projects. These stewards occupy a critically 
important “authorial” role in splicing individual authorial interests into a collective 
one. 
Project-Leader/Coordinator as Author-Stewards 
To understand FOSS project-leader/coordinators’ authorial persona as “steward” is 
not based on a false belief that FOSS programmers are incapable of making original 
contribution as individuals. There is no need to overcompensate for the weakness of 
Romantic aesthetics by denying the existence of programming “genius” in the FOSS 
community. In fact, many lead FOSS programmers are first known to the public for 
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 See Lemley, “Romantic Authorship”, supra note 1 at 885  
32
 It is worth emphasising again the difference between copyleft and non-copyleft schemes. Copyleft 
licences makes all generations of authors have the same set of responsibility to commit their 
contributions to the commons, while non-copyleft licences schemes only limit this responsibility to 
the first generation of authors. 
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their virtuoso hacking skills rather than the relatively unsung role as project 
coordinators. Recall that Levy’s 1984 hagiography of computer hackers, as its 
subtitle “Heroes of the Computer Revolution” suggests, is exactly a book full of 
larger-than-life programming geniuses in the pioneering days of hacking. One of the 
most notable of them is no doubt Richard Stallman, who is depicted by Levy much 
like a typical solitary Romantic genius. For example, during Stallman’s personal 
struggle against the proprietary software company Symbolics which refused to share 
improvements of the Lisp language, Stallman’s individual virtuosity in programming 
even won the admiration from a Symbolics employed programmer who commented: 
“[…] Stallman doesn’t have anybody to argue with all night over there. He’s 
working alone! It is incredible anyone could do this alone.”33 (original emphasis) 
Levy’s writing is one of the earliest sources where Stallman gains this lonely (and 
sometimes unsociable) “genius” image. In 1990, this image is further reinforced by 
the prestigious MacArthur fellowship (also known as the “genius grant”) given to 
Stallman literally in recognition of his “genius” status in the hacking world.34 Nine 
years later, Michael Gross conducted an important interview further revealing that 
Stallman has exhibited all kinds of attributes normally associated with a solitary 
genius since his childhood as a lonely prodigy who was precociously talented and 
curious in many intellectual subjects.35 
However, Stallman’s image as hacking genius sometimes overshadows his arguably 
more mundane administrative role as the coordinator-steward behind the GNU 
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 Levy, Hackers, p.426 
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 It is interesting to note that the very generous “genius grant” ($240,000 in value including health 
insurance to Stallman) allows to Stallman to fully dedicate himself to the cause of free software 
without taking another full time job. Lerner explains what kind of people can be the awardees of the 
“genius grants”: “The MacArthur fellowships, known as "genius grants," are awarded annually to 
exceptionally talented and creative people. This year's recipients include artists, human rights 
activists, mathematicians, and astronomers.” Reuven M. Lerner, “Stallman wins $ 240,000 in 
MacArthur Award”, 18 July 1990 at < http://tech.mit.edu/V110/N30/rms.30n.html>  
35
 In this interview, Stallman recalled that he was a very lonely child who had few friends, but he took 
an avid interest in many subjects: “I learned calculus when I was something like 7 or 8. So it wasn't 
hard for anyone to tell that I was interested in learning as much math and science as possible. For a 
couple of years when I was 14 to 16, I would go to the library and get two or three books a week 
about various subjects, like History, Math and Science. And I would read them all. At one point, I 
decided to learn Latin, so I got a first-year Latin textbook and went through it in a month, and then I 
got the second-year book and went through that in the next month”. See Michael Gross, “Richard 
Stallman: High School Misfit, Symbol of Free Software, MacArthur-certified Genius”, 2000, 
<http://www.mgross.com/MoreThgsChng/interviews/stallman1.html>; this interview about Stallman 
as a genius is important because it lays the foundation for a later book-length biography of Stallman 
by Sam Williams. Sam Williams, Free as in Freedom—Richard Stallman's Crusade for Free 
Software, O’Reily 2002 at <http://www.oreilly.com/openbook/freedom/> 
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project. From the whole project’s point of view, Stallman’s persevering stewardship 
can be much more important than his personal geniushood. This is because 
Stallman’s individual ingenuity, however great it is, would only be diluted in a robust 
project that can continue to attract a burgeoning number of contributors. At the same 
time, Stallman’s role as coordinator would only be gradually accentuated over the 
time because a growing pool of programming talents needs more and more of his 
stewardship to channel their peer-produced contributions into a coherently integrated 
project. To put it succinctly, it is a lead programmer’s tenacity rather than his 
ingenuity that gives him the stewardship, which matters most to the sustainability 
and longevity of a project.  
The above point becomes even clearer when it is applied to the Linux project under 
the stewardship of Linus Torvalds. Raymond observes that Torvalds fails to be an 
individually “original” computing genius like Stallman in the first place, but he 
stands out as an engineer who is extremely good at implementing and integrating 
other people’s contributions into the project. In this sense, Torvalds is considered to 
be a kind of lesser “genius of engineering and implementation”, but he knows how to 
harness the collective intelligence from other hackers despite his lack of personal 
ingenuity:  
But Linux didn’t represent any awesome conceptual leap forward. Linus is not 
(or at least, not yet) an innovative genius of designing in the way that, say, 
Richard Stallman [… is]. Rather, Linus seems to me to be a genius of 
engineering and implementation, with a sixth sense for avoiding bugs and 
development dead-ends and a true knack for finding the minimum-effort path 
from point A to point B. Indeed, the whole design of Linux breathes this quality 
and mirrors Linus’ essentially conservative and simplifying design approach.36 
It is not difficult to find that Raymond’s argument has subtly widened the meaning of 
“genius”, which has been conventionally pegged to the individualistic mode of 
“originality” under Romantic aesthetics. For Raymond, the “genius” may mean not 
only the self-inspired creator in the Romantic sense, but it may also include the more 
                                                 
36
 Eric Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar, version 3.0 at 
<http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/>  (hereafter Cathedral) 
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mundane but less individualistically “original” type of “genius of engineering and 
implementation” as epitomised by Torvalds who is good at using and reusing other 
people’s innovation. In fact, Torvalds is not alone for being this kind of lesser 
“genius”, but he belongs to a core stewardship team of subsystem maintainers for the 
Linux project. This team of maintainers are Linux’s “gatekeepers”, because they are 
responsible for reviewing all contributed patches, which can only be integrated into 
the mainline kernel with its approval.37 Kelty illustrates how these gatekeepers do 
their daily job of reviewing and merging code submitted from other contributors: 
Almost all of the decisions made by Torvalds and lieutenants were of a single 
kind: whether or not to incorporate a piece of code submitted by a volunteer. 
Each such decision was technically complex: insert the code, recompile the 
kernel, test to see if it works or if it produces any bugs, decide whether it is 
worth keeping, issue a new version with a log of the changes that were made. 
Although the various official leaders were given the authority to make such 
changes, coordination was still technically informal. Since they were all 
working on the same complex technical object, one person (Torvalds) ultimately 
needed to verify a final version, containing all the subparts, in order to make 
sure that it worked without breaking.38 
Furthermore, when a project-leader keeps coordinating or stewarding a project for a 
continuingly long time, he would not only be credited for his individual contribution, 
but more significantly, he would also get credit for his stewardship work that 
integrates other contributors’ efforts into a collective whole. To illustrate, Torvalds 
may claim two types of authorship for his work. On the one hand, he is the individual 
author of the code written by him; on the other hand, he is also the stewardship 
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 Kelty, Two Bits, p.220 
 194
author who reviews, approves and integrates other people’s contribution into the 
mainline Linux kernel. The former is familiar to the Romantic mode of individuated 
authorship, while the latter is a less familiar one but is crucial to the success of a 
large-scale collaborative FOSS project. 
These two types of authorship may substantially overlap in a small budding project 
in its early formative stage, when a main programmer’s individual contributions 
account for the most part of the program. At this stage, his significant individual 
authorship can easily give rise to project leadership, which is “essentially the same as 
ownership” as observed by Weber.39 However, when the project scales up into a 
huge one, the lead programmer’ individual authorship can be rapidly diluted to the 
extent that he can no longer justify his ownership/leadership of the whole program. 
Suppose that this programmer continues to be enthusiastic about leading the project 
ahead, the basis of his leadership practice must shift from the ever-dwindling 
ownership of the software to the ever-increasing stewardship responsibility in 
coordinating other people’s contributions for the project.40 
This shift from ownership to stewardship is significant to a rounded understanding of 
project-leaders’ unique authorial role in taking stewardship responsibility to forge 
collaboration in a FOSS project. Most importantly, countering the Romantic 
assumption of self-inspired authorship, FOSS leaders’ author-stewardship seems to 
flesh out the two most important components of the author-as-steward thesis argued 
by Kwall. The first component comes from an awareness that an author himself is 
not the sole source of his own creation. Instead, inspiration is externally endowed as 
a  gift that enables the author to make his own creation.41 In other words, the author 
is not entirely self-inspired, but he receives external inspiration as a gift that contains 
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 According to Lucy and Mitchell, the hallmark of stewardship is one’s “responsibilities of careful 
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Hyde vividly portrays how externally endowed inspiration work for creative artists: “We also rightly 
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upon him. An idea pops into his head, a tune begins to play, a phrase comes to mind, a color falls in 
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“unearned value”42 bestowed upon him. In a large-scale FOSS project, it is clear that 
every programmer benefits from other people’s contributions, and no one can claim 
to be the sole source of the whole program. Even for those founding members of 
projects, many of them try hard to avoid reinventing the wheel if there are existing 
technologies available for reuse. For example, Linus Torvalds did not start the Linux 
kernel from scratch in 1992, but his inspiration comes from the pedagogical Minix 
system initially developed by the Amsterdam-based computer scientist Andrew 
Tanenbaum in the late 1970s. Similarly, Stallman did not start the Emacs editor in 
the early 1980s from nothing, but the program was co-developed by a few 
programmers at the MIT Lab since the 1970s.  
The second component of author-stewardship goes against rewarding creators with 
exclusive ownership right. Instead it evokes a sense of responsibility to offer an 
author’ work as a return gift back to the community where the author gets his 
externally endowed inspiration in the first place. Or to put it in Kwall’s words, this is 
the author’s stewardship responsibility to participate in “the cyclical dimension of 
creative enterprise”.43 Lewis Hyde thinks that this responsibility actually comes from 
creators’ “labour of gratitude” which spurs creators to do something reciprocal for 
the external inspiration that is bestowed upon them early on.44 In the history of FOSS 
development, Richard Stallman is exactly a programmer with a strong sense of 
stewardship responsibility to offer his software back to the community, though his 
view has lost much support facing the rise of commercial proprietary software. When 
Stallman started his GNU project in 1983 (two years before his first copyleft licence 
in 1985), his initial announcement of the project clearly indicates that he was driven 
by an ethical responsibility to share his software with the community: “I consider 
that the golden rule requires that if I like a program I must share it with other people 
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who like it.” 45  His later experiment with copyleft, which makes programmers 
contribute (publicly released) modifications or improvements back to the community, 
further bears out his belief in “the cyclical dimension of creative enterprise” that is 
articulated in the legal language through software licensing.46 To summarise, fusing 
the aforementioned two components together, author-stewardship manages to 
“blend[] an awareness of both externally endowed inspiration and the cyclical 
dimension of creative enterprise”47, and it is very different from the conventional 
author-ownership model, which argues that the solitary self-inspired Romantic 
genius needs to be rewarded with private ownership to protect their creative works. 
Reputational Incentive in the FOSS Community 
It would be unrealistic to expect all FOSS programmers to harbour the same 
irresistibly strong and noble sense of stewardship responsibility to share software as 
Stallman does. FOSS licensing only prescribe a minimum set of stewardship 
responsibilities that secure software freedom, but they do not and cannot translate the 
entire MIT-style stewardship tradition in legal forms. In fact, individual 
programmers are often driven by a diversity of motivational forces ranging from a 
high sense of stewardship to highly self-interested motives. This is in line with 
Macneil’s general thesis (as discussed in Chapter 4) that participants to a long-term 
cooperative relation can be driven by a spectrum covering both individual utility-
enhancement and non-utility-maximisation motives. Most interestingly, if Stallman’s 
high sense of stewardship represents the selfless non-utilitarian end of the spectrum, 
Eric Raymond’s argument in favour of reputational reward marks the individualistic 
utility end of the spectrum of FOSS programmers’ motivations. As I will soon show 
that, in the following Section 5.3, US case law (represented by the Jacobsen case) 
seems to be primarily based on a Raymondian individualistic understanding of FOSS 
                                                 
45
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programmers’ motivation and leaves little room for a Stallmanian one, it is 
worthwhile explaining Raymond’s approach in some detail now. 
From a Raymondian point of view, it is futile to find whether it is morally right or 
wrong for programmers to share software with the community or “hoard” software 
privately. 48  It is more important to know that FOSS programmers are not 
fundamentally different from other self-interested rational human beings who seek to 
maximise their individual utility. A FOSS bazaar functions just like a free market 
and it is made of “a collection of selfish agents attempting to maximize utility which 
in the process produces a self-correcting spontaneous order more elaborate and 
efficient than any amount of central planning could have achieved.” 49  (added 
emphasis) However, what really makes FOSS bazaar unique is the fact that money is 
not primarily used as a measure of programmers’ utility.50 In this scenario, FOSS 
programmers use “reputational reward” as an alternative kind of utility that they 
intend to maximise. Or in Raymond’s words, reputation simply has the “utility 
function” that satisfies FOSS programmers’ egos.51 More specifically, there are three 
kinds of “utility” from reputation gains that may drive a programmer to participate in 
a FOSS project. Firstly, Raymond does not doubt that “good reputation among one’s 
peers is a primary reward”, i.e., it gives intrinsic satisfaction to a programmer. 
Secondly, one programmers’ good reputation also tends “to attract attention and 
cooperation from others.”52 In this sense, reputation is not a matter of individual 
motivation, but it also leads to collaboration. “If one is well known for generosity, 
intelligence, fair dealing, leadership ability, or other good qualities, it becomes much 
easier to persuade other people that they will gain by association with you.”53 Thirdly, 
“reputation may spill over and earn you higher status” in the world outside the FOSS 
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community. 54  Note all the three reasons given by Raymond is not qualitatively 
different from lawyers’ understanding of highly skilled individuals’ attributional 
right to secure reputational gains as a kind of “human capital”. For example, the legal 
scholar Catherine Fisk is one of the most notable champions of the view that the 
“reputation we develop for the work we do proves to the world the nature of our 
human capital.”55 In fact, reputation is believed to be a kind of “property” owned by 
individuals. “If professional reputation were property, it would be the most valuable 
property that most people own.” 56  This reputational “property” is especially 
important to those highly skilled and highly educated workers, the value of whose 
work is otherwise difficult to be accurately assessed: 
Particularly in the case of highly-educated or highly-skilled employees or 
people who possess a great deal of tacit knowledge, assessing the nature and 
value of human capital is difficult. The abilities of a software designer or music 
producer cannot be measured the way the speed of a typist or the competence of 
a machine operator can. When the cost of errors in assessment is great, or when 
assessments about human capital need to be made frequently or rapidly, easily, 
interpretable information about human capital is valuable because it reduces 
search costs. Thus, credit becomes a form of human capital itself because it 
translates and signals the existence of a deeper layer of human capital.57 
Although Raymond’s reputation theory seems highly plausible to explain individual 
programmers’ incentive to participate in FOSS programming, it suffers from at least 
two weaknesses that need to be addressed. First, Raymond’s theory by no means 
gives the whole picture of multiple motivational forces behind FOSS programmers’ 
efforts. An important empirical survey conducted by Lakhani and Wolf shows that 
reputation ranks rather low (11%) among all motivational forces that are most 
commonly recognised by programmers themselves. In particular, it shows that 
incentives such as programmers’ intrinsic pleasure from FOSS programming for its 
own sake (“Code for project is intellectually stimulating to write”, 44.9%; “Improve 
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programming skills”, 41.3%)58 and their desire to contribute software back to the 
community (“Believe that source code should be open”, 33.1%; “Feel personal 
obligation to contribute because use F/OSS”, 28.6%) 59  are regarded as more 
important than the reputational gains. (See Table 5.1) The second weakness of 
Raymond’s theory comes from its individualistic assumption. It does not really 
explain why programmers as selfish agents, who keen to maximise their individual 
reputational gain, would collaborate to create an integrated project. Weber finds that 
uncoordinated individual reputation competition might only introduce conflict 
among individual programmers, or even lead to disintegration of a project. 60 
Furthermore, Raymond does not really delve into the important issue where FOSS 
programmers are also keen to protect the collective reputation of a whole project. For 
example, Stallman has campaigned very hard to make sure that the “GNU” project’s 
always get credit when it is used in juxtaposition with the Linux kernel.61 Most 
interestingly, FOSS project-leaders may not only resort to copyright to protect FOSS 
programmers’ attribution right (as the legal carrier of FOSS programmers’ 
reputation), but they may also evoke trademark law to protect a certain project’s 
name as the repository of the collective reputation or goodwill, which will be dealt 
with in the following section in some detail. 
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Table 5.1 Lakhani and Wolf’s Survey of Motivations to Contribute to FOSS Projects62 
 
Motivation 
Percentage of respondents 
indicating up to three 
statements that best reflect 
their reasons to contribute  
Percentage of 
volunteer 
contributors  
Percentage 
of paid 
contributors 
Enjoyment-based 
intrinsic 
motivation  
Code for project is 
intellectually stimulating 
to write  
44.9 46.1 43.1 
Economic/extrins
ic-based 
motivation  
Improve programming 
skills 
41.3 45.8 33.2 
Code needed for user 
need (Work need only) 
33.8 19.3 55.7 
Code needed for user 
need (Nonwork need) 
29.7 37.0 18.9 
Enhance professional 
status 
17.5 13.9 22.8 
Obligation/comm
unity-based 
intrinsic 
motivations  
Believe that source 
code should be open 
33.1 34.8 30.6 
Feel personal obligation 
to contribute because 
use F/OSS 
28.6 29.6 26.9 
Like working with this 
development team 
20.3 21.5 18.5 
Dislike proprietary 
software and want to 
defeat them 
11.3 11.5 11.1 
Enhance reputation in 
F/OSS community 
11.0 12.0 9.5 
Note: This survey is also relevant to my argument about relational contract as discussed in 
Chapter 4. It shows that FOSS collaboration is not motivated solely by individuals’ desire to 
maximise their material wealth, but it is driven by a diversity of values ranging from intrinsic 
satisfaction of code writing to reputational enhancement. This defeats the Easterbrookian 
assumption that all that licensees want is the lowest price, but it is in line with Macneil’s 
viewpoint that participants are driven by both economic and non-economic motivational 
forces to collaborate under a long-term relational contract. 
5.3 Development of the Legal Persona of FOSS Programmers 
Although FOSS collaboration is largely based on the nonexclusive use and reuse of 
software components, this does not mean that FOSS programmers wish to give up 
the paternity right in their contributions. Instead, they are keen to claim credit where 
it is due and an efficient attribution system is necessary for that purpose. Almost all 
FOSS licences, regardless of being copyleft or non-copyleft, require downstream 
distributors to retain copyright notices including attribution information about the 
concerned projects and contributing programmers in all future public redistributions. 
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Legal scholars has been well aware that there is a strong norm of retaining correct 
attribution information in the FOSS community, where licences are used to make 
sure that credit as well as blame goes to the right projects and contributors. For 
example, Fisk observes that “[a]ttribution is important to many participants in the 
open source movement, even though exclusivity is shunned.”63 She further points out 
that because FOSS programs are publicly modifiable, both upstream contributors and 
downstream modifiers should be correctly attributed for their respective 
contributions:  
Open source licenses are an example of explicit effort to allocate credit and 
blame in attribution. All open source licenses seek to prevent bad modifications 
of the software from being attributed to the original authors. Although the 
explanation of the attribution requirements contained in the licenses are more 
focused on preventing wrongful attributions of blame than credit, presumably if 
a modification proves to be wonderful, the original authors will not get credit 
either.64 (added emphasis)  
In the same vein, the Free Software Act (FSA), which has been proposed by Free 
Software Consortium, nicely summarises the licensing norm of correct attribution in 
three points. “Authors’ rights shall be protected in the following way […]: (a) The 
author of any free software program retains the right of attribution to his/her work. (b) 
Any modifier must acknowledge the authorship of the original program and the 
authorship of the modification. (c) All authorship must always be correctly 
attributed.”65  This explanation and Fisk’s have something important in common. 
Both acknowledge the importance of a proper attribution system that should be even-
handed on the authorial interests of both upstream authors and downstream 
modifying authors. It is worth noting that FOSS attribution is not merely about 
crediting these individual authors, but it is also about acknowledging the collective 
authorship that can be credited as the source of an integrated software artifact. Very 
often this integrated collective authorship is known to the general public through the 
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name of the corresponding project (e.g. “Linux”, “Apache”, “GNU”, etc.). Some 
projects would become brand names if they continue to provide products or services 
with certain a level of consistent quality for a sustaining period of time.  
  Although there is clearly a need to attribute FOSS authors at both individual and 
collective levels, Anglo-American legal system does not straightforwardly have a 
statutory attribution right for computer programmers. This has posed two difficult 
problems for the jurisprudence of FOSS licensing to tackle. First, how do FOSS 
programmers write their attribution requirement into the licensing condition of 
copyright licences? Secondly, how do FOSS programmers use the trademark as a 
proxy attribution right system to protect the reputation or goodwill of the collective 
authorship of the whole project? My analysis below finds that FOSS programmers, in 
order to compensate for the lack of statutory attribution right under copyright, have 
no choice but to assume the legal persona as the “owner” of intellectual property 
(either copyright or trademark, or both) of their contributions in the first place, which 
will then allow them to indirectly claim authorship legally. The situation is far from 
ideal and certain, but it partially works without changing the existing legislative 
structure about programmers’ attribution right. As copyright and trademark are 
different legal regimes in relation to authorial attribution, I will deal with “copyright” 
(in Section 5.3.1) and “trademark” (in Section 5.3.2) separately. The discussion will 
be followed by a further examination of how FOSS project leaders find the legal 
form of their stewardship in trademark in comparison with copyright (in Section 
5.3.3).  
5.3.1 Claiming FOSS Authorship under Law (I): Copyright 
Strictly speaking, authors’ right to claim attribution of their creation, also known as 
the right of paternity, is not a proprietary right. Instead, it belongs to the “moral 
right” regime independent from a copyright owner’s economic right. Article 6bis of 
the Berne Convention makes this clear: “Independently of the author’s economic 
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rights, and even after transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to 
claim authorship of the work […].66   
Unfortunately, the Berne-type attribution right is not directly applicable to software 
programmers under Anglo-American copyright law. In the US, only visual artists but 
not computer programmers are entitled to the moral right of attribution.67 In the UK, 
computer programmers are expressly excluded from having the right to be identified 
as author68, and this attribution right is only conferred to a few non-programming 
creators who affirmatively assert their attributional interest.69 However, the British 
copyright law traditionally gives authors a right against “false attribution”, which 
may still be applicable to computer programmers. This British indigenous moral 
right is not derived from the Berne Convention, but it harks back to the UK Fine Arts 
Copyright Act 1862, and has its reincarnations in respectively in s.43 of the 
Copyright Act 1956 and s.84 of CDPA 1988.70 Lai finds this right against false 
attribution is an historical “anomaly” and it makes little sense for computer 
programmers to have it without having the right of attribution in the first place.71 In 
comparison, US programmers do not readily have a category against false attribution 
under their copyright law, but they may have an analogue protection under s.43(a) of 
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the Lanham Act that codifies the common law action of passing off, which I will 
come back to in Section 5.3.3 in some detail.72 
Although Anglo-American copyright has largely failed to reproduce a Berne-type 
attribution regime to protect their programmers, this lacuna may be filled by private 
licensing schemes made by programmers in their capacity of copyright owners. This 
means these copyright licences make attribution ride on the proprietary right owned 
by FOSS developers. For this reason, Lastowka argues that Anglo-American 
copyright only protects attribution half-heartedly “in a collateral fashion”, where the 
attribution requirement needs to be “contracted in”: 
It might be argued that copyright protects attribution in a collateral fashion .By 
protecting works of creative authorship as property, copyright enables the 
contractual protection of attribution. If an author can control the dissemination 
and reproduction of her work pursuant to copyright law, copyright law will 
grant her the contractual leverage to protect her attribution interests. (added 
emphasis)73  
So FOSS developers, in order to have their moral right of attribution enforceable 
under law, must take on the legal persona first as the copyright owners. The 
possibility of collateral protection of attribution via a copyright licence has been 
subject to a 2008 landmark ruling made by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (CAFC) in Jacobsen v. Katzer, where the FOSS code in dispute was 
reproduced, modified and distributed without attributing to the original FOSS 
contributors.74 
“Collateral” Protection of Attribution in Jacobsen v. Katzer  
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The Jacobsen case concerns a dispute over a FOSS project known as “Java Model 
Railroad Interface” (JMRI) that develops software controlling model railroads. JMRI 
is led by Professor Robert Jacobsen, who is a Berkeley physicist by profession and a 
model train hobbyist in his spare time. The JMRI code under dispute was then 
released under Artistic License (AL)1.0.75 It is generally believed that this licence 
has explicitly created a private regime of moral rights enabling JMRI developers to 
have wider authorial control than allowed under the statutory language of the US 
copyright law. The Preamble of AL1.0 makes no effort to conceal this intent: “The 
intent of [AL] is to state the conditions under which a Package may be copied, such 
that the Copyright Holder maintains some semblance of artistic control over the 
development of the package […]”.76 (added emphasis) Fabricius comments that “the 
essential novelty” of AL lies exactly in its “granting the author more attribution and 
creative control than would be granted in the ordinary case of a copyright license to 
copy, distribute, and prepare derivative works”.77 In this way, JMRI programmers are 
given “a private moral right” that is akin to the Section 106A of the U.S. Visual 
Artists Right Act providing attribution right only to certain visual artists.78 
The actual dispute revolves around a program called DecoderPro®, which is a sub-
project of the JMRI.79  In September 2006, the JMRI developers discovered that 
Matthew Katzer had copied and modified some DecoderPro files into his own 
                                                 
75
 JMRI now changes their licence to the GPL 2.0.  
AL1.0 is not drafted by a lawyer but it is written by Larry Wall, a linguist by training and a reputable 
hacker who has invented the widely used open source Perl programming language. Wall, though not a 
lawyer, was convinced that copyright law was crucial to any open source project. A short extract 
below from Wall’s writing reflects his awareness of the importance of copyright: “A circle with a ‘c’ 
in it [i.e. ©]. Open Source lives or dies on copyright law. Our fond hope is that it lives. Please, let’s all 
do our part to keep it that way. If you have a chance to plug copyrights over patents, please do so. I 
know many of you are already plugging copyright over trade secrets. Let’s also uphold copyright law 
by respecting the wishes copyright holders, whether or not they are spelled out to the satisfaction of 
everyone’s lawyer.” See Larry Wall, “Diligence, Patience, and Humility”, in Open Sources—Voices 
from the Opens Revolution, DiBona, Ockman & Stone (eds.), (Sebastopol: O’Reilly, 1999) p.142 
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 Preamble, Artistic License 1.0  
77
 Erich M. Fabricius, “Jacobsen v. Katzer: Failure of the Artistic License and Repercussions for Open 
Source” (2008) North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology 65, at 85 
78
 ibid., at 85 
79
  “DecoderPro is able to easily configure more than 300 types of devices because hobbyists have 
contributed more than 100 decoder definition files. These definitions, produced by lots of separate 
contributors, are what makes the program so useful, since they express a model railroader’s view of 
how best to configure a particular device. DecoderPro first started using this approach in September 
2001” JMRI, “JMRI Defense: Our Story So Far”, at <http://www.decoderpro.com/k/History.shtml>, 
last retrieved on 15 April 2010 
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proprietary product. At the same time Katzer deliberately removed the following 
information that would have identified JMRI contributors as authors of their code:  
1) the authors’ names,  
2) JMRI copyright notices  
3) references to the COPYING file  
4) and identification of SourceForge or JMRI as the original source of the 
definition files, and  
5) a description of how the files or computer code had been changed from the 
original source code.80 
Katzer did not dispute that his act of copying, but he contended that AL as a public 
licence had permitted him to copy the code and non-attribution of JMRI authors was 
not a cause of action itself under the US copyright law.81 So the difficult question is 
whether Katzer’s act of deleting attribution information would lead to the 
infringement of the copyright of DecoderPro software.82  The trial court (District 
Court for the Northern District of California) took the view that the attribution 
requirement was merely a contractual covenant, the breach of which would only 
entitle JMRI developers to contractual damages but not an injunctive relief: “The 
condition that the user insert a prominent notice of attribution does not limit the 
scope of the license. Rather, Defendants’ alleged violation of the conditions of the 
                                                 
80
 535 F.3d 1373 at 1376 
To illustrate, a typical JMRI file contain a piece of XML code showing who the author is. Here is an 
example from JMRI’s webpage about the dispute: 
                <version author="Phil Grainger (phil.grainger@ca.com)" 
                  version="1" lastUpdated="20030805" /> 
The above XML code identifies three items of author-related information: 1) the author’s name is 
“Phil Grainger” followed by his email address; 2) the version number is "1"; 3) it was last updated by 
the author on the date of 5 August 2003. However, when Katzer copied of JMRI files, he only retains 
the last two items, but he deliberately left out the first item about JMRI authors. JMRI developers 
further observes: “Original JMRI definition files contain the version, the date modified, the author’s 
name, and a copyright notice. These have free-form content, so there are many formats. The version 
strings and the modification date strings in the KAM files are EXACTLY the same as those in the 
original JMRI files they were copied from. The author’s name, however, was not copied into the 
KAM file, nor was the JMRI copyright information.” JMRI, “JMRI Defense: Our Story So Far”, at 
<http://www.decoderpro.com/k/History.shtml>; For more evidential information, see JMRI, “Copying 
Evidence: JMRI Defense: Evidence KAM Copied From JMRI”, at 
<http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/copycomparison.shtml> 
81
 The CAFC finds that the parties “do not dispute that Jacobsen is the holder of a copyright for 
certain materials distributed through his website. Katzer/Kamind also admits that portions of the 
DecoderPro software were copied, modified, and distributed as part of the Decoder Commander 
software. Accordingly, Jacobsen has made out a prima facie case of copyright infringement. 
Katzer/Kamind argues that they cannot be liable for copyright infringement because they had a license 
to use the material.” 535 F.3d 1373 at 1379 
82
 It is noticed that the “heart of the argument on appeal concern whether the terms of the AL are 
conditions of, or merely covenants to, the copyright license.” Ibid., at 1380 
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license may have constituted a breach of the nonexclusive license, but does not 
create liability for copyright infringement where it would not otherwise exist.”83  
Failing to get an injunction, Jacobsen appealed the case to the CAFC, which reversed 
the district court ruling by arguing that attribution of JMRI developers is a necessary 
condition for the public to use their copyright material.84 The failure to fulfil this 
condition would lead to infringement of copyright, which may give rise to the 
remedy of injunctive relief. Note that the CAFC does not straightforwardly enforce 
JMRI authors’ attribution as such: “Open source licensing restrictions are easily 
distinguished from mere ‘author attribution’ cases. Copyright law does not 
automatically protect the rights of authors to credit for copyrighted materials.”85 
Instead, FOSS developers’ attribution interest is only collaterally protected when 
they are the condition of a copyright licence that is intended to fulfil certain 
economic goals: 
The clear language of the Artistic License creates conditions to protect the 
economic rights at issue in the granting of a public license. These conditions 
govern the rights to modify and distribute the computer programs and files 
included in the downloadable software package. The attribution and 
modification transparency requirements directly serve to drive traffic to the 
open source incubation page and to inform downstream users of the project, 
which is a significant economic goal of the copyright holder that the law will 
enforce.86 (added emphasis) 
This interpretation seems largely, if not entirely, to vindicate Lastowka’s view that 
copyright only gives collateral protection to author’s attribution.87 In other words, the 
                                                 
83
 The District Court’s decision was quoted by CAFC, ibid. 
84
 The appellate court made two observations to support its argument. First, AL states “on its face” 
that it creates “conditions”: “The intent of this document is to state the conditions under which a 
Package may be copied [...]” (added emphasis). Secondly, the US case law shows that the phrase 
“provided that” is typically employed to indicate that a certain condition has to be met. For example, 
the clause that Katzer was alleged to breach is Section 3 of AL stipulating that licensees, among other 
conditions, “may otherwise modify [their] copy of this Package in any way, provided that [they] insert 
a prominent notice in each changed file stating how and when [they] changed that file […]” (added 
emphasis). AL 1.0. 
85
 535 F.3d 1373, FN5 at 1382 
86
 535 F.3d 1373 at 1382 
87
  Lastowka argues that copyright give collateral protection of “creative authorship as property” 
through contractual arrangements. See Lastowka, “Trademark Function”, supra note 73 
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CAFC ruling interprets that FOSS authors need to claim their attributional interest as 
a matter of licensing condition in furtherance of the economic goal of copyright and 
thus wear the legal persona as copyright owner in the first place. The licensing 
“conditions” including the attribution requirement help to get upstream authors as 
“copyright holders” of their contributions always credited in downstream 
distributions: 
The conditions set forth in the Artistic License are vital to enable the copyright 
holder to retain the ability to benefit from the work of downstream users. By 
requiring that users who modify or distribute the copyrighted material retain the 
reference to the original source files, downstream users are directed to 
Jacobsen's website. Thus, downstream users know about the collaborative effort 
to improve and expand the SourceForge project once they learn of the 
“upstream” project from a “downstream” distribution, and they may join in that 
effort.88 (added emphasis) 
Although the Jacobsen ruling is widely welcomed among FOSS developers and 
supporters of their cause89, it is not entirely free from problems. There are at least 
two problems that are worth further scrutiny. The first one concerns an unintended 
consequence that FOSS author-owners may freely (mis)use Jacobsen-like licensing 
conditions to expand control over their works. It has been worried that Jacobsen can 
be an open-source version of the unpopular Seventh Circuit’s ProCD decision90. 
Narodick points out that Jacobsen “does not represent a fundamental shift in judicial 
policy, but the Federal Circuit's rationale in Jacobsen may justly concern the very 
open source software engineers who want to produce more programs in the future. 
This expansion of intellectual property rights effectively stacks the deck in favor of 
any software producer already in the market.”91 If Narodick is right, Jacobsen is just 
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 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) at 1381 
89
 For example, Lessig wrote a blog entry celebrating the Jacobsen decision: “So for non-lawgeeks, 
[the Jacobsen case] won’t seem important. But trust me, this is huge.”, see Lessig, “Huge and 
Important News: Free Licenses Upheld”, 13 August 13 2008, at 
<http://lessig.org/blog/2008/08/huge_and_important_news_free_l.html> 
90
 For the discussion of ProCD and its influence in software licensing jurisprudence, see Chapter 4 
91
 It is observed that “ProCD has been gradually accepted by the federal judiciary up through and 
including the decision in Jacobsen.” Benjamin I. Narodick, “Smothered by Judicial Love: How 
Jacobsen v. Katzer Could Bring Open Source Software Development to a Standstill” (2010) 16 Boston 
University Journal of Science and Technology Law 264 at 279-281 
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another case where copyright owners expand their proprietary right through a private 
licensing scheme regardless of the software being FOSS or proprietary: in this case, 
the expansion yielded an author’s attribution right; in another case, it could diminish 
or eliminate a user exception or effectively (as in ProCD) extend copyright 
protection to non-copyrightable materials. Gomulkiewicz is aware of a view that not 
all restrictions in a software licence will qualify as a non-contractual licensing 
“condition”, but they should be limited to certain acts that directly concern or “touch 
upon” copyright. In this scenario, in order to decide whether a clause is too 
expansive to qualify as a copyright “condition” proper, questions must be asked how 
far or remotely this condition “touches on”, or is related to, the right to copy, 
distribute or make derivative works under copyright. “The farther a purported 
condition strays from touching on an exclusive copyright, the less compelling the 
case that a licensee infringed a copyright by failing to abide by the condition.”92 
Unfortunately, in the case of moral rights, Gomulkiewicz himself is not sure whether 
attribution “touches upon” copyright, because it is an extremely uncertain “gray 
area” that is not related “directly to copying, distribution, or derivative works”.93  
This uncertainty leads to a second problem: if CAFC’s interpretation gives an 
impression of AL being a device to privately organise copyright holders’ “economic” 
interests, does it really fall under the Easterbrookian neoclassical agenda to establish 
economic efficiency as the best justification for standard-form software licences? 
This is not entirely clear. CAFC’s underlying philosophy seems to be only slightly 
more eclectic than the economic reductionist approach apparent in the ProCD 
rationale, which assumes that all software consumers or end-users need is the 
cheapest price with transaction cost saved from the unbargained standard-form 
                                                 
92
 Gomulkiewicz gives some sample criteria about “touching upon” copyrights: “To qualify as a 
condition on the right to copy, for instance, the condition should relate to issues such as: Copying onto 
what? Using what to make copies? How many copies? What type of copies? Who can make copies? 
For a condition on the right to distribute, the condition should relate to issues such as: Where (and 
where not)? When? To whom? By whom? For how long? For a condition on the right to make 
derivative works, the condition should relate to: What type of works? Who can make derivatives? 
Analytically, this approach seems to make sense—copyright violations triggered by breach of a 
license condition should actually invoke copyrights.”  Robert Gomulkiewicz, “Conditions and 
Covenants in License Contracts: Tales from a Test of the Artistic License” (2009) 17 Texas IP Law 
Journal 335 at 354 
93
 He also feels uncertain about the situation of copyleft. For example, GPL’s share-alike provision 
“might not qualify” as a “condition” in this sense either, because it does not directly “touch upon” 
copyrights. ibid., 355 
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licence.94 The Jacobsen court is aware that FOSS is different from other traditional 
commercial copyright materials that are mainly sold for money, but the lack of 
monetary exchange with FOSS does not mean it cannot bring economic benefit to the 
FOSS author as the copyright holder: 
Traditionally, copyright owners sold their copyrighted material in exchange for 
money. The lack of money changing hands in open source licensing should not 
be presumed to mean that there is no economic consideration, however. There 
are substantial benefits, including economic benefits, to the creation and 
distribution of copyrighted works under public licenses that range far beyond 
traditional license royalties. For example, program creators may generate 
market share for their programs by providing certain components free of charge. 
Similarly, a programmer or company may increase its national or international 
reputation by incubating open source projects. Improvement to a product can 
come rapidly and free of charge from an expert not even known to the copyright 
holder.95 
The above paragraph shows that CAFC has noticed at least two types of non-
monetary “economic” gains, the first being market share growth a certain FOSS 
product and the second being FOSS programmers’ boosted reputation that may 
attract a diversity of expertise needed to improve software itself. Note the second 
benefit from a good reputation (as italicised above in the CAFC’s decision) is not 
qualitatively dissimilar from a Raymondian economic understanding of the 
reputational incentive in FOSS production, where good reputation will attract 
cooperation from other experts: FOSS programmers’ “prestige is a good way […] to 
attract attention and cooperation from others. If one is well known for generosity, 
intelligence, fair dealing, leadership ability, or other good qualities, it becomes much 
easier to persuade other people that they will gain by association with you.”96 This is 
exactly a kind of non-monetary benefit that proprietary software owners would not 
have, because their users are merely consumers who are not allowed to modify or 
                                                 
94
 For ProCD’s economic reductionist approach, see Deborah Post,“Dismantling Democracy: 
Common Sense and the Contract Jurisprudence of Frank Easterbrook”, (2000) 16 Touro Law Review 
1205; see also Section 4.4.1 Chapter 4 of this dissertation for more detail. 
95
 535 F.3d 1373, 1379 
96Eric Raymond, Noosphere, supra note 50 
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improve the proprietary products. In this sense, the Jacobsen court seems to agree 
that reputation is a special human capital, which resembles but is not exactly the 
same as money. This view has been articulated by Rishab Ghosh who likens FOSS 
programmers’ reputation to “a currency, i.e. a proxy, which greases the wheels of the 
economy”, but it is subtly different from the monetary currency: 
Unlike money, reputation is not fixed, nor does it come in the form of single 
numerical values. It may not even be cardinal. Moreover, while a monetary 
value in the form of price is the result of matching demand and supply over time, 
reputation is more hazy. In the common English sense, it is equivalent to price, 
having come about through the combination of multiple personal attestations 
(the equivalent of single money transactions). 97 
Apart from being a non-monetary “hazy” currency, reputation also functions as a 
proxy-measure of quality of one’s work as assessed by peer programmers. Weber 
finds that a FOSS “author is too close to the work and needs external measures of 
quality in order to know whether the work is good and how to improve it” 98 and 
that’s why external assessment of reputation by peers is needed: 
As is true of many technical and artistic disciplines, the quality of a 
programmer’s mind and work is not easy for others to judge in standardized 
metrics. To know what is really good code and thus to assess the talent of a 
particular programmer takes a reasonable investment of time. The best 
programmers, then, have a clear incentive to reduce the energy that it takes for 
others to see and understand just how good they are. […] The programmer 
participates in an open source project as a demonstrative act to show the quality 
of her work. Reputation within a well-informed and self-critical community 
becomes the most efficient proxy measure for that quality.99 
                                                 
97
 Rishab Ayer Ghosh, “Cooking Pot Markets: An Economic Model for the Trade in Free Goods and 
Services on the Internet” (1998) 3 (3) First Monday at 
<http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/580/501> 
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 Weber, Success, p.141 
99
 Weber, Success, p.142 
Fisk is also aware that reputation as a quality measure is not just in software area. In most cases of 
“highly-educated or highly-skilled employees or people who possess a great deal of tacit knowledge, 
assessing the nature and value of human capital is difficult”: “The abilities of a software designer or 
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In short, the double function of reputation as both an incentive and a proxy-measure 
of quality largely bears out CAFC’s analysis that the “lack of money changing hands 
in open source licensing should not be presumed to mean that there is no economic 
consideration”100, but the licensing condition requiring attribution can help to fulfil 
copyright owners’ “economic” goal of organising FOSS production and circulation. 
However, the Jacobsen court’s economic approach, which makes attribution ride on 
the economic interest of the copyright holder, has to pay a price. It unfortunately 
screens out some “softer” non-economic values (e.g. “software freedom”) that a true 
Macneilian relational licence would embody.101 For example, Stallman has insisted 
that the licensing conditions of the GPL are intended to advance “software freedom”, 
which is an intrinsic value independent of programmers’ economic interests.102 He 
further argues that accurate attribution to the names of “free software” projects is 
absolutely necessary to spread the ideal of “software freedom” behind their efforts. 
For example, as the “GNU” software is a significant integral component in the whole 
Linux operating system, Stallman is afraid that a common non-attribution to “GNU” 
would only leave people oblivious to the “software freedom” value that GNU 
programmers are keen to spread. For this reason, he is emphatic that the right way of 
attribution of the operating system is “GNU/Linux” rather than “Linux”. He is even 
prompted to write an essay—“What’s in a Name”—to stress the importance of 
attribution to GNU and the underpinning software freedom ideal, without which their 
efforts may be gradually watered down by the encroachment of proprietary software:  
                                                                                                                                          
music producer cannot be measured the way the speed of a typist or the competence of a machine 
operator can. When the cost of errors in assessment is great, or when assessments about human capital 
need to be made frequently or rapidly, easily, interpretable information about human capital is 
valuable because it reduces search costs. Thus, credit becomes a form of human capital itself because 
it translates and signals the existence of a deeper layer of human capital.” Fisk, supra note 55, p.54 
100
 535 F.3d 1373, 1379; supra note 95 
101
 Recall that, in Chapter 4, I argue that a Macneilian relational licence is very different from a 
neoclassical contract (as exemplified by Easterbrook’s ProCD ruling) but it embodies a multiplicity of 
values including those non-economic values. See also William Whitford, “Ian Macneil’s Contribution 
to Contracts Scholarship”, (1985) Wisconsin Law Review 545 
102
 The Jacobsen court seems to be skewed towards the business-friendly “open source” approach 
advocated by Raymond, in order to argue that FOSS licensing conditions have the effect of furthering 
the economic goal of copyright holders. However, it seems difficult to square the more purist “free 
software” values with the Jacobsen ruling. Stallman argues that “free software is an ethical 
imperative, because only free software respects the users' freedom. By contrast, the philosophy of 
open source considers issues in terms of how to make software “better”—in a practical sense only.” 
See Stallman, “Why Open Source Misses the Point of Free Software” at 
<http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/open-source-misses-the-point.html>   
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Names convey meanings; our choice of names determines the meaning of what 
we say. An inappropriate name gives people the wrong idea. […] Is it important 
whether people know the system's origin, history, and purpose? Yes—because 
people who forget history are often condemned to repeat it. The Free World that 
has developed around GNU/Linux is not guaranteed to survive; the problems 
that led us to develop GNU are not completely eradicated, and they threaten to 
come back. 103 
According to Stallman, the GNU project desperately needs credit because their cause 
of fighting for software freedom is far from successful and the correct attribution to 
the project would constantly remind people of this cause: “If ‘the job’ [of the free 
software movement] really were done, if there were nothing at stake except credit, 
perhaps it would be wiser to let the matter drop. But we are not in that position. To 
inspire people to do the work that needs to be done, we need to be recognized for 
what we have already done. Please help us, by calling the operating system 
GNU/Linux.” 104 Interestingly, the Jacobsen ruling did mention the (GNU/) “Linux” 
system twice in passing, referring to “GNU” on the first occasion 105 but not the 
second one106. It is worth noting that on the second occasion, the “Linux” system 
(without attributing to GNU) is quoted as an example to show why FOSS licensing is 
essential to fulfil the economic goal of “creative collaborative projects” in a most 
efficient way: 
Open Source software projects invite computer programmers from around the 
world to view software code and make changes and improvements to it. 
Through such collaboration, software programs can often be written and 
debugged faster and at lower cost than if the copyright holder were required to 
do all of the work independently. In exchange and in consideration for this 
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 Stallman, “What’s in a Name?” at <http://www.gnu.org/gnu/why-gnu-linux.html> 
104
 ibid. 
105
 “Open source licensing has become a widely used method of creative collaboration that serves to 
advance the arts and sciences in a manner and at a pace that few could have imagined just a few 
decades ago. […] Other public licenses support the GNU/Linux operating system […].” 535 F.3d 1373 
at 1378 (added emphasis) 
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 This time the court only mentions the “GNU” in juxtaposition with the “GPL”, but not with 
“Linux”, i.e., it does not use the term “GNU/Linux” as insisted by Stallman. The court writes that “the 
GNU General Public License, which is used for the Linux operating system, prohibits downstream 
users from charging for a license to the software.” ibid., FN 2 at 1379 
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collaborative work, the copyright holder permits users to copy, modify and 
distribute the software code subject to conditions that serve to protect 
downstream users and to keep the code accessible.107 
Note that CAFC interprets FOSS licensing exactly as a cost-efficient way of 
manufacturing and improving software thanks to the collaborative intelligence that 
can be attracted to the job: because “software programs can often be written and 
debugged faster and at lower cost than if the copyright holder were required to do all 
of the work independently,” this is certainly in the economic interests of the 
copyright holders. “Software freedom” is not mentioned as one of most important 
non-economic values behind the GNU/Linux. 108  In this light, I think that the 
Jacobsen ruling, though hailed as a long waited victory for FOSS authors, does not 
go far enough to embrace the Macneilian message to respect non-economic values in 
building a relational contract. It merely substantiates Lastowka’s worry about the 
persistent influence of “utilitarian and property-centric view of copyright” 109  in 
software licensing jurisprudence. It also illuminates how the programmer’s 
attributional interest is “collaterally” protected under their legal persona as a utility-
maximising property “owner”, who uses licensing conditions to advance their 
economic interest.110 Having said that, the situation is not entirely CAFC’s fault, 
because the court is restrained by the existing legislative framework where there is 
no stand-alone attribution right. 
5.3.2 Claiming FOSS Authorship under Law (II): Trademark 
Apart from relying on copyright for collateral protection of attribution, FOSS 
projects nowadays are also actively seeking trademark protection of their 
attributional interests. This is because trademarks designating the origin of goods or 
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 The paragraph is from the main text accompanying the FN2 of the ruling. ibid. 
108
 Here my observation is not a critique of the CAFC’s failure to mention “software freedom”, 
because the court is constrained by previous case law and the copyright legislation where attribution 
on its own is not recognised. What I want do is only draw a Macneilian perspective that may shed 
some light on some non-economic factors that may also essential to FOSS collaboration. 
109
 Lastowka, “Trademark Function”, supra note 73 at 1217 
110
 Lastowka comments: “If we see authorship simply as a system for efficiently parcelling out 
proprietary ownership rights, the law should grant ownership (denoting it as ‘authorship’) to the most 
efficient distributors and exploiters of works. Again, the problem with this model—from the 
standpoint of attribution—is that the non-statutory, non-dominant author lacks the control to secure 
attribution”. ibid. 
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services are not dissimilar from an authorial attribution system ascertaining the origin 
of creative works 111 , though I will show soon the two systems are not exactly 
identical.   
When a FOSS project has been able to provide a software product or service, whose 
quality can be consistently experienced by the public, then the name of this project 
may well accumulate enough reputation or goodwill to become a brand over the 
years.112 Examples of brand-name projects are profuse and many of them already 
have had registered trademarks such as Linux®, Apache®, or DecoderPro®, just to 
name a limited few. The official guide provided by Software Freedom Legal Centre 
(SFLC) fully recognises the necessity of protecting a “brand”-name FOSS project 
through the trademark regime: “Like other products, FOSS applications develop 
reputations over time as users come to associate an application’s name with a 
particular standard of quality or set of features. Trade mark law can help protect this 
relationship of trust and reliance that a project develops with its users; it allows the 
project to maintain a certain amount of control over the use of its brand”.113 The 
Apache Software Foundation’s (ASF) is an outstanding example which has been 
serious about protecting the “Apache” brand by working out a trademark policy 
making clear what kind of marks and graphic signs that are intended to be protected: 
“‘Apache’, ‘Apache Software Foundation’, the multicoloured feather, and the 
various Apache project names and logos are trademarks of The Apache Software 
Foundation, and are usable by others only with express permission from the ASF.”114 
Moreover, the ASF is also a pioneer that explicitly incorporates a trademark clause 
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 Lastowka proposes to do a thought experiment to see the connection: “If one were […] to equate 
authorial attributions with trademarks and works of authorship with all other goods, misattributions 
would capture a situation that seems generally analogous to trademark infringement.” Furthermore, if 
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112
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 See Software Freedom Law Center, “Chapter 5: Common Trademark Issues” in A Legal Issues 
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 Apache’s graphic mark of multi-colour feather looks like this:   see Apache Software 
Foundation, “FAQ—Is Apache a Trademark”, at <http://www.apache.org/foundation/licence-
FAQ.html#Marks> 
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into its licensing scheme, which is designed to prevent unauthorised use of the marks 
that it owns: 
This [Apache] License does not grant permission to use the trade names, 
trademarks, service marks, or product names of the Licensor, except as required 
for reasonable and customary use in describing the origin of the Work and 
reproducing the content of the NOTICE file.115 
The Apache-style trademark clause is widely used in the FOSS community. Artistic 
License 1.0 (as the one used by JMRI in the Jacobsen case) is another prominent 
example: “The name of the Copyright Holder may not be used to endorse or promote 
products derived from this software without specific prior written permission.”116 
Interestingly, early versions of the GPL do not have a trademark clause and Stallman 
was not aware that it could have been an issue. It was not until the latest version 3.0 
when Stallman decided to follow ASF’s footstep by adding an option to decline “to 
grant rights under trademark law for use of some trade names, trademarks, or service 
marks”.117  
FOSS trademarks can be either registered marks or unregistered marks, the former of 
which gives stronger and more certain protection. SFLC strongly recommends that 
FOSS projects to register marks with trademark authorities: “Registration grants 
much stronger protections for your trademark if someone else uses the mark in 
connection with goods similar to the ones described in your registration 
application.” 118  For example, “Linux®” is a registered marks owned by Linus 
Torvalds119 and administered by the Linux Mark Institute (LMI)120. It is worth noting 
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that Torvalds and his fellow programmers were initially not aware of the need to 
register the “Linux” mark when the project started to take off in the early 1990s and 
the GPL 2.0 adopted by Linux has not yet had an explicit trademark clause. However, 
in 1994, William R. Della Croce, Jr., a person unrelated to the development of the 
Linux kernel, first registered the “Linux” mark in an attempt to collect licensing fee 
from various Linux distributors. In 1996, Linus Torvalds on behalf the Linux 
community filed a lawsuit against Croce’s bad-faith registration. The case was 
settled and it led Croce to transfer the ownership of the mark back to Torvalds, who 
then delegated his right to the LMI for the use of the mark. A similar dispute over a 
registered FOSS mark also took place in the aforementioned Jacobsen case. The 
JMRI project has registered mark “DecoderPro®”, but the domain name 
decoderpro.com was first registered by Matthew Katzer, who had never involved in 
the development of the DecoderPro product. According to Katzer, the reason for his 
registration was as follows: “If I decide that to released (sic) a licensed version of an 
open source development effort, what better place to have it [than] the name of the 
development effort?”121 Katzer’s reason, though hardly justifying his cyber-squatting 
behaviour, usefully indicates that the name of a FOSS project can be a valuable asset 
as it points towards to the “development effort” behind the project. Independent of 
his copyright claim, Jacobsen filed a Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy (UDRP) complaint with the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) 
in Switzerland in order to regain the domain name for the DecoderPro project. The 
WIPO panel ruled that Katzer’s registration was in bad faith and “there is essentially 
a purpose on the part of Katzer to disrupt the business of a competitor by interfering 
with [JMRI team’s] exercise of [their] trademark rights”. The panel ruling led 
DecoderPro.com to be transferred. 122 In summary, the above two disputes give an 
glimpse into the world where the registered marks (or domain names) may play a 
function of crediting FOSS projects because they can be extremely useful to 
ascertain their origin as well the development efforts behind. 
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Apart from registered marks, it is also possible for the trademark regime to protect 
unregistered marks through the common law action of “passing off”. In the US 
context, it was not uncommon for US authors to invoke Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act, which has codified the “passing off” law, to protect authorial attribution to 
creative works123 and even the artistic integrity of the authors.124 In 2001, the US 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Planetary Motion v. Techsplosion, ruled 
in favour of an attempt to resort to Section 43(a) for the unregistered trademark 
protection of a FOSS product. In this case, Byron Darrah has written an email service 
program for UNIX users and he released it under GNU GPL 2.0 free of charge since 
1994. He named this software “Coolmail”, which appeared with the announcement 
sent to the users and the user manual for each release. Darrah later transfers all 
intellectual property rights in this software to a company known as Planetary Motion, 
who then became the proprietor of “Coolmail” software. Techsplosion was another 
company, which in 1998 offered a similar email service program also bearing the 
mark “Coolmail” (four years after Darrah’s use of “Coolmail”). Planetary Motion 
sued Techsplosion for infringement of the unregistered mark that was purchased 
from Darrah under the Section 43 (a). The assignment of Darrah’s rights to Planetary 
Motion was not disputed, but Techsplosion contended that Darrah’s “Coolmail” 
software was merely a hobby unworthy of common law trademark protection in the 
first place.125 The Eleventh Circuit found that Darrah did not “warehouse” or squat 
on the mark, but his continuous distribution of the software under this mark gave him 
the prior right to the “Coolmail” mark and his effort deserved to be identified as the 
source of the product. In particular, the distribution of the software under GPL 2.0, 
which lacks an explicit trademark clause, did not undermine Darrah’s IP rights in his 
software including the trademark. The court pointed out:  
That the Software had been distributed pursuant to a GNU General Public 
License does not defeat trademark ownership, nor does this in any way compel 
a finding that Darrah abandoned his rights in trademark. Appellants [i.e., 
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Techsplosion] misconstrue the function of a GNU General Public License. 
Software distributed pursuant to such a license is not necessarily ceded to the 
public domain and the licensor purports to retain ownership rights, which may 
or may not include the rights to a mark.126 
In fact, the GPL is more than just showing Darrah’s non-abandonment of proprietary 
rights to the public domain, but it is evidence that positively affirms the intention to 
control the “Coolmail” mark. “Because a GNU General Public License requires 
licensees who wish to copy, distribute, or modify the software to include a copyright 
notice, the license itself is evidence of Darrah’s efforts to control the use of the 
‘Coolmail’ mark in connection with the Software”.127 Most relevant to our discussion, 
the court is also aware that the “Coolmail” mark is extremely useful for users to 
identify Darrah as the source, as well as the lead “Author/Maintainer”, of the 
software: 
[…] the mark served to identify the source of the Software. The ‘Coolmail’ 
mark appeared in the subject field and in the text of the announcement 
accompanying each release of the Software, thereby distinguishing the Software 
from the other programs that might perform similar functions available on the 
Internet or sold in software compilations. The announcements also apparently 
indicated that Darrah was the ‘Author/Maintainer of Coolmail’ and included his 
e-mail address.128  
This source/author identification function of the mark will become ever more 
important for identifying the origin of a FOSS project, because it may be subject to 
unlimited numbers of downstream redistributions. For example, when SuSE—a 
famous distributor of the Linux system in Germany—attempts to incorporate 
Darrah’s software into its own product, it can easily locate Darrah as the 
“author/maintainer” of the software in the US and request permission to use the 
“Coolmail” mark. This will in turn help SuSE’s users or even competitors to easily 
trace the origin of the “Coolmail” software in SuSE’s redistribution. The appellate 
court observes: “Any individual using the SuSE product, or competitor of SuSE, that 
                                                 
126
 ibid. 
127
 ibid., FN 16 at  1198 
128
 ibid.,  at 1197 
 220
wanted to know the source of the [Coolmail] program that performed the e-mail 
notification function, could do so by referring to the user manual accompanying the 
product.”129  
It is not difficult to find that in a small project like “Coolmail”, Darrah is the author 
as well as the owner of the program. This author-ownership makes him the 
undisputable project leader who dictates the direction in which the program will 
go.130 In this sense, Coolmail is a typical case of Weber’s “small project” where 
leadership is “essentially the same as ownership”.131 However, as has already been 
mentioned in Section 5.2.3, the basis of leadership in a much bigger project like the 
Linux kernel is very different from a small project like Coolmail, but it shifts from 
lead programmers’ ever-dwindling ownership of the program to their ever-growing 
stewardship responsibility in shepherding the project. It is worth noting that project 
leaders’ stewardship by no means entirely extinguishes their own, let alone ordinary 
contributors’, “IP” rights. Instead, one of their most important stewardship 
responsibilities is to coordinate programmers’ authorial interests in order to make a 
legally coherent project that can be attributed as a collective project-level “author”. I 
will now explain project leaders’ author-stewardship as a way to summarise FOSS 
programmers’ legal persona that has been affected by both copyright and trademark 
laws. 
5.3.3 Legal Persona of Author-Stewardship 
The legal persona of the FOSS authors is no doubt a complex and puzzling 
phenomenon. It is an extremely grey intersectional area where it is not always clear 
whether copyright or trademark laws should be invoked to regulate the designation 
of the authorial origin of FOSS programs. For example, in Jacobsen, FOSS 
attribution is protected through the copyright route, whilst, in Planetary Motion, 
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trademark law is used to do the similar job. In fact, it is important to see that FOSS 
authorship has both copyright and trademark elements, which play slightly different 
roles in FOSS projects and are worth explaining separately. To begin with, copyright 
is a legal institution that traditionally regulates the activities such as reproduction, 
modification and distribution of works of authorship. An author, from a traditional 
copyright’s point of view, is an individual who impresses his creative personality 
onto his work. Ginsburg’s definition of “author” nicely captures the essence of 
conventional copyright law’s understanding of authorship:  
[…] an author is (or should be) a human creator who, notwithstanding the 
constraints of her task, succeeds in exercising minimal personal autonomy in 
her fashioning of the work. Because, and to the extent that, she moulds the work 
to her vision (be it even a myopic one), she is entitled not only to recognition 
and payment, but to exert some artistic control over it.132 (added emphasis)  
From the above definition, we see that one of the most important aspects of copyright 
is to reward an individual author with certain exclusive control over his creation (be 
it “recognition and payment” or “some artistic control over it”). Under Anglo-
American copyright law, this exclusive control is mainly interpreted as the protection 
of authors’ economic interests rather than that of their attributional interests. (To put 
it succinctly, it puts “payment and recognition” before “artistic control”.) So FOSS 
authors have to write copyright licences to collaterally protect their authorial 
attribution as if it is of great economic consequence. The most prominent example in 
the FOSS world is the aforementioned Jacobsen case, where the appellate court 
argues that attribution as the licensing condition is to fulfil the economic goal of 
FOSS programmers as copyright holders. 133  In short, following the Jacobsen 
rationale, it is essential for FOSS programmers to wear their legal persona as 
copyright owners, who are assumed to be the economic utility maximisers, in order 
to directly claim authorship under a FOSS licence.  
However, it would be much harder to employ the same Jacobsen rationale to further 
satisfactorily explain lead programmers’ stewardship to coordinate or organise peer-
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produced contributions into a project as a whole. In fact, many lead programmers 
work hard to play down their own individual importance in the project and 
emphasise their non-economic motives to lead the project. For example, Linus 
Torvalds has been famous for his self-deprecating manner through belittling himself 
as “basically a very lazy person who likes to get credit for things other people 
actually do”.134 Also he refrains from expressly admitting that his devotion to the 
project is motivated by mainly maximising his individual economic utility or 
reputational incentive, but he regards the intrinsic pleasure to solve programming 
problems in a community as the primary motive.135 In Torvalds’s own parlance, this 
intrinsic pleasure in coding is the “Entertainment with the capital E”, which is “the 
kind that gives your life meaning” among FOSS programmers.136 Of course, it is 
FOSS project leaders’ stewardship responsibility to channel his and other 
programmers’ “Entertainment” into a meaningful collaborative effort. In short, lead 
programmers, as the anchorage of a project, need to build their credibility and 
trustworthiness from their relatively selfless commitment. Weber observes that 
Torvalds and leader programmers of other large projects must share this good 
stewardship quality of being humble and at the same time capable of motivating 
other programmers: 
While leaders of other large projects have different personality traits, they do 
tend to share an attitude that underemphasizes their own individual importance 
in the process. And they share, more importantly, a commitment to invest 
meaningful effort over time in justifying decisions, documenting the reasons for 
design choices and code changes in the language of technical rationality that is 
the currency for this community.137 
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Of course, FOSS leaders have an important stewardship responsibility to make sure 
that the collective authorship of the whole project is always correctly attributed. 
There are two routes to achieve this goal. The first route is to unify copyright 
ownership of individual programmers’ code into the hand of lead programmer on 
behalf of the project. This would give the project leader undisputable power to 
enforce FOSS licensing conditions including its attribution requirement. For this 
reason, Software Freedom Law Centre (SFLC) believes “[c]entralizing copyrights 
via direct copyright assignment provides some compelling advantages if developers 
are willing to do so”.138  
However, it is not always an easy task to persuade every programmer to assign their 
copyright to the project despite some perceived advantages of doing so. So project 
leaders may seek to protect the collective authorship of a project via the trademark 
route, which seems to be a more convenient legal form that FOSS leaders’ 
stewardship can fit into. There are two distinct features of this trademark-protected 
stewardship. On the one hand, trademark protects collective authorship of a whole 
project but not directly individual authorship; on the other hand, trademark does not 
only protect authors, but it also protects the public from being confused about the 
authorial origin of the software. First, almost all individual authors would get 
copyright over their individual contribution, but most of them are unlikely to have 
their names protected as trademarks. Only the names of the whole projects such as 
“Linux”, “JMRI” or “Apache” would be the depository of collective reputation or 
goodwill that merits trademark protection. Here the collective authorship of a project 
deviates from Ginsburg’s definition of “author” as an individual “human creator”, 
but it is largely an organisational fiction that integrates countless individual 
authorship under a collective persona bearing the project’s name. This fictional 
collective persona is necessary, because it is much easier for the public to identify 
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one FOSS product with one collective “author” rather than countless individual 
authors. The collective FOSS authorship bears out Heymann’s “authornym” theory 
that separates “the fact of authorship” and “the statement of authorship”, the latter of 
which is rightly called “authornym” by her.139 So in a FOSS project, each individual 
authors would be the Ginsburgian “human creator” (i.e., the fact of authorship) while 
the collective author bearing the project’s name would be the Heymannian 
“authornym” (i.e., the statement of authorship), which is mainly used to give a 
unified persona that can be easily recognised by the public. For this reason, Heymann 
argues that “authornymic attribution is not a matter of authorial justice, but rather a 
matter of organizational integrity. It preserves the organizational framework that 
authornyms create such that reader responses will be informed and minimizes the 
likelihood of confusion a consumer of creative commodities might otherwise 
experience.”140  
Secondly, to get a FOSS project’ name correctly attributed is not merely a matter of 
garnering credit for this project, but it also protect users from the public from being 
confused about the authorial origin of the program. It is in these users’ interest to 
make them always go to the software bearing the name that can correctly identify the 
authorial origin of the project. Just as Heymann observes, when a work is 
misattributed, it does not only cause a copyright harm to the author but also a 
trademark harm to the public, who may well be confused about the origin of the 
creative work.141 In this sense, trademark law can be employed not just to give credit 
to the collective authors but it also prevents public confusion, because it is exactly a 
legal institution that regulates the designation of the sources of products or services. 
For example, the public deserve to know that the “DecoderPro” product is produced 
by Jacobsen’s team rather than Katzer’s company, or the open source “Coolmail” is 
originated from Byron Darrah rather than Techsplosion, or the Linux kernel product 
is maintained by Linus Torvalds and his colleagues rather than Mr. Croce. Based on 
the correct attribution, members of the public will be protected from using a “wrong” 
FOSS product bearing the same or similar marks.  
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Moreover, I should also warn that the legal form of FOSS author-stewardship 
through trademark does not necessarily reproduce the whole hacker stewardship 
tradition. Nor do the FOSS licences that prescribe the minimum stewardship 
responsibility to secure software freedom (which has been discussed in Chapter 3). In 
fact, it is very difficult to translate a full sense of stewardship obligation, which 
“blends an awareness of both externally endowed inspiration and the cyclical 
dimension of creative enterprise” summarised by Kwall142, into one single legal form 
(be it trademark or copyright). A high sense of stewardship has more to do with what 
the sociologist Richard Sennett calls the “craftsmanship” instinct, which is hard-
wired to FOSS programmers’ fundamental motivational make-up. According to 
Sennett, the “desire to do a job well for its own sake” is a common hallmark of to all 
types of craftsmanship143 and FOSS programmers are an exemplary type of these 
craftspeople144. Just as a computer hacker in Levy’s book says: “Hackers can do 
almost anything and be a hacker. It’s not necessarily high tech. I think it has to do 
with craftsmanship and caring about what you’re doing.”145 (added emphasis) It is 
exactly this high sense of stewardship/craftsmanship to do a job well for its own sake 
(or simply the feeling of “caring about what you’re doing”) that motivates many 
FOSS programmers, especially those long-term project leaders, to work for a certain 
project for a sustaining period of time. In this light, it is understandable for a few 
FOSS developers to call for replacing ownership with stewardship in understanding 
FOSS: “we must make a distinction between ‘ownership ‘and ‘stewardship.’ 
Ownership is something that is fully transferable from one owner to another without 
loss of values. [….] Stewardship, on the other hand, applies when something 
undergoes change, when it evolves, or when it has some kind of life cycle.”146 In this 
sense, stewardship is a better way of realising the full value of an evolving object 
that has a life cycle (e.g. animals or software that needs to be “herded”) than private 
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ownership, which might be only good at dealing with discrete static non-evolving 
objects. To assume steward’s responsibility is not an easy job but it requires a lot of 
skills and competence and “only a good steward can realize the full value of that 
which is stewarded”.147 Most importantly, a carefully stewarded project tends to be 
nurtured by a long-term collaborative relation among programmers, and it is mostly 
likely coordinated by a highly capable long-term project leader, who would then 
always be associated with this project. This long-term stewardship would sometimes 
outcompete many commercial proprietary software projects, which are not 
“stewarded” but commercially “managed” by company executives: 
The proof is in the longevity of open source software projects and the stewards 
who tend them. Linus Torvalds is still at the head of the Linux kernel ‘tribe’ 
more than a decade after the first public release of Linux. Eric Allman has 
guided Sendmail for more than 20 yeas. Larry Wall is still the guiding vision 
behind Perl, gain after more than 20 years. In these and many more cases, a 
common core group stood behind the software for far longer than most 
proprietary software enjoys the benefits of a common development team. It is 
this—the dynamics of stewardship—far more than the ‘legions of programmers’ 
that accounts for the success of open source software.148 (added emphasis) 
Raymond makes a similar observation about Stallman’s long-term stewardship that 
gives the GNU Emacs project a “unified architectural vision”, and most interestingly, 
it makes Stallman stewardship-“author” of the project: 
In fact, there have been open-source projects that maintained a coherent 
direction and an effective maintainer community over quite long periods of time 
without the kinds of incentive structures or institutional controls that 
conventional management finds essential. The development of the GNU Emacs 
editor is an extreme and instructive example; it has absorbed the efforts of 
hundreds of contributors over 15 years into a unified architectural vision, 
despite high turnover and the fact that only one person (its author) has been 
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continuously active during all that time. No closed-source editor has ever 
matched this longevity record.149 (added emphasis)  
To summarise, the success of a collaborative FOSS project does not only depend on 
a good number of individual programmers, but lead programmers’ good 
stewardship—which makes individually contributed code into a collective one—is an 
equally important matter. This stewardship mainly finds its legal form in trademark, 
which is most helpful to protect the collective authorship of the project as whole. 
However, trademark law does not translate the whole stewardship obligation into a 
particular legal form, but FOSS project leaders need to make additional efforts to 
coordinate the long-term collaboration under their stewardship.  
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined FOSS programmers’ authorial persona in both aesthetical 
and legal senses. Aesthetically I find that the Romantic author vision of author-
genius does not tally well with programmers’ collaborative attempt to “author” a 
FOSS project. Instead, I find that FOSS programmers’ desire to be identified as the 
authorial origin of their creation happens at both individual and collective levels. It is 
very important to recognise the role of project leaders/stewards who are crucial to 
channel individual contributions into a collective work of authorship, which can be 
held responsible and deserve credit for this FOSS project as a whole. Legally, the 
Anglo-American system does not readily recognise programmers’ non-economic 
authorial interests including their right to be attributed as the origin of their creation. 
So FOSS developers have to wear the legal persona of copyright/trademark owners 
to indirectly claim their authorship. The situation is further complicated by the need 
to claim FOSS authorship at both individual and collective levels. I find that 
copyright licences can largely satisfy the need to recognise individual authorship, 
whilst trademark gives a more suitable legal form to reflect lead programmers’ 
stewardship responsibility to defend FOSS projects’ collective reputation and 
goodwill. 
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Chapter 6  Conclusion  
 
6.1 Contributions to the Scholarly Literature 
The emergence of free and open source software (FOSS) has posed many challenges 
to mainstream ways of producing and circulating software as proprietary products. 
This dissertation has been written in an attempt to make sense of only one dimension 
of these challenges: i.e. FOSS programmers’ use of intellectual property licensing 
schemes in support of large-scale decentralised collaboration. On the surface, these 
FOSS licences may look quite similar to other mass-market standard-form contracts 
including proprietary software licences, where software users are given the licensing 
terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. However, my scrutiny of these licences in this 
dissertation shows that FOSS licences are different from their proprietary cousins in 
three aspects, the identification of which is intended to be my three modest 
contributions to the legal scholarship of software licensing jurisprudence. These three 
distinctions respectively cover the historical (Chapter 2), legal (Chapters 3 and 4) and 
authorial (Chapter 5) aspects of FOSS licensing. My study of these three aspects 
aims to create a synergy to show FOSS programmers’ struggles against a dominant 
assumption—which has underpinned both intellectual property and contract laws—
that human beings are fundamentally self-constituting individuals and they work 
mostly in a possessively individualistic and competitive environment. I will now 
briefly review each of the aspects that are essential to a sound understanding of the 
collaborative ethos in relation to FOSS licensing.  
Firstly, FOSS licensing does not come into existence in a historical vacuum, but it is 
a unique product from a historical period when the MIT-style hacker custom was 
eclipsed by the rise of intellectual property regulation (especially copyright) over 
software in the early 1980s. The GNU General Public License (GPL) is often 
believed to be the very first conscious attempt to graft the hacker custom on the IP 
institution through a licensing scheme crafted by Richard Stallman. However, it is 
relatively a difficult task to gauge the exact influence of the lingering influence of the 
hacker custom in the GPL, which has also been criticised for overly relying on 
software copyright and its underlying proprietary ideology. In order to avoid 
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exaggerating the emergence of FOSS licensing either as a historical inevitability or 
merely the consequence of a few isolated one-off accidents, my assessment of the 
historical context is based on a few general prescriptive tenets of the Hacker Ethic1 
but it is also balanced out by some historically specific events including the Emacs 
dispute, which directly led to the creation of the first copyleft licence in 19852. I 
highlight three important controversies (i.e. the Xerox printer incident, the Symbolics 
incident and the Emacs incident) to show that FOSS licensing comes out of a mix of 
idealism and pragmatism. All of them share a common theme in that Stallman, as a 
dedicated hacker, has campaigned hard to rescue the Hacker Ethic rooted in its 
original MIT-based setting, where programmers are guided by their “Hands-on 
Imperative” to indulge their curiosity about computer technology.3 In 1998, this free 
software movement led by Stallman was further complicated by a spin-off campaign 
under the banner of “open-source” led by Eric Raymond to integrate non-proprietary 
software into the commercial mainstream. I argue that the “open source” twist both 
benefits and challenges Stallman’s cause. As a benefit, the “open source” agenda 
functions much like a business plan for “free software” to be marketed to a much 
wider constituency beyond the close-knit MIT-style hackerdom. As a challenge, it 
also forces Stallman to clarify his “free software” philosophy to put an ethical limit 
on the commercialism of “open source” movement by emphasising the intrinsic 
value of “software freedom”.4  My analysis also shows that the two definitional 
baseline documents—Free Software Definition (FSD) and Open Source Definition 
(OSD)—respectively championed by Stallman and Raymond are compatible with 
each other as both stipulate similar minimum stewardship responsibility for FOSS 
programmers to preserve software commons. In contrast, proprietary software 
developers mainly use their licence to maximise their revenue streams and there is no 
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ethical limit to rein in that motive. They do not have a responsibility to make 
software reproducible, modifiable and redistributable for downstream users or 
developers. In other words, proprietary licences create an “asymmetrical relation” 
where there is an unbridgeable gap between software owners and the non-owning 
public. On the other hand, FOSS licences create a “symmetrical relation” where 
upstream and downstream developers have exactly the same sets of rights (i.e. 
software freedom) and obligations (i.e. the minimum stewardship responsibility as 
specified in FSD and OSD) to co-develop software.5 
Secondly, the symmetrical relations intended by FOSS licensing do not mean 
anarchy but are organised around two legal institutions covering both “IP” and 
contract. As these two institutions provide different mechanisms to structure a 
licence, I need to deal with them separately, which will eventually lead to my 
proposal to tackle the issue from a relational contract perspective. First, FOSS 
programmers are not simplistically for or against “IP”, but they have much more 
nuanced understanding of the issue. They are aware that “IP” is not a unified body of 
law but that software freedom is affected by its two important components—
copyright and patent—in subtly different ways.  
Copyright: When copyright was first extended to software as though it were a kind 
of literary work, FOSS programmers’ initial knee-jerk reaction was very negative.6 
However, they soon discovered that copyright’s threat to software freedom could 
be contained by appropriately crafted licensing terms. In particular, after his 
dispute with Gosling over Emacs, Stallman wrote the “copyleft” condition into his 
copyright licence, which allowed publicly released modifications and 
improvements of the original code to be shared with the community in order to 
mimic the hackers’ old share-alike tradition. However, FOSS programmers’ use of 
copyright does not mean that they embrace copyright without reservation, because 
most of them are still against stretching copyright to further cover non-literal (i.e., 
functional) elements of software. This is exemplified by the campaign led by 
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 The distinction between “symmetrical relation” (in commons) and “asymmetrical relation” (in 
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 For example, Stallman thought it was “blasphemous” to the Hacker Ethic by copyrighting software 
programs in the early 1980s. See Weber, Hackers, p.419 
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Stallman and his MIT colleagues to protest against Lotus’s lawsuit to bring its 
non-literal user interface under copyright law. 
Patent: Unlike software copyright, FOSS programmers were not immediately 
aware, let alone able to make an assessment, of the threat from patent to software 
freedom. In 1981 when the US Supreme Court allowed a software-related 
invention to be patentable in Diamond v. Diehr, the issue simply passed unnoticed 
by most FOSS programmers. 7  However, the hidden threat from patent only 
gradually revealed itself in the early 1990s (almost ten years after Diehr).8 FOSS 
programmers find patent threat much more difficult to handle and it can be only 
partially contained by licensing schemes. This is because the patent system is 
much less intuitive than copyright and at the same time it is prohibitively 
expensive for most individual programmers who pursue FOSS merely as a hobby 
to get patents. Despite this difficulty, the latest revision of the GPL (v3.0) does 
make some efforts to deal with various patent issues but this would not change 
Stallman and his followers’ patent abolitionist position.9  
Apart from “IP” law, the second legal institution that heavily affects FOSS licensing 
is contract. However, it is not always clear whether a FOSS licence, or more 
specifically some of its conditions, have a contractual status. The heated debate about 
whether a FOSS licence is a pure property licence or a contractual licence is 
emblematic of this puzzling issue. 10  One of the most vocal oppositions against 
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treating FOSS licence as contract comes from the Free Software Foundation, which 
insists that the GPL is a pure property licence and not a contract. The reason behind 
this opposition stems from the need to distance the GPL from the kind of software 
licensing jurisprudence used by Easterbrook in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, where a 
standard-form licence was ruled contractually binding on an end user.11 The ProCD 
decision and its model law progeny (i.e. Uniform Computer Information Transaction 
Act or UCITA) is based on a law-and-economics presumption that all that a licensee 
needs is to maximise his material wealth through non-negotiated standard-form 
licensing contract, which is achieved by reducing transaction cost. I argue that this 
ProCD jurisprudence has largely inhibited the further development of FOSS 
licensing jurisprudence from being in keeping with a few new theoretical 
breakthroughs in contract scholarship. Most significantly, I propose that FOSS 
licensing jurisprudence, if scrutinised in a contractual framework, needs to 
incorporate Macneil’s relational contract theory (RCT), which is conspicuously 
absent in the legal literature about FOSS licensing. For the sake of completeness, I 
list all the three contractual approaches to show how RCT stands out from the 
classical and neoclassical approaches to software licensing. 
Contract as consent (classical approach): The classical contract model bases its 
legitimacy on the idea that consent is obtained through a fully bargained process 
between parties. It assumes that there is a single moment when the minds of 
negotiators unequivocally meet and the total contractual obligation is thus 
“presentiated” into a present paper document that is fully binding on parties after 
that moment. Neither proprietary software licensing nor FOSS licensing fits neatly 
into this classical model, whose rigidity may limit this approach to be only 
heuristically useful in explaining contractual exchanges in an idealised textbook 
setting. 
Contract as discrete product (neoclassical approach): The neoclassical model 
deviates from the classical model by marginalising the role of fully verbalised 
“consent” in contract formation. Instead, it takes a self-claimed “realist” position 
to recalibrate contractual exchanges against the neoclassical rationale of material 
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wealth maximisation for individuals. The ProCD decision epitomises this 
neoclassical approach by pretending that end users’ silence is an acceptance of the 
standard-form licensing terms, which are actually justified on the basis that they 
provide lowest price for consumers with reduced transaction cost. By doing so, the 
ProCD jurisprudence effectively creates a kind of discrete “contract-as-product”12 
or “legal-ware”13 as if the licensing terms are an integral “physical” feature of the 
licensed product. This dissertation argues that it is exactly this neoclassical variant 
(rather than the classical law) that has posed the greatest conceptual obstacle to 
understanding FOSS licensing contractually. The neoclassical view may reflect 
well what proprietary software licensors intend to achieve, but it hardly explains 
the highly collaborative relations that are essential to the success of FOSS projects. 
Contract as relation (RCT approach): Both classical and neoclassical approaches 
conceive of contractual exchanges as discrete transactions, where a sustaining 
relation developed between exchangers is not essential. (The only difference 
between the two is that the neoclassicist is willing to sacrifice the classicist 
consent for thorough transactional discreteness.) In contrast to contract-as-consent 
classicism and contract-as-product neoclassicism, I suggest that FOSS licensing 
should be understood as a relational contract where the software code is not traded 
merely as commodity but a kind of “relation-ware” to sustain long-term 
collaboration where participants are motivated by a multiplicity of values. The 
rationale behind this “relation-ware” is different from the current dominant ProCD 
law in software licensing jurisprudence in two senses. First, FOSS “relation-ware” 
still respects contract as a consensual relation, but parties’ consent is now 
relationally understood in a longer-term context, where no total obligation is 
formed at one particular single moment. Instead, parties’ consent is allowed to 
evolve when the project move on to reflect the highly serendipitous and flexible 
nature of FOSS contributions. In other words, no total obligation can be 
presentiated in the beginning of a FOSS project, but only a minimum set of 
responsibilities of programmers is written down in the text of a FOSS licence and 
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they are mainly about how to keep software freedom rather than the actual content 
of contributions. Secondly, to make FOSS “relation-ware” is driven by a 
multiplicity of motivational forces ranging from the hard-core monetary motive to 
the more ambivalent reputational incentive to the “soft” values such as “software 
freedom” to the intrinsic satisfaction from coding, while the ProCD ruling tends to 
reduce this multiplicity to a single individualistic utility-maximising rationale. 
This second argument reflects what relational contract scholars are keen to 
achieve 14 , and is deserving of more attention from the academia, and FOSS 
licensing provides an excellent opportunity to prosecute such an endeavor. Based 
on the above two insights, I then propose to examine the GPL as an “umbrella 
relational contract”15, which coordinates many contributors’ legal commitments to 
a project. The GPL as an umbrella “relation-ware” is a compromise between two 
needs. On the one hand it tries to satisfy the need for serendipity and flexibility in 
terms of the actual content of contribution, which is not presentiated at all in the 
beginning. On the other hand, it also tries to cater to the need for limited certainty 
to make sure all generations of contributions would be legally compatible with 
each other in any downstream distribution. Furthermore, to analyse GPL as a 
relational umbrella contract also gives a chance to see how far RCT can be applied 
to a real-world collaborative situation. It hopes to show that RCT is not merely a 
scholarly thought experiment, but it may also provide judiciaries with some 
insights into some highly relational cases, where classical and neoclassical law 
designed for discrete transactions clearly cannot cope well. 
The third contribution that I try to make is about FOSS programmers’ authorial 
consciousness as manifested respectively in their aesthetical and legal personas. In 
terms of FOSS authors’ aesthetical persona, there is little doubt that the Romantic 
aesthetical vision of author as solitary “genius” does not suit the highly collaborative 
nature of FOSS programming. It is inadequate in the sense that it shares the exactly 
the same individualistic presumption adopted by the discrete transactional view from 
the classical contract model as discussed above. In fact, in a FOSS project, there are 
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not merely individual programmers who can be identified as the individual authors 
of their contributions, but more importantly, there is also a collective author that can 
be held responsible and deserve credit for the production of an integrated FOSS 
project as a whole. I thus argue that a full evaluation of FOSS authorship in relation 
to FOSS licensing should be scrutinised at both individual and collective levels, 
though the existing literature does not tend to be discerning enough to differentiate 
the two. In particular, I analyse the pivotal role of lead programmers in “stewarding” 
FOSS projects for a sustaining long period of time. These project-leaders’ author-
stewardship does not replace the individual programmers’ efforts in actually 
producing code, but it only channels individual authorship into collective authorship 
of a certain project.  
My enquiry of FOSS programmers’ legal persona tackles the following question: 
How do FOSS programmers claim credit through law? In short, FOSS programmers 
need to wear the legal persona as the “IP” owners of their contributions in the first 
place and then indirectly claims their authorship in order to compensate for the lack 
of statutory attribution right under the Anglo-American system. This may be 
achieved either via copyright or trademark for different situations. 
Copyright: Unlike the continental European legal system, Anglo-American 
copyright does not readily recognise a standalone paternity right for software 
programmers to be attributed to their works. As a makeshift solution, copyright 
licences need to be crafted to make the attributional interests ride on the 
proprietary rights owned by FOSS developers. Just as Lastowka observes that 
copyright protects attribution only “in a collateral fashion” by using the device of 
its licensing schemes.16 So FOSS developers, in order to have their attribution 
right enforceable under law, must take on the legal persona as the copyright 
owners to begin with. This observation has been corroborated in a 2008 landmark 
ruling in Jacobsen v. Katzer, where the US Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (CAFC) enforced the condition in a FOSS licence that requires correct 
attribution to the original FOSS contributors.17 Although Jacobsen is widely hailed 
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as a long-waited triumph within the FOSS community, it is far from unproblematic. 
It is worried that the Jacobsen ruling only strengthens copyright owners’ 
proprietary interest that becomes an unavoidable prelude to enforcing 
programmers’ attribution right collaterally through a copyright licence. 
Furthermore, the licensing condition made by copyright owners can effectively 
allows a privately legislated moral right regime that upsets the initial balance 
intended by the copyright legislation. I think that the only permanent solution to 
solve this problem is a legislative change that separates out programmers’ 
paternity right from their economic right and as a result FOSS programmers would 
no longer pretend that attribution furthers the economic goal of copyright holders 
under a copyright licence but it could be enforced in its own right.  
Trademark: Apart from relying on copyright for collateral protection of attribution, 
many FOSS developers also actively seek trademark protection of their projects’ 
names. This is because trademarks designating the origin of goods or services are 
not dissimilar from an attribution system ascertaining the authorial origin of 
creative works. The name of a project is worth protecting when it accumulates 
enough reputation or goodwill to become a brand name. Projects do not have to 
register their names with trademark authorities, though registration would give 
them stronger and more certain protection. The Anglo-American system brings 
unregistered marks under protection through the common law action of “passing 
off”. In the US, it is not unusual to invoke Section 43(a) of Lanham Act, which 
codifies the “passing off” action, as a proxy paternity right to get authorial 
attribution. The 2001 US case Planetary Motion v. Techsplosion is exactly a 
successful example where a FOSS project had its unregistered mark (i.e. its project 
name “Coolmail”) protected under the Lanham Act.18 Furthermore, I argue that, in 
a large-scale FOSS project, lead programmers have the stewardship responsibility 
to defend the collective reputation or goodwill of a project as a whole, and 
trademark lends itself to be suitable legal form to manifest this stewardship. There 
are two features of trademark protection of the name a FOSS project under 
stewardship. Firstly, trademark protects the collective authorship of a whole 
project but not directly individual authorship. Secondly, when a FOSS project is 
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misattributed, it does not only cause a copyright harm to its author but also a 
trademark harm to the public, who can be confused about the authorial origin. In 
this sense, trademark law can be employed not just for the purpose of allocating 
credit (and possibly reputational incentives) to authors of their works, but it may 
also help the public to find a FOSS product with the right origin. 
In summary, both copyright and trademark may be employed to protect FOSS 
programmers’ attributional interests. Neither of the two regimes is entirely 
satisfactory because they make attribution heavily dependent on the strong 
proprietary right afforded by law in the first place.  In particular, trademark gives a 
legal form to FOSS project-leaders’ stewardship, which is responsible to defend the 
collective reputation or goodwill of the project as a whole, though it does not 
translate the whole hacker tradition to coordinate the collaborative efforts among 
FOSS programmers. 
6.2 Avenues for Future Research 
This dissertation is a study of some key legal issues concerning FOSS licensing 
jurisprudence, which is largely informed by Steven Levy’s pioneering work on the 
Hacker Ethic as published in 1984 (one year before the “copyleft” licence was first 
invented by Stallman). In following decades, this Hacker Ethic has undergone a 
chequered development largely due to the changing legal environment concerning 
intellectual property regulation over software innovation. However, two more recent 
developments, which may have a continuous impact on the Hacker Ethic as well the 
FOSS movement, should not go unnoticed. One is the increasing corporate 
participation in FOSS projects and the other is the spilling over of the Hacker Ethic 
into non-programming or mixed innovations. I will now explain briefly why these 
two developments can be two avenues leading to worthwhile research in the future. 
The first avenue concerns a revaluation of Tenet 3 of the Hacker Ethic—“Mistrust 
Authority—Promote Decentralisation”—which was interpreted by Levy as hackers’ 
mistrust of any type of centralised bureaucratic system19  epitomised by software 
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companies like the IBM.20 Levy argues that IBM programmers are “priests and sub-
priests” and they “could never understand the obvious superiority of decentralized 
system, with no one giving orders.”21 Ironically, over two decades later after this 
observation was first made, IBM today becomes one of the most active companies 
contributing to FOSS projects including Linux and Apache.22 Apart from IBM, other 
corporate giants such as Google, Intel, HP, Novell, Red Hat, which would no doubt 
be classed as “bureaucracies” by Levy’s 1984 standard, are also important FOSS 
contributors.23 Lerner and Schankerman, in a recent book-length research, further 
demonstrate that many companies in fact produce both proprietary code and FOSS 
code, the two of which can be closely “comingled” in a corporate environment.24  
In this light, it is important for scholars to examine the extent to which this corporate 
foray into FOSS would challenge Benkler’s peer-production model where code is 
produced independent from a hierarchical corporate structure oriented towards 
making economic profits.25 In other words, it is worth finding out the degree of 
compromise that those employed FOSS programmers can afford to make without 
losing their independent status to the corporate culture. 26  Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation has provided a glimpse of this issue through the lens of “open source 
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patents” 27 , though it is not intended to be a full account of the still emerging 
corporate FOSS phenomenon. It observes that some corporate FOSS developers are 
keen to build patent portfolios to defend themselves against potential patent litigation, 
whilst individual FOSS hobbyists are unlikely to do so given the sheer cost of getting 
and maintaining patents. Again IBM is a most conspicuous example of a corporation 
both developing FOSS and owning a large number of “software patents.”28 Another 
interesting example is a FOSS patent consortium known as Open Invention Network 
(OIN) formed by corporate FOSS developers to defend Linux from patent 
litigation.29 To acquire defensive patents for FOSS projects is far from a satisfactory 
solution because it does not eradicate the threat to software freedom from its root, i.e. 
the legal system that produces software invention patents in the first place. It also 
unfortunately creates a schism within the FOSS community into two divisions: one 
belongs to the well-financed corporate developers who are less interested in changing 
the patent system and the other belongs to hobbyist-developers with no direct 
corporate affiliation who are keener to defend software freedom in its own right. I 
think that FOSS licensing schemes would play a very limited role in eliminating this 
schism by reining in corporate penetration into FOSS. My speculation is that how far 
this corporate foray into FOSS will go would largely be dependent on the scope of 
the commercial success that these companies can achieve by selling their FOSS 
products on the market. Corporate FOSS is likely to flourish mainly in the consumer-
goods area where products are mainly used by non-sophisticated end-users who are 
not expected to make modification or improvement to the software. Corporate FOSS 
would thus understandably be less able to harness large-scale decentralised 
collaboration under the peer-production model.30  In this light, I argue that legal 
scholarship needs to be more attentive to this new development of corporate 
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participation in FOSS, which would be significant in changing the landscape of 
FOSS collaboration.  
Apart from calling for more research into corporate FOSS, I also need to highlight 
another avenue that merits further research. This second avenue concerns the last 
tenet (i.e., Tenet 6) of the Hacker Ethic—“Computers can change your life for the 
better”—under which Levy predicts that the Hacker Ethic would spill over into and 
eventually benefit the non-programming world enabled by computer technologies: 
“Surely everyone could benefit from a world based on the Hacker Ethic. This was the 
implicit belief of the hackers irreverently extended the conventional point of view of 
what computers could and should do—leading the world to a new way of looking 
and interacting with computers.”31 Following this tenet, there seems no significant 
conceptual barrier preventing FOSS programmers from bringing their software 
freedom to other creative spheres such as music.32 A most glaring success story of 
this kind of endeavour is the attempt to build a collaborative online encyclopedia 
universally accessible to and modifiable by every internet user. Stallman, in an essay 
titled “The Free Universal Encyclopaedia and Learning Resource”, calls for “a 
universal encyclopedia covering all areas of knowledge, and a complete library of 
instructional courses” and “a conscious effort to prevent deliberate sequestration of 
the encyclopaedic and educational information on the net.”33 This vision indeed led 
to the creation of Wikipedia under the efforts of Jimmy Wales and his collaborators, 
who use the wiki technology to enable users all over the world to create a universally 
free encyclopedia.34 The Wikipedia phenomenon, clearly a product of the last tenet of 
the Hacker Ethic, also reflects a widespread optimism about “collective creativity” 
enabled by networked computer technologies (e.g. wiki), which are sometimes 
romanticised as the “weapons of mass collaboration” in the “age of participation”.35 
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Most significantly, this optimism has also led some lawyers to experiment with new 
licensing schemes to facilitate the Wikipedia-type collective creativity. The most 
well-known example is no doubt a set of creative commons licences that aim to 
“build a layer of content, governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others 
can build upon” in a free and re-mixable culture.36 However, some other lawyers are 
not entirely convinced by this trend. For instance, Merges, who is keen to defend 
private property in the digital era, is vehemently against over-romanticising 
“collective creativity” enabled by networked computer technologies. For Merges, the 
“weapon of mass innovation” would defeat neither individual creativity37 nor private 
property.38 I think that Merges is mostly right in the sense that creativity in the real 
world does not have one single particular mode but it can run the whole gamut from 
being very solitary to highly collaborative, though most contributions to a FOSS-
inspired collective work are most likely to be closer to the collaborative end of the 
spectrum.  
However, in order to further test Merges’ thesis that private property is still relevant 
to collective creation in the digital age, I think that more study needs to be done 
because the property system, on which FOSS licensing schemes are based, is by no 
means the only parameter that makes collaboration take place.39 For this reason, I 
wish to narrow this enquiry down to a case study of a collaborative project known as 
PureData—which is a widely used computer music language—to see how far the 
Hacker Ethic (as well as Merges’ thesis about property) can stand in an intersectional 
area of programming and non-programming (i.e. musical) creativities. There are two 
                                                                                                                                          
access markets, and delight customers in ways that only large corporations could manage in the past. 
This is giving rise to new collaborative capabilities and business models that will empower the 
prepared firm and destroy those that fail to adjust.” Tapscott and Williams, Wikinomics (London: 
Portfolio, 2006) p.11 
36
 Lessig explains: by using creative commons licences, “[v]oluntary choice of individuals and 
creators will make this content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a public 
domain.” Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture 
and Control Creativity (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004) p.283 
37
 Merges does not believe that “collective works will and should systematically replace individual 
works in the digital era.” Robert Merges, “The Concept of Property in the Digital Era” [2008] 45 (4) 
Houston Law Review 1239 at 1249 
38
 Merges argues that “property rights still make sense as a legal and social institution. […] continuing 
to grant and enforce property rights does not threaten the viability of collective creativity, but […] 
seriously curtailing property rights so as to further promote collective creativity would significantly 
undermine the conditions for individual creativity.” (original emphasis) ibid. 
39
 Again, it would be inappropriate to solely credit private property for the making of collective works 
while ignoring other parameters contributing to the real lived experience of collaboration. 
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reasons why PureData is a promising candidate for this kind of research in the future. 
First, PureData sits astride two creative fields covering both software and music. On 
the one hand, it is a visual programming language with a modular and extensible 
architecture, whose lead developer/coordinator—Miller Puckette—is deeply 
sympathetic with the original MIT-type hacker ethic since he was an undergraduate 
student at MIT. In fact, the proprietary predecessor to PureData called Max, which 
was also initially developed by Puckette in 1988 when he was affiliated with Institut 
de Recherche et Coordination Acoustique/Musique (IRCAM) in Paris, has drawn 
many ideas directly from researchers and developers based at MIT.40 Puckette later 
felt deeply disaffected by IRCAM’s decision to strengthen intellectual property 
control over Max as a proprietary product because this created a lot more difficulties 
for Puckette and his colleagues to disseminate Max-related works to the world 
outside IRCAM. 41  As a result, Puckette left IRCAM and started the spin-off 
PureData project licensed under a FOSS licence.42 On the other hand, PureData is not 
merely for software programmers but it also used by musicians dedicated to making 
electronic arts. It follows a long line of pursuit to build a kind of “composition 
machine”, which can be stretched back to the early modern time of Leibnitz (1646-
1716) and Marin Mersenne (1588-1646). 43  Note that PureData as a versatile 
programming tool does not only facilitate electronic music making, but it also deals 
with other forms of electronic arts such as video and still images with its Graphics 
Environment for Multimedia (GEM) external, which also effectively bears out Tenet 
4 of the Hacker Ethic: “You can create art and beauty on a computer”. In short, 
PureData users/co-developers are two categories of creators—programmers and 
sound artists—rolled into one. The second reason why PureData is worth further 
researching is that its community members are well aware of the ongoing debate 
about IP and creativity and consciously pursue their electronic arts in the spirit of the 
FOSS movement. Within the PureData community, there has been a palpable anti-
                                                 
40
 Miller Puckette, “Who Owns Our Software—A First-person Case Study”, 2004 ISEA Online 
Proceedings, available at <http://crca.ucsd.edu/~msp/Publications/isea-reprint.pdf> 
41
 Puckette’s situation at IRCM at this point is not dissimilar from Stallman’s at MIT AL Lab in the 
early 1980s. 
42
 This licence is called Standard Improved BSD License (SIBSD), which is a variant of the original 
BSD License. 
43
 For the intellectual and historical background of PureData, See Winfried Ritsch, “Does Pure Data 
Dream of Electric Violins?—PD Introduction and Overview”  (Wolke Verlag, Hofheim, 2006) from 
the edited book based on the First International Pd-Convention 2004, Graz/Austria, p. 11 
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property sentiment akin to early computer hackers’ dislike of private ownership of 
software44. For example, Puckette himself argues that electronic arts (such as the 
PureData project) are not privately “ownable” when detached from physical 
embodiments: 
Artifacts of art may be owned, but ‘digital art’ itself is not intrinsically ownable 
by anybody. This is bad news to composers, for instance, who obviously would 
like to own their scores. They do indeed own the paper and ink on top of it, but 
the work exists only as a way of arranging things, not in the things themselves, 
and therefore can’t be owned. Composers and other digital artists must survive 
by the mechanism of attribution. This is indeed how J.S. Bach operated; the 
intervening years, dominated by physical printing presses and their output, can 
be seen as an aberration, now coming to an end.45 (added emphasis) 
I think that Puckette’s above argument indicates at least two directions in which the 
so-called “digital art” may go under the impact of the MIT-style Hacker Ethic. 
Firstly, it can be read as a challenge to Merges’ defence of private ownership in the 
digital age. Largely due to the nature of digital art “as a way of arranging things, not 
in the things themselves”, this art form cannot be owned like physical objects. 
Puckette further suggests that the material gain from private ownership would distort 
the creators’ (including both researchers and artists) self-motivation to indulge their 
academic or artistic passion: “It is now ironic that researchers and artists now find 
themselves trapped by their own efforts to make their creations have monetary value 
in the form of IP. Researchers […] are too easily seduced by the promise of material 
gains to be reaped from our work. Artists […] fall into the same trap. Both eventually 
lose control over their own work.”46  This argument bears strong resemblance to 
Stallman’s polemic where he argues why software should not be owned.47 Secondly, 
Puckette envisions a mechanism that protects digital artists’ attributional interest to 
sustain their creation in the digital era just like in J.S. Bach’s time. This argument is 
largely in line with my observation made in Chapter 5, where I find FOSS 
                                                 
44
 This dislike is strongly registered by Stallman in his essay “Why Software Should Not Have 
Owners”, 1994, at <http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/why-free.html> 
45
 Miller Puckette, “Who Owns Our Software—A First-person Case Study”, supra note 40 
46
 ibid. 
47 Richard, Stallman, “Why Software Should Not Have Owners”, 1994, at 
<http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/why-free.html> 
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programmers are keen to claim the attribution right independent from the economic 
right of their works. It also converges with a growing legal literature calling for 
separating non-economic authorial right from private ownership right in creative 
works. For example, the legal scholar Zimmerman argues that it is possible to protect 
and encourage “authorship without ownership” in the current digital age.48 I believe 
that more empirical research is necessary to examine the extent to which PureData 
artists’ practice can flesh out Zimmerman’s thesis (as opposed to Merges’s thesis) in 
a mixed creative environment of programming and arts.  
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter summarises three modest contributions that I intend to make to the 
existing literature of FOSS licensing jurisprudence. Firstly, it shows the historical 
context from which FOSS licensing emerged as a response to the rise of intellectual 
property regulation over software innovation. Secondly, it deals with the legal aspect 
of FOSS licences, which are proposed to be scrutinised under a relational contract 
perspective. The third contribution concerns the authorial aspect of FOSS licensing, 
which is shown to have developed independently from Romantic aesthetics. It 
explains the FOSS authors’ attributional right—in the legal form of copyright and 
trademark—at both individual and collective levels. Furthermore, I suggest that there 
are two possible avenues for future research. Firstly, more research needs to be done 
to assess the impact of the increasing corporate penetration in FOSS, which may 
gradually erode Benkler’s peer-production model of FOSS production. Secondly, I 
call for further research into the impact of the Hacker Ethic and IP law on the 
intersectional areas of programming and non-programming creativities and I suggest 
that an electronic arts project known as PureData is a promising candidate for 
continuing the line of inquiry of the FOSS movement in a broader context.
                                                 
48
 Based on her observation that the Victoria literary publishing in 19-century England depended 
much more on authors’ relation with editors and publishers than the private property system, 
Zimmermann proposes that internet publishing can similarly take off without private copyright 
ownership. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “Authorship without Ownership: Reconsideration Incentives 
in a Digital Age” (2003) 52 DePaul Law Review 1121 
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Appendix (A): Development of “Intellectual Property” and FOSS: A Timeline 
 Copyright  Patent Trademark Miscellaneous  
1972  Gottschalk v. Benson 
(US SC) 
  
1973  European Patent 
Convention 
  
1978 US CONTU 
recommendation  
   
1980 US Congress 
amended its 
Copyright Act to 
expressly cover 
software 
   
1981  Diamond v. Diehr 
(US SC) 
  
1983    Emacs dispute 
between Stallman 
and Gosling 
1984    Steven Levy 
documented the 
Hacker Ethic 
1985    Emacs GPL (first 
copyleft licence) 
1986 Whelan v. Jaslow 
(3rd Cir.) 
    
1987  Vicom/Computer-
related invention 
(EPO) 
  
1988 UK CDPA 
(expressly 
recognising 
copyright 
subsistence in 
“software” ) 
   
1989    -Stallman’s Anti-
Lotus Litigation 
Protest 
-GPL 1.0 
1990 Lotus v. Paperback 
(first Lotus case) 
   
1991 EU Software 
Directive 
   
1992 Computer 
Associates v. Altai 
(2nd Cir.) 
  GPL 2.0 
1996 * ProCD v. 
Zeidenberg (7th Cir.) 
   
1998  State Street Bank v. 
Signature Financial 
Group (CAFC)  
 Open Source 
Initiative (OSI)  
founded  
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2001   Planetary 
Motion v. 
Techsplosion 
 
2002  PBS 
Partnership/Pension 
Benefit System (EPO) 
 
 
 
2004  Hitachi/Auction 
Method (EPO) 
  
2006  Microsoft/Clipboard 
Form I&II (EPO)  
 Open Source As 
Prior Art (OSAPA) 
launched 
2007  Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco 
Holdings Ltd. (UK 
CA) 
 GPL 3.0 
2008 Jacobsen v. Katzer 
(CAFC) 
Bilski v. Kappor 
(CAFC) 
  
2010  Bilski v. Kappor (US 
SC) 
  
(*Author’s Note: The ProCD case is not purely a copyright case. More importantly, it deals 
with an intersectional area covering both copyright and contract. See Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation for a more detailed analysis. ) 
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Appendix (B): GNU Emacs General Public License (1985)  
originally published in 1985,clarified 11 February 1988** 
The license agreements of most software companies keep you at the mercy of those 
companies. By contrast, our general public license is intended to give everyone the right to 
share GNU Emacs. To make sure that you get the rights we want you to have, we need to 
make restrictions that forbid anyone to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the 
rights. Hence this license agreement.  
Specifically, we want to make sure that you have the right to give away copies of Emacs, 
that you receive source code or else can get it if you want it, that you can change Emacs or 
use pieces of it in new free programs, and that you know you can do these things.  
To make sure that everyone has such rights, we have to forbid you to deprive anyone else of 
these rights. For example, if you distribute copies of Emacs, you must give the recipients all 
the rights that you have. You must make sure that they, too, receive or can get the source 
code. And you must tell them their rights.  
Also, for our own protection, we must make certain that everyone finds out that there is no 
warranty for GNU Emacs. If Emacs is modified by someone else and passed on, we want its 
recipients to know that what they have is not what we distributed, so that any problems 
introduced by others will not reflect on our reputation.  
Therefore we (Richard Stallman and the Free Software Foundation, Inc.): make the 
following terms which say what you must do to be allowed to distribute or change GNU 
Emacs.  
Copying Policies 1. You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of GNU Emacs source 
code as you receive it, in any medium, provided that you conspicuously and appropriately 
publish on each file a valid copyright notice "Copyright 1988 Free Software Foundation, 
Inc.'' (or with whatever year is appropriate); keep intact the notices on all files that refer to 
this License Agreement and to the absence of any warranty; and give any other recipients of 
the GNU Emacs program a copy of this License Agreement along with the program. You 
may charge a distribution fee for the physical act of transferring a copy.  
2. You may modify your copy or copies of GNU Emacs source code or any portion of it, and 
copy and distribute such modifications under the terms of Paragraph 1 above, provided that 
you also do the following:  
- cause the modified files to carry prominent notices stating who last changed such files and 
the date of any change; and  
- cause the whole of any work that you distribute or publish, that in whole or in part contains 
or is a derivative of GNU Emacs or any part thereof, to be licensed at no charge to all third 
parties on terms identical to those contained in this License Agreement (except that you may 
choose to grant more extensive warranty protection to some or all third parties, at your 
option).  
- if the modified program serves as a text editor, cause it, when started running in the 
simplest and usual way, to print an announcement including a valid copyright notice 
"Copyright 1988 Free Software Foundation, Inc.'' (or with the year that is appropriate), 
saying that there is no warranty (or else, saying that you provide a warranty) and that users 
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may redistribute the program under these conditions, and telling the user how to view a copy 
of this License Agreement.  
- You may charge a distribution fee for the physical act of transfer ring a copy, and you may 
at your option offer warranty protection in exchange for a fee.  
Mere aggregation of another unrelated program with this program (or its derivative) on a 
volume of a storage or distribution medium does not bring the other program under the scope 
of these terms.  
3. You may copy and distribute GNU Emacs (or a portion or derivative of it, under 
Paragraph 2) in object code or executable form under the terms of Paragraphs 1 and 2 above 
provided that you also do one of the following:  
- accompany it with the complete corresponding machine-readable source code, which must 
be distributed under the terms of Paragraphs 1 and 2 above; or,  
- accompany it with a written offer, valid for at least three years, to give any third party free 
(except for a nominal shipping charge) a complete machine-readable copy of the 
corresponding source code, to be distributed under the terms of Paragraphs 1 and 2 above; or,  
- accompany it with the information you received as to where the corresponding source code 
may be obtained. (This alternative is allowed only for non commercial distribution and only 
if you received the program in object code or executable form alone.)  
For an executable file, complete source code means all the source code for all modules it 
contains; but, as a special exception, it need not include source code for modules which are 
standard libraries that accompany the operating system on which the executable file runs.  
4. You may not copy, sub license, distribute or transfer GNU Emacs except as expressly 
provided under this License Agreement. Any attempt otherwise to copy, sub license, 
distribute or transfer GNU Emacs is void and your rights to use GNU Emacs under this 
License agreement shall be automatically terminated. However, parties who have received 
computer software programs from you with this License Agreement will not have their 
licenses terminated so long as such parties remain in full compliance.  
5. If you wish to incorporate parts of GNU Emacs into other free programs whose 
distribution conditions are different, write to the Free Software Foundation. We have not yet 
worked out a simple rule that can be stated here, but we will often permit this. We will be 
guided by the two goals of preserving the free status of all derivatives of our free software 
and of promoting the sharing and reuse of software.  
Your comments and suggestions about our licensing policies and our software are welcome! 
Please contact the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139.  
NO WARRANTY  
BECAUSE GNU EMACS IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, WE PROVIDE 
ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE 
STATE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING, FREE 
SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, INC, RICHARD M. STALLMAN AND/OR OTHER 
PARTIES PROVIDE GNU EMACS "AS IS'' WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, 
EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A 
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PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND 
PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE GNU EMACS 
PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY 
SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.  
IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW WILL FREE SOFTWARE 
FOUNDATION, INC., RICHARD M. STALLMAN, AND/OR ANY OTHER PARTY 
WHO MAY MODIFY AND REDISTRIBUTE GNU EMACS AS PERMITTED ABOVE, 
BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY LOST PROFITS, LOST 
MONIES, OR OTHER SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 
ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE (INCLUDING BUT NOT 
LIMITED TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR 
LOSSES SUSTAINED BY THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO 
OPERATE WITH PROGRAMS NOT DISTRIBUTED BY FREE SOFTWARE 
FOUNDATION, INC.) THE PROGRAM, EVEN IF YOU HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF 
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES, OR FOR ANY CLAIM BY ANY OTHER 
PARTY.  
(**Author’s Note:  This is the very first copyleft licence written by Stallman as his response 
to the dispute with Gosling over a version of Emacs editor from 1983 to 1985. It is followed 
by the three generic versions of GNU General Public License respectively published in 1989, 
1992 and 2007. For the history of the GPL, see Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation for more 
detail.) 
